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Abstract

Over the past half of a century, international society, particularly across the industrially
developed world, has experienced an unprecedented technological transformation. The
ubiquity of digital technology and its smooth integration with human activities has
brought tremendous advantages. Simultaneously, diverse new activities called
‘cybercrimes’ have emerged in association with this technological revolution. Legal
scholars have addressed these crimes and delivered initially controversial arguments
regarding the adequacy of the traditional substantive and procedural laws to effectively
criminalise and deal with them. Many developed countries, such as Australia and the
USA, responded to the problem of cybercrime in a variety of ways. By contrast, in
Jordan, there is no comprehensive law addressing cybercrime but a handful of
legislative provisions that were originally enacted to protect physical objects.
This study is focused on Jordan and its need for law reform. Australia and the United
States were selected for comparative study because they are already well advanced in
their experiences of and in their legal responses to cybercrimes, thus providing
benchmarks for Jordanian developments. In 2001, Australia enacted a comprehensive
law, the Cybercrime Act 2001, and established the Australian High-Tech Crime Centre.
The USA enacted its Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 1984.
Jordan has long understood the importance of Information Technology (IT) as a key
element to improve the quality of life of its people. The Electronic Transaction Act
2001 and Telecommunications Law 1995 demonstrate this. It also established a
Computer Crime Unit as a part of the Public Security Directorate to investigate
cybercrime and to provide laboratory services in the inspection and analysis of digital
evidence. However, Jordan’s lack of cybercrime legislation is problematic because
cybercrimes are borderless crimes. Jordan’s lack can influence the rest of the world by
creating, for instance, jurisdictional havens. The novelty of cybercrime challenges the
existing Jordanian models of law enforcement investigations. Traditional laws are either
too narrow or inappropriate to address all the forms of cybercrimes and deal with search
and seizure of digital evidence in adequately.

iii

This thesis examines several major themes associated with cybercrime investigation
confronted by Jordanian law enforcement officers executing searches and seizures of
computers. It concentrates on the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of traditional
Jordanian laws in coping with cybercrime investigations. It critically examines and
compares the procedures of search and seizure of computers in Australia and the USA.
The thesis aims to contribute to the streamlining and strengthening of search and seizure
procedures in Jordanian cybercrime investigations.
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Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABA

Australian Banker Association

AFP

Australian Federal Police

APEC

Asian-Pacific Economic Co-operation

ATM

Automatic Teller Machine

ATT

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

BBS

Bulletin Board System

CCC

Computer Chaos Club

CCTV

Closed-Circuit Television

CFAA

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1984

CICs

Cybercrime Investigation Centres

CNN

Cable News Network

CoE

Council of Europe

CPPA

Child Pornography Prevention Act

CSI

Computer Security Institute

DDoS

Distributed Denial of Service

DNS

Domain Name System

DOJ

Department of Justice

DoS

Denial of Service

DPP

Director of Public Prosecutions

DSEA

Domestic Security Enhancement Act

DVD

Digital Versatile Disc

EPU

Environmental Police Unit

FACTA

Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act

FIDNET

Federal Intrusion Detection Network

FTC

Federal Trade Commission

FRE

Federal Rule of Evidence

GP

General Prosecutor

GPD

General Prosecutorial Department

HTC

High-Tech Crime Centre

HTTP

Hypertext Transfer Protocol
vii

ICMP

Internet Control Message Protocol

IO

Offensive Information Operation

IRC

Internet Relay Chat

ISN

Initial Sequence Number

ITADA

Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act

KB

Kilobytes

LAN

Local Area Network

MD5

Message-Digest Algorithm 5

MLAT

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty

NII

National Information Infrastructure

IACIS

International Association of Computer Investigative
Specialists

IP

Internet Protocol

ISP

Internet Service Provider

ISN

Initial Sequence Number

ITADA

Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act

JCCU

Jordanian Computer Crime Unit

JD

Jordanian Dinar

JPEG

Joint Photographic Experts Group

JPSD

Jordanian Public Security Directorate

MSN

Messenger Service Network

PC

Personal Computer

PDA

Personal Digital Assistance

PSD

Public Security Directorate

PGP

Pretty Good Privacy

PROTECT

Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act

RAM

Random Access Memory

ROM

Read-Only Memory

RTA

Road Traffic Authority

SMTP

Simple Mail Transport Protocol

SNN

Social Security Number

SYN

Synchronize
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SWGDE

Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence

TCP

Transmission Control Protocol

TAP

Technological American Party

TWHS

Three-way Handshake

UDP

User Datagram Protocol

UN

United Nations

URL

Uniform Resource Locator

USB

Universal Serial Bus

WWW

World Wide Web

YIPL

Youth International Party Line
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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Introduction
The invention of the computer is one of the pivotal events in human history. It is
compared to the most significant and prominent developments witnessed by human
beings in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.1 It has culminated in the
prevalence of the Personal Computer (PC), which forms the nucleus of the Information
Age. In conjunction with such rapid developments, the marriage between computers and
communication systems ushered in the birth of cyberspace.2 Virtual world, Internet,
digital community, cyberworld and cyberspace are almost used synonymously.3
The prefix ‘cyber’ is commonly used to describe online activities4 constantly
exchanging information online, and using cyberspace applications, such as chatting, email, World Wide Web (WWW),5 and so on.6 Space, on the other hand, was exclusively
used for a while in astronomical fields to describe the region beyond earth’s
atmosphere,7 such as a solar system, other planets, and stars. The same terminology
combined with ‘cyber’ transmitted to information technology (IT) to describe ‘the
virtual shared universe of the world's computer networks’,8 such as online
conversations, chat rooms, communications, and e-commerce.
It is undoubtedly that new aspects of crimes and criminals have been shaped by
cyberspace. The term ‘Cybercrime’, therefore, is used to describe a wide range of
1

See generally, Vincent Mosco, The Digital Sublime (2004) 18.
The term “Cyberspace” was first coined by William Gibson in his novel Neuromancer (1984) to
describe a fictional and visionary world experienced by millions of users in every day. See, William
Gibson, Neuromancer (1984) 67.
3
See, eg, Narushige Shiode, An Outlook For Urban Planning in Cyberspace: Toward The Construction
of Cyber Cities With The Application of Unique Characteristics of Cyberspace (1997) UCL Centre for
Advanced Spatial Analysis <http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/planning/articles2/urban.htm> at 1 May 2006.
4
Douglas R Groothuis, The Soul in Cyberspace (1997) 13.
5
World Wide Web is one of the common information services available on the Internet. See, ibid.
6
Tom O'Connor, Cybercrime: the Internet as Crime Scene (2005) North Carolina Wesleyan College
<http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/315/315lect12.htm> at 11 April 2006.
7
See, eg, Space <http://www.answers.com/topic/space> at 5 November 2005.
8
Technologically, cyberspace is defined as ‘a bio-electronic environment of knowledge that exists
everywhere there are telephone wires, coaxial cables, fiber-optic lines or electromagnetic waves’. See,
Paul Shafer, Freedom, Community and the Third Wave (1996) Electronic Frontier Foundation
<http://www.eff.org/Misc/Publications/E-journals/CyRev/cyrev4.html#freedom> at 26 August 2005.
2

1

virtual illegal activities that takes place in cyberspace, such as hacking, communications
systems sabotage and trespass.
This chapter focuses on the fundamental aspects of cybercrimes as a new phenomenon
with particular reference to cybercrime definitions, classifications, and criminals of
cyberspace. The given definitions of cybercrime will be analysed and divided into two
main general definitions, narrow and broad, and a new definition of the cybercrimes
will be suggested and analysed. After that, the main common cybercrime classifications
will be refined and compiled into two categories to serve the research objectives.
Finally, the developing history of hackers as the typical criminal of cyberspace will be
analysed and compiled into two main schools, an old and new school, and other
criminals involved in cyberspace will be defined and distinguished from different types
of cyber criminals.

1.1 Cybercrime Definition
A definition for cybercrime is necessary to delineate the outer limits of the subject of
study and to distinguish it from other types of real world crimes and Offensive
Information Operation (IO).9 In addition, a cybercrime definition helps to figure out the
most appropriate terminology to be used, such as cybercrime itself, computer-related
crime, or other terms. Finally, identifying an accurate term for illegal activities taking
place in cyberspace will enable the identification and differentiation of cybercrime subcategories and investigations responsibility.
Basically, a wide range of differences at the international level usually precludes
reaching a unanimous definition of a controversial phenomenon, 10 just as political,

9

US Department of Defence Directive S-3600.1 defines Information Operations as ‘actions taken to
affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information, and
information systems’.Thomas C Wingfield, Legal Aspects of Offensive Information Operations in Space
Air University <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/wingfield.doc> at 3 March 2006.
Another definition is: ‘actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems and defend
one’s own’. According to Zanini and Edwards, three types of offensive IO can be used by terrorist
groups: first, perception management and propaganda; second, a disruptive attack; and, finally, a
destructive attack. Cyberterrorism and cyberwar are types of offensive information operations. See, eg,
Michele Zanini and Sean J A Edwards,‘ The Networking of Terror in the Information Age’ in John
Arquilla et al, (eds), Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (2001) 29, 41.
10
Alaeldin Maghaireh, ‘Combating Cyberterrorism: The Response from Australia and New Zealand’ in
James Veitch (ed), International Terrorism: New Zealand Perspectives (2005) 81, 83.

2

social, economical, and religious concerns all conspire to hamper an accredited
definition.11 For example, the international community has not yet reached an approved
definition of terrorism, but more than a hundred scholarly definitions of terrorism have
been put forward.12 In a similar manner, while cybercrime is widely considered as a new
phenomenon compared with older, real world crimes, there is no internationally
unanimous definition.13 The principal obstacle to reaching a comprehensive definition
of cybercrime is that IT is a rapidly evolving arena, which allows ever more innovative
crimes to be committed in cyberspace. Nevertheless, academics researching in the
emerging field of cybercrime studies have dedicated their efforts to an exhaustive
definition of cybercrime. They interchangeably used terms such as computer crimes,
computer-related crimes, electronic crimes, digital crimes, info highway crimes,14
cyber-related crimes,15 cyber crimes,16 high-tech crimes, computer abuse, computer
fraud, and Internet crimes, all of which describe illegal activities taking place in
cyberspace or ones associated with computer networks. Arguably, this legal jargon can
be condensed into no more than two general headings, ‘cybercrime’ and ‘computer
crime’. As will be explained later, ‘cybercrime’ and computer crime terminologies are
interchangeably used in this research.
Cybercrime definitions can be divided into two groups. The first group adopts a narrow
conception of cybercrime, while the second group presents a wide conception of
cybercrime. But first, it is an absolute prerequisite to define a crime.
A ‘crime’ can be defined generally as ‘an act or the commission of an act that is
forbidden or the omission of a duty that is commanded by a public law and that makes
the offender liable to punishment by that law’.17 Two points in this definition are
especially worthy of notice as their applicability to cybercrime is different from real
11
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9 July 2005.
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Micheal J. O’Brien, Computer Crime <http://www.mobrien.com/computer_crime1.htm> at 18 August
2005.
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See, eg, Peter Stephenson, Investigating Computer-Related Crimes (2000) 3.
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at 22 August 2005.
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world crimes. The first is that a person is legally punished for a negative or a positive
action committed contrary to the law.18 The negative element of this point is not
applicable to cybercrime because no cybercrime is committed by negative actions.
These negative actions are described in chapters 3 and 4. The second point is ‘that no
matter how immoral, reprehensible, damaging or dangerous an act is, it is not a crime
unless it is made such by the authorities of the state’.19 This point is applicable to
cybercrime as some aspects of cybercrime are not criminalised in Jordan. These crimes
are also described in chapters 3 and 4.

a) Narrow Conception of Cybercrime
Richard Power identifies computer fraud20 as ‘computer-related crimes involving
deliberate misrepresentation or alteration of data in order to get something of value’; he
defines computer abuse, on the other hand, as ‘wilful or negligent unauthorised activity
that affects the availability, confidentiality, or integrity of computer resources’.21
Forester and Morrison defined computer crime as ‘a criminal act that has been
committed using a computer as the principal tool’.22 Parker, in his early writing on
computer crimes, defined computer crimes as ‘any incident associated with computer
technology in which a victim suffered or could have suffered loss and a perpetrator by
intention made or could have made gain’. 23 As the phenomenon evolved, a new
definition was adopted by the same author. That innovative definition, however, focused
on the knowledge of computer technologies to commit computer-related crimes as its
sole prerequisite.24 Smith, Grabosky and Urban, renowned cybercrime scholars,
distinguish between ‘cybercrimes’ as a single word and ‘cyber crimes’ as a descriptive
term.25 They argue that the ‘former encompass new criminal offences perpetrated in
new ways and the latter is conventional crimes perpetrated using new technologies’. 26
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Richard Power.
21
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In a similar vein, the Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) has defined cybercrime as
‘any crime effected or progressed using a public or private telecommunications
service’. 27 The Department of Justice (DOJ) of USA offers a more comprehensive
definition of computer crime than the ABA’s. It defines computer crimes as ‘any
violations of criminal law that involve knowledge of computer technology for their
perpetration, investigation, or prosecution.’28
It can be seen that these attempts have defined cybercrime by focusing either on a
specific type of cybercrime, such as using a computer system to commit a crime, or on
the culprit’s motivation behind the attack, such as the pursuit of something of value (see
Richard, Forester, Morrison, and Parker above). Those definitions are narrow, because
of the wide range of cybercrimes motivated by technological challenge, and creativity.
Smith, Grabosky and Urban’s definition omits the inextricably interlinked cybercrimes.
A single offence could be categorised under both terms. For instance, an Internet
Protocol (IP) spoofing attack is the creation of IP packets with a forged source IP
address (i.e. a new crime). This attack used to gain an initial foothold or root access on
the Internet to carry out a further crime such as internet fraud (i.e. a conventional crime
perpetrated using new technology). Should such a crime be classified as a cyber crime
or a cybercrime? It is a cybercrime in the first act, i.e. creation of IP packets, and a
cyber crime for the second act, i.e. using an IP forged to commit a traditional crime. The
distinction, however, between cybercrime and cyber crime is important in terms of
providing the appropriate benchmark for classifying cybercrimes into two categories.
Therefore, the thesis will adopt this distinction to distinguish between two types of
crimes, namely cybercrimes and cyber crimes.
In a similar manner, the ABA and DOJ definitions have adopted one technical facet of
cybercrime, such as using a communication service to commit a crime or the
requirement for specialist knowledge of computer technology (see ABA, DOJ definition
above).
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Cybercrime Inquiry (2004) Australian Bankers’ Association Inc <
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b) Broad Conception of Cybercrime
A second group of scholars and international organisations have adopted a broad
conception of cybercrime definition. Steven Branigan, a renowned computer expert,
defines cybercrime as occurring when ‘the criminal uses technology in the commission
of a crime, or a criminal attacks technology and makes it the target of the crime’. 29 The
definition identifies the binary nature of cybercrime; the computer is the target or tool of
the crime. Similarly, Patrick Hess, the author of Cyberterrorism and Information War,
defines cybercrime as ‘harmful acts committed from or against a computer or
network’.30
Internationally, the Tenth United Nation Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders in Vienna in April 2000 defined cybercrime as ‘Any crime that
can be committed by means of a computer system or network, in a computer system or
network or against a computer system or network. In principle, it encompasses any
crime capable of being committed in an electronic environment’.31
It seems, however, that both of these groups have to some degree failed to present a
fluid conception of cybercrime. The growing concern over cyber attacks against critical
infrastructure and the nascent threat of cyberterrorism demand urgent efforts at all levels
to reach an agreed definition, which distinguishes between cybercrime and other cyberillegal activities.
Therefore, the author suggests an exhaustive definition avoiding the shortcomings
mentioned earlier. Hence, cybercrimes can be defined as ‘any illegal activities
simultaneously associated with information technologies and cyberspaces, intentionally
perpetrated for tangible or/and intangible benefits and primarily motivated by selfinterest’. According to the definition, the theft of computer hardware devices would not
qualify as a cybercrime, but a real world crime. Moreover, offences where a computer
system is incidentally used in a crime, such as storing illegal drug information, also
would not be considered as a cybercrime. In addition, the definition includes
cyberterrorism but not cyberwar, because the former is mainly motivated by self-
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interest, such as satisfying a perceived religious duty of cyber Jihad.32 Meanwhile, the
latter is coordinated and committed by states in order to achieve political goals since
such action would have an adverse effect on the information technology capabilities of
the attacked country. Finally, a crime perpetrated by a stand-alone computer,33 such as
forging a transcript, is a computer-related crime but not a cybercrime, as indicated
below.
The line that can be drawn, therefore, to differentiate between cybercrime and computer
related crime would depend upon the relationship that exists between a computer and
cyberspace. The correlation between cyberspace and computer systems is conceivably
parallel to the relationship that exists between a soul and a human body: assuming that
the soul is cyberspace and a stand-alone computer is the human body, when the soul
leaves the human body, the crime committed on the latter after that would be differently
qualified, i.e. corpse abuse. For example, a deliberate act causing death is a homicide,
but the same act executed on a deceased person would not be labelled as a murder
crime. In the context of search and seizure procedures, however, computer-related
crimes and cybercrimes are dealt with equally. Computer forensics procedures are used
in both types of crimes.34

1.2 Cybercrime Classifications.
Cybercrime classification is significantly derived from the broad definition of
cybercrime. However, cybercrime can be divided into different categories. It has been
categorised based on the type of attacks or the victim of the crime or the criminal
motivations, and the role of the computer in a crime as well.

32
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network.
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The legitimate ground for having a separate category of cybercrime or framing such a
category was elucidated by Tavani when he introduced three different perspectives:
legal, moral and informative or descriptive perspective.35 He stressed that:
From a legal perspective, computer crime might be viewed as a useful category for prosecuting
certain kinds of crimes...From a moral perspective the need for a separate moral category is that
many of the ethical issues associated with computer crime also border on distinct, but related,
issues involving intellectual property, personal privacy, and free speech in cyberspace… From a
descriptive perspective…it could help us gain a certain level of clarity and precision in analysing
crimes involving the use of computer technology.

36

Accordingly, from a legal perspective, having a cybercrimes classification is useful for
deciding whether a crime involving the presence of IT in its preparation or execution is
a cybercrime investigated by a Hi-Tech Crime Unit and prosecuted under Cybercrime
Acts, or a real world crime. Law enforcement agencies are specialised and assigned the
task of investigating particular types of crimes, for example, a Hi-Tech Crime Unit
investigating only cybercrime. Indeed, categorising cybercrimes terminates disputes
over investigating responsibilities and the prosecution’s duties. For example, the
manufacture of counterfeit $100 bills (using a computer system) is assigned to the
department of forgery, but counterfeiting Internet Protocol (IP) packets is assigned to
the department of Hi-Tech Crime Unit.37 From a descriptive perspective it helps to
describe and analyse each cybercrime precisely.
Criminology scholars, therefore, have divided the crime that is associated with IT into
different categories. Some of these categories are broad enough to include real world
crimes, such as categorising based on the type of the attacks, motivations, and the
victim of the crime. Seger, Icove and Vonstroch classify cybercrimes into four
categories using the type of the attack and its prevention tactics as a benchmark.38 The
first category they claim as a computer crime is the breaching of physical security, such
as Denial of Service (DoS) attack by shutting off the power or by using electromagnetic
disturbances. (DoS attacks are described and analysed in Chapter 3.) It can be seen that

35

See, Herman T Tavani, 'Defining the Boundaries of Computer Crime: Piracy, Break-Ins, and Sabotage
in Cyberspace' (2000) Computers and Society 3.
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Karl Seger, David Icove, and William Vonstorch, Computer Crime a Crime Fighter’s Handbook
(1995) 35.
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a physical action is necessary to commit the crime in this category and to prevent it as
well. The second category is the breaching of personal security, such as by social
engineering tricks39 and committing identity theft.40 The offender mainly uses a physical
form, such as password scavenging, or electronic forms, such as web spoofing. Once the
offender obtains confidential information, he can impersonate the victim and withdraw
funds from the latter’s account.41 A breach of communication and data security is the
third category.42 This category primarily refers to data attacks or software attacks, such
as a virus attack. Finally, breaches of operations security, such as ‘IP spoofing’,43 are
the fourth category.44 It can be seen that classifying cybercrimes into four groups based
on the type of attack (see Seger, Icove and Vonstroch above) is loose and leaves a broad
range of traditional crimes, such as a physical damage of hardware caused by breaching
physical security (first category) or breaching personal security (second category), such
as password scavenging, to be classified as cybercrimes. On the other classification,
Bernadette and Clemens have used the object of cybercrime as a benchmark to divide
cybercrime into two categories.45 The first category is cybercrime resulting in harm to
property, such as Denial of Service (DoS), and cyber vandalism. 46 The second category
is cybercrime resulting in harm to a person, for example cyberstalking,47 and cyber
pornography. 48 Classification of cybercrime, however, based on the object of the crime
creates blurred boundaries among cybercrimes because the vast arrays of cybercrimes
intersect and overlap.

39

Social engineering is a low-tech trick, such as sending enticing e-mails to many Internet users. This
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Ibid.
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Chapter 4.
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A different classification mechanism, in which the vast majority of scholars agree, is
that cybercrimes’ best classification is based on the role of the computer system in a
crime.49 This classification has three categories.
The first category occurs where the computer may be an instrument used to commit
conventional crimes.50 Information technologies are widely used to commit traditional
crimes. This category primarily refers to online and Automatic Teller Machine (ATM)
fraud, identity theft, stalking, child pornography, salami technique,51 and copyright
infringements. Although, these offences are traditional crimes facilitated by computer
systems, the emergence of cyberspace has created new dimensions which require
innovative responses from law enforcement, because physical proximity is no longer
intrinsic to commit traditional crime and the criminal capability is now amplified by the
advent of cyberspace; the perpetrator may commit the crime anonymously, and without
leaving a single trace. Also, because investigation procedures, including searching and
seizing, applied to the above crimes are significantly different from the procedures
applied to traditional crimes, Hi-Tech Crime Centres (HTCC) are involved in the
investigation of such crimes.
The second category occurs where the computer is incidental to the commission of the
crime.52 This category includes all the conventional crimes that are merely facilitated by
cyberspace, such as a drug dealer trafficking narcotics on the Internet, or using IT to
conceal a crime, such as using encryption technology to hide and encrypt incriminating
data. This sort of crime can be committed without utilising cyberspace or IT. The
computer system is neither the principal tool in the crime nor the core of the crime, but
it helps the crime to occur faster and makes it harder to trace and investigate.53
Therefore, the suggested definition of cybercrime omits this category of offence.
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However, investigating this type of crime requires the use of similar investigative tools
and procedures of cybercrimes.
Finally, the computer as the subject or the target of the crime is the third category of
cybercrime.54 Over the course of only a few decades, the world has become more and
more dependent upon computers to function economically and socially. This
dependence has spread to the general public with the introduction of the PC and the
explosive growth of the Internet. As digital technology has become increasingly
integrated into national infrastructures, and as the number of participants has grown, so
too has the threat of cybercrime. In this category, the perpetrator attacks computer
systems, networks, and cyber-services using cyber-tools. It encompasses TCP/IP
crimes, cyber vandalism, cyber trespass and IP spoofing.55 Crimes fall under this
category - the subject of chapters 3 and 4 - are new crimes56 perpetrated by a new
generation of criminals. They are mainly motivated by human curiosity and the
challenge of the computer system. The next section will explore the history and the new
path taken by cybercriminals.

1.3 Cybercriminals
It is widely known that alongside cyberspace advantages, the dark side has been the
advent of a novel pattern of crimes, perpetrators and motivations. While the real world
criminal’s character and motivations were deeply investigated by psychologists, the
criminals of cyberspace as a new phenomenon of delinquency have been relatively
ignored.57
Little research has been done regarding cybercriminal psychology. 58 Some patterns of
cybercriminal psychologies are different from other real criminals. 59 Nevertheless, there
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is an implicit consensus among academics and computer experts on the basic traits that
a typical cybercriminal owns. These attributes enable the cybercriminal to be
categorised under the traditional theories or schools of psychology, for example the
cognitive school or behavioural school.60 Cognitive theories focus on an individual’s
mentality and internal feeling, such as anger, frustration, desire and despair.61 In
contrast, the behavioural theories address individual mentality in the social context,
such as the impact of socio-economic status, race, and ethnicity on individuals.
Cybercriminals can be classified under one or other of these schools, because they vary
from an inept hacker to a professional criminal62 and from middle class and desperate
families to the bourgeoisie.63
Nowadays, cybercriminals are widely known as hackers64 and their activities are called
hacking,65 which generally mean ‘the process of attempting to gain unauthorised access
into computer and communication systems’.66 ‘Hackers’ and their activities, however,
are a controversial issue amongst academics, law enforcers, computer experts, and
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60
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hackers themselves. The argument has led to a distinction between different types of
cybercriminals.
1.3.1

Hackers

Peter Lilly has stressed in his book Hacked, Attacked and Abused that, based on several
studies which focused on hacker psychology, through interviews conducted with
hackers, that the hacker profile, in general, is:67


A white teenager;



Having poor social skills;



Speaking too loudly and/or quickly and/or in an unremitting monotone;



Unresponsive to humour;



Easily distracted but able to focus intently on technical problems; and



Having an exceptional ability to mentally retain long strings of numbers.

According to Winn Schwartau the following personal qualities can be added.68 They
are:


From dysfunctional families;



Misfits and misunderstood; and



They cannot get a date.

Ironically, it seems that the notion of mental disturbance among hackers has played a
key role in the prosecution and sentencing of a number of young hackers.69 Several
convicted hackers have benefited from the psychological notion of mental disturbance
and Internet addiction disorder.70 For example, the British hacker, Paul Bedworth, a 19year-old student accused of unauthorised access to several computer systems, was
acquitted on the grounds that he was addicted to computing.71
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The public and the media, however, have engaged in the debate pertaining to the
controversial legitimacy of hackers’ activities.72 Some part of the debate has deviated to
declare the myth of the hacker’s and superhacker’s existence,73 and another to depict a
white picture for hacking subculture.74 This debate, however, has merely promoted
vagueness about the real malignant of the hacking subculture, and the relationship
between hackers and cybercriminals as well.
Initially, the public and the computing community praised the hacking world, believing
that hacking would explore a computer system’s vulnerabilities,75 and lead to improving
security measures. In contrast, law enforcers have strongly condemned hacking
activities and consider hackers as criminals.76 The debate has been significantly
influenced by both the historical development of hacking, which spans nearly forty
years, and the media.
The hacking phenomenon can be divided historically into two different schools, an old
and a new school of hackers. The ideologies and behaviours of the hackers in each are
different from the other school.
The old school of hacker was informally formed in 1950s by small and well-known
groups of students and professors affiliated to technological institutions in the USA who
acted for non-profit purposes.77 In the early days of the hackers, the computing and
programming industry were not completely integrated into public services nor
considered a phenomenon worthy of mention in the mass media.
Nevertheless, commentators on the hacking phenomenon have described the first stage
of hacking as a ‘golden era of hacking’78 or these hackers as ‘computer virtuosos’.79
72
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Hackers engaged in decoding intricate programmes and analysing computer puzzles.
They spent long lonely hours in front of the little screen to learn more about a computer
system and then to develop it by using their own ideas and techniques.80 They were
fascinated by the computer system and unintentionally observed an implicit ethical
code.81 During this era an ethical code was explicitly published and expressed in Steven
Lavy’s 1984 book, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution. In essence, the hacker
golden era ethic reads as follows:82

1) All information should be free;
2) Access to all computer systems should be free;
3) Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such as degrees, age,
race, or position;
4) You can create art and beauty on a computer; and
5) Computer can change your life for the better.
The hackers’ code of ethics demonstrated an independent set of principles as well as a
first brick in the construction of the hackers’ subculture.83 However, hackers’ ethics are
not recognised by law enforcement agencies, because it seems like a virtual code written
to justify illegal hacking activities. Nevertheless, most importantly, the old school of
hackers did not show any sign of a malicious intention to destroy or interrupt computer
systems. They were driven by the intellectual challenge and curiosity. Moreover, none
of its members was ever prosecuted or accused of any criminal offences.84 On the
contrary, most of them have crafted a vast array of software programmes sparking the
proliferation of information technologies and Silicon Valley start-up companies.85
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The new school of hackers, on the other hand, can be divided into two phases; each a
new kind of hacker. The first stage of the new school of hackers, spanning from the
1970s to the mid-1990s, was triggered by the widespread use of the PC in developed
countries and later on by the creation of cyberspace.86 The transition of hacking from
innovative exploration of computer systems to unauthorised intrusions and other sorts of
illegal activities motivated by self-interest87 was a fundamental shift in the hackers’
subculture.88 The ethical code gradually deteriorated, but in many cases where hackers
were applauded by the mass media and described as ‘White Hat’ hackers or ‘Heroes of
Digital Culture’. 89 For example, a hacker who trespassed onto computer systems
belonging to wealthy individuals and large corporations and then transferred money to
poor individuals and small organisations was depicted as a ‘Digital Robin Hood’.90 As
more new people joined the hacking community,91 the term ‘Cracker’ was coined by the
old school of hackers to distinguish between themselves and criminal hackers.92
Scholars and computer experts have described the latter as the dark side of the
hackers.93 It is worth mentioning that there is a growing recognition of the crackers’
own subculture. The majority of hackers do not show a malicious intention to destroy or
interrupt a service, but crackers are driven by malevolent incentives. Crackers believe
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that cracking activities should not be illegal or immoral;94 while hackers keep a delicate
line between immoral and ethical hacking.95
During this era, the political motivations of hacking also began to take a new shape. For
instance, an American group established the ‘Youth International Party Line’96 (YIPL),
which is the first American hackers’ organisation to adopt a political agenda for
cyberspace.97 Nonetheless, this phase of hacking witnessed waves of legislation and
criminal procedures against the phenomenon.98 For example, in 1986 the USA enacted
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Moreover, several notorious hackers were
arrested and brought to trial. In 1987, for instance, eighteen hackers from New York
were arrested on charges of illegally reprogramming memory chips in their mobile
phones in order to make free calls99 and, in 1990, ‘Operation Sun Devil’ was launched
in fourteen USA cities to crack down on illegal computer hacking activities.100 This
stage in hacking culminated with the maturation of a complete virtual world:
websites,101 organisations,102 magazines,103 hacking tools, books,104 conferences,105 the
Bulletin Board System (BBS), all supporting various agendas and motivations.
The second phase of the new school is the New Millennium hackers’ school, or the
hackers of the 21st Century. The participation of developing countries in this cyberspace
world has enriched the hacking subculture. Vast arrays of hackers from the third world
have joined the hacking community. They have created innovative hacking techniques,

94

Bruce J Baird, Lindsay L Baird Jr and Ronald P Ranauro, 'The Moral Cracker?' (1987) 6 (6) Computer
& Security 471.
95
Kanaley Reid, 'Computer Hackers Wrestle with Often Ambiguous Morals of Cyberspace', Knight
Ridder/Tribune News Service 23 August 1995.
96
In 1973 the YIPL changed its name to the ‘Technological American Party’ (TAP). It published
newsletter and information about ‘phone freak’ or ‘freaking’ - a type of computer-related crime that is
perpetrated by a hacker to exploit telephone systems for the purpose of making free long-distance callsafter TAP terminated, the hackers’ magazine 2600 was launched. See Taylor, above n 89, 62.
97
Taylor, above n 89, 62-65.
98
Kovacich Gerald L, 'Hackers: Freedom Fighters of the 21st Century' (1999) 18 (7) Computers &
Security 573, 573.
99
Forester and Morrison, above n 22, 35.
100
Shredder, Operation Sundevil (1993) Hack Canada
<http://www.hackcanada.com/blackcrawl/general/sundevil.txt> at 30 August 2005.
101
For example, http://www.hackerscatalog.com.
102
For example, Foundstone’s Hacking School.
103
For example, the quarterly 2600 Hackers Organisation Magazine.
104
For example, The Hackers Bible, and Hacking for the Beginning: Methods and Secrets by Maxim
Levin.
105
For example, the Annual World Hacker Congress in Germany sponsored by Computer Chaos Club
(CCC), and annual DefCon hacker gathering.

17

for instance the ‘love bug’ or ‘I LOVE YOU’ virus106 was launched from the
Philippines.107 However, the new generation of cyber attacks have significantly turned
the world’s view against hacking activities. For example, the recent waves of cyber
attacks against eBay, Yahoo, CNN, Amazon and other prominent websites were ample
to revise media and public attitudes to hacking activities.108
Simultaneously, a new front of hackers’ advocates was born to defend the hackers’
subculture against a distorted image drawn by the mass media. For example, Goldstein,
the founder and editor of the Hacker Quarterly 2600 magazine, in an attempt to defend
hackers writes:
So far, the corporate media has done a very bad job… blaming hackers and in the next sentence
admitting they have no idea who’s behind it… claiming that hackers are behind it indicates some
sort of knowledge of the motives and people involved. This could be the work of someone who
lost their life savings to electronic commerce. Or maybe it’s the work of communists. It could
even be corporate America itself! After all, who would be better served by a further denigration
109

of the hacker image with more restrictions on individual liberties?

To distinguish among different types of the hackers, several academic scholars and
organisations categorise hackers according to their own characteristics and motivations.
For example, Peter Lilley and the Information Security School of Moscow have divided
hackers into four categories. The former has named them as neo-hackers, crackers,
freakers and script kiddies,110 and the latter has classified hackers as jokers, frackers,
professional crackers, and vandals.111 Other scholars such as Donn Parker classify
hackers into three different categories: benign, unsavoury and malicious hackers.112
Also, Steven Philippsohn distinguishes between two types of hackers: external and
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internal hackers.113 The hackers’ motivations are considered the principal point of
distinction between hackers and crackers, as well as hacking capabilities.
1.3.2

Internal Cybercriminals

Computer crime surveys clearly demonstrate that a significant number of cybercrimes
are perpetrated by internal culprits.114 The surveys have come to support the
conventional wisdom that the ‘threat from inside the organisation is far greater than the
threat from outside the organisation’.115 The internal perpetrators range from highranking employees such as executive security managers, to disgruntled retired
employees. Ulrich Sieber, a renowned computer crime expert, has mentioned in his
book, The International Handbook on Computer Crime, that ‘the majority of acts of
sabotage recorded in Western countries up to 1986 have been committed by angry
employees seeking revenge, protesting against rationalisation of their company, or just
wishing to retire early’. 116
The relationship between the internal cybercriminals and other hackers, however, is
weak and uncertain. In most cases, they do not share the same ethical values as the
hackers, although they do share with hackers the advanced knowledge to carry out the
offence.117 For the majority of computer crimes that are committed by internal
perpetrators, for example, the Local Area Network (LAN) is used. Moreover, they enjoy
a high level of understanding of the complexities surrounding the victimised systems,
including company security procedures.118 In 2000, Vitek Boden, for example, became
the archetypal disgruntled former employee who attacked public infrastructure.119
Boden hacked into a municipal council's sewage control computer system and altered
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pump station operations.120 Consequently, up to one million litres of raw sewage flowed
into public parks and creeks on Queensland's Sunshine Coast.121
One can conclude that not all internal cybercriminal are hackers. On the contrary, a
wide range of crimes are committed by insiders such as disgruntled employees or
contractors who do not share hackers ethics and are not involved in other hacking
activities.
1.3.3

Malware Writers

Malware is ‘any programme or file that is harmful to a computer user’.122 It is a
programme that causes a variety of damage to an infected computer system, such as
deleting or altering sensitive files.123 Malware includes computer viruses, Trojan horses,
worms, and other miscellaneous programmes.124 Although writing Malware requires a
high level of knowledge of computer programming language, executing a Malware
attack sometimes needs no more than a little knowledge of the basic principles of
computer system usage.
Just as criminal law distinguishes between different types of murder, comparable
distinctions should be applied to Malware writers, because they have different
motivations and seek to achieve differing objectives.125 They create the weapon of the
crime and, therefore, it is not necessary to be used by the creator but it offers script
kiddies126 and other cybercriminals127 the widest range of abilities to cause cyber-chaos.
For example, the most significant portion of cybercrimes that inflict massive damage on
information technology systems is caused by Malware attacks.128 They also cause
enormous pecuniary losses more than any other cyber attacks and are usually committed
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without leaving any trace. For example, mi2g Intelligence, the London-based security
consultancy, estimates that the total damages worldwide from Malware infection lies
between $166 and $202 billion dollars in global economic damages. 129 Therefore, the
Malware creators should be classified under cybercriminal categories, if their
motivation was to create a programme causing cyber-chaos.
1.3.4 Cyber Organised Crime
Recently, organised crime syndicates have benefited from the globalisation process,
including privatisations, free trade zones, off shore banking centres, and Internet
facilities.130 The attitude of organised crime towards the virtual world is utterly different
from other kinds of cybercriminals. The accessibility and continuity of online services
are important to quickly and surreptitiously achieve their agendas. Consequently,
cyberspace and computer systems are used in the organised crime environment to
facilitate traditional crimes rather than to disrupt cyberspace itself.131 For example, a
professional Russian pensioner, a former computer programmer, teamed up with four
hackers to steal details of Western credit cards. They had managed to steal $10,000
online before they were caught.132
The anonymity and proximity privileges that cyberspace offers entice an organised
crime syndicate to partially migrate their operations to cyberspace. Thus, there is a great
likelihood that hackers or disgruntled employees might be recruited or coerced by
organised crime to carry out a part of their activities online.133
1.3.5 Cyber Terrorists
Cyber terrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace,134 which is slightly
different from cybercrime. Although there is no consensus on the definition of
129

2004: Year of the Global Malware Epidemic- Top Ten Lessons (2004) Gale Group.
<http://www.highbeam.com/library/doc3.asp?DOCID=1G1:125077476&num=1&ctrlInfo=Round18%3A
Prod%3ASR%3AResult&ao=&FreePremium=BOTH> at 18 October 2005.
130
'Laundering Money: Obscuring the Link between the Criminal and the Crime', UN Chronicle
6/22/1998 1998.
131
See, eg, Phil Williams, Organized Crime and Cybercrime: Synergies, Trends, and Responses
Computer Crime Research Centre <http://www.crime-research.org/library/Cybercrime.htm> at 25 April
2006.
132
See, eg, 'Russia Arrests Grandfather of Cybercrime', BBC News 26 May 2001.
133
Joseph D Serio and Alexander Gorkin, above n 115, 197.
134
Denning Dorothy, Cyberterrorism: Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism
Committee on Armed Services (2000) Georgetown University
<http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror.html> at 26 April 2006.

21

cyberterrorism, definitions given are largely derived from the definition of real world
terrorism.135 The latter by nature is difficult to define,136 because of several factors
including the cliché ’One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter’,137 and also
because the relationship between terrorism and crime remains unresolved, 138 even
though that the relationship between them is evident.139 However, Dorothy Denning, a
professor of computer science at Georgetown University, defined cyber-terrorism as
‘unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information
stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in
furtherance of political or social objectives’. 140 The perpetrators of cyberterrorism, and
the magnitude of disruption or destruction inflicted by such attacks, and the motivation,
are important factors used to distinguish between a hacker attack -cybercrime- and a
technologically skilful terrorist attack.
Since the 2001 multi-terrorists attacks that took place in New York and Washington,
and then spread around the world, the picture of terrorist organisations malignantly
embracing cyberspace has been widely absorbed. It has generated countless horrific
scenarios of cyberattacks against American National Informational Infrastructure
(NII),141 nuclear plants, power grid, dams etc. Dan Verton’s book, Black Ice: the
Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terror, for example, depicts an extraordinary hypothetical
cyberterrorism scenario.142 The scenario hypothesises a massive information system
disruption leading to devastating physical destruction inflicted by cyber terrorism.143
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These scenarios were based mainly on reports indicating that American critical
infrastructure were susceptible to cyberattacks.144
In 2002, ‘Digital Pearl Harbor’, a simulated massive cyberattack on America’s critical
infrastructure sponsored by the Naval War College,145 followed by ‘Operation
Livewire’, a more recent simulation of a cyberterror attack,146 came to refute the surreal
theoretical speculations about looming devastation cyberterrorism. The simulations
found that the cyber security preparedness of American NII is substantially immune.
Furthermore, a report issued by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular
Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, concluded that a
concentrated devastating cyberattack is, at least in the near future, significantly beyond
the capabilities of Al-Qeada and other terrorist organisations.147
Up to the time of writing, there is no incident of cyberterrorism recorded nor a
cyberattack characterised as a cyberterrorism. The disruption of non-essential services
typically is not seen as cyberterrorism.148 Dorothy Denning stresses that ‘while past
cyber attacks have caused billions of dollars in damage, they cannot be characterised as
terrorism. Rather, past events are better described as cybercrimes. True cyber-terrorism
is something far more devastating in terms of its scope and impact on a society’. 149
Indeed, cyberspace is a vital tool for terrorist organisations to communicate and deliver
their propaganda, and therefore, it is unlikely that they will target cyberspace.
Nevertheless, the most likely scenario for cyberterrorism to happen is in tandem with
physical attacks. For example, in October 2000, the cyber war began between Arab and
Israeli hackers shortly after the Lebanese Shi'ite Hezbollah movement abducted three
Israeli soldiers.150 Cyberterrorism takes three different forms of attack. The first form of
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cyberterrorism is perception management and propaganda.151 This form, which
unfortunately has been excluded from the above definition, completely relies on
cyberspace accessibility; the cyber multimedia in this form play a key role in recruiting
and funding terrorism. Therefore, an innovative definition of cyberterrorism is needed
to include this form of cyberterrorism. It aims to influence public opinion,
communicate, recruit new terrorists and generate funding. The Times newspaper, for
example, reported that Omar Bakri Mohammad,152 a Lebanese fundamentalist, is
continuing to reach and preach his followers in Britain through websites and Internet
chat rooms.153 In addition, it is widely recognised that Al-Qaeda utilised cyberspace,
before and in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack.154 Recently, on 6 of October 2005, it was
reported that Al-Qaeda was operating a website containing guidance and full
instructions about preparing and making traditional bombs as well as a nuclear bomb.155
The second form of cyberterrorism is disruptive attacks.156 One of the most known
pictures of disruptive attacks is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.157
Although this sort of attack is neither lethal nor sophisticated, the financial damage
incurred might be immense.158
The third pattern of cyberterrorism is ‘destructive attacks’.159 This type is a combination
of digital and physical destruction perpetrated online, but the ultimate objective is to
cause critical physical damage, 160 such as shutting down the aviation system.
It is noticeable that terrorism inexorably inhabits cyberspace and, while the first form of
cyberterrorism is booming and becoming more sophisticated, the second and third forms
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of cyberterrorism are plausible, and worthy of being on the agenda of governments and
international organisations.

1.4 Conclusion
The burgeoning of information technology and cyberspace has created a new
independent field of legal studies. While the lion’s share of these studies have addressed
the emerging cyberspace legal issues, such as electronic commerce, intellectual
property, and privacy, the dark side of information technologies and cyberspace are
addressed by criminologists, who deem cybercrime to be an independent field of
criminology and criminal justice.
Several scholars, computing experts, and organisations, however, who speak, write and
publish extensively on cybercrime, have introduced definitions covering the principal
points of the phenomenon. These definitions are either broad or narrow, always leaving
the door open for new definitions. The definition suggested by this author, therefore,
was necessary to address the shortcomings found in the prior definitions as well as to
distinguish between cybercrime and other related offences.
Cybercrime classifications, on the other hand, outline the ambit of cybercrimes in
further detail. This will particularly help law enforcement investigating cybercrimes as
Tavani mentioned in his statement about cybercrime classification perspectives. The
new phenomenon of online illegal activities has delivered a new pattern of crimes
perpetrated by a class of neo-criminals. Several nascent studies have been carried out by
both criminologists and psychologists to understand the hackers’ world. The majority of
these studies have come up with a general hackers’ psychology map. While the hackers
have dominated cyberspace and been depicted as sole cybercriminals, statistics and
recorded incidents of cybercrime indicate that they are a wide spectrum of different
kinds of cybercriminals ranging from the inept young hacker and the highly gifted
hacker to the disgruntled employee.
Cyberspace creates a unique environment for criminals and terrorists to be able to
interact, work together and learn from each other. The risk of recruiting hackers to work
with organised crimes or terrorist organisations is growing remarkably fast. This unique
25

environment i.e. cyberspace requires the initiation of a comprehensive anti-hacking
strategy policies, regulations, and traditional laws must be evaluated and adjusted as
required, to facilitate law enforcement efforts to combat cybercrime.
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2 OBJECTIVE AND METHODS OF THE STUDY
2.1

Introduction

Following the general background review of the global picture on cybercrimes, this
chapter considers some methodological and other relevant issues concerning the
research. It states the research problem, the research questions, the research scope and
methodology. The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the significance and benefits of
the study and provides a brief overview of chapters.

2.2

Statement of the Problem

Many modern states have sought and succeeded in fostering an information society by
providing their service online. In the developed world today, critical infrastructure and
vital utilities such as hospitals, communications, trading, universities, the banking
systems and governmental operations completely rely on information technology.161
The Jordanian government and lawmakers both recognise the ubiquity of information
technology and its usefulness. In 1999, a High-Tech crimes force was established as a
part of the Public Security Directorate. The more recently established Department of
Computer Crime Prevention is equipped with advanced technologies designed to crack
down on computer offences, and has a number of computer forensics experts and
computer technicians. Unfortunately, this development has not yet been accompanied
by a parallel development in legal and regulatory reforms. The process of obtaining
digital evidence that is used to establish conclusive evidence of cyber wrongdoing is a
crucial stage in cybercrime investigations and successful prosecutions. Therefore, the
absence of comprehensive legislation that specifically addresses cybercrime, and the
lack of guidelines and instructions pertaining to cybercrime investigation priorities,
challenges, and inappropriate search and seizure procedures make it difficult for law
enforcement officers to respond to cybercrime adequately. An appropriate approach to
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cybercrime investigation should protect law enforcement efforts as well as individual
confidentiality, evidence integrity, and privacy.
The existing laws and procedures are generally insufficient to criminalise all forms of
cybercrimes and recognise digital evidence. Search and seizure procedures are also
inadequate to cope with cybercrime’s challenges and the seizure of intangible items. For
this reason, lawmakers must admit the need for change in the law in this area and
enforcement officers and general prosecutors must understand how search and seizure
procedures can be efficiently applied to cybercrime and how digital evidence that is
used to establish conclusive evidence of wrongdoing can be obtained.
Although the main subject of this thesis is to address the procedures of search for and
seize of digital evidence extracted from cybercrime scenes to establish admissible and
probative evidence of cyber wrongdoing, this study will also address procedures
concerning digital evidence extracted from other non-cybercrime scenes to prosecute
offenders committing traditional crimes.

2.3 Research Questions
This dissertation argues that the general principles of search and seizure in criminal
investigation have failed to be applied efficiently to investigating cybercrime. This is
because the existing laws do not fit smoothly within cyberspace and the scope of
computer systems is beyond the traditional approaches of criminal investigation. The
classical laws are accordingly unable to fully protect and fulfil the interests both of law
enforcement agencies and the cyber-suspects, nor third parties’ privacy rights.
Therefore, the main research questions of this study are:
Are the existing legal provisions in place to search and seize physical evidence efficient
to search computers in cybercrime investigation?
How can the investigative authority maintain and improve a legitimate regime that can
be employed to investigate and gather the required data and Internet contents with
respect to a third party’s rights of privacy and confidentiality of personal data as well as
extracting admissible digital evidence?
28

The answers to these questions are primarily provided in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
Chapters 3 and 4 provide a very insightful perspective on the capacity of existing laws
to deal with cybercrime. The final chapter provides a summary and recommendations
for improving laws, policies, and search and seizure procedures in the realm of
cybercrimes investigations.

However, in order to answer these main questions, the following sub-questions need to
be addressed:
(1) To what extent are existing laws equipped to handle cybercrimes?
A comprehensive response to cybercrime offences is a prerequisite to success in
searching and seizing computers and obtaining digital evidence.
(2) How should law enforcement and prosecutors approach a cybercrime investigation?
The availability of investigative guidelines coupled with an experienced investigator are
pivotal in executing a successful investigation. The question will be answered through
exploring law enforcement’s understanding of cybercrimes as well as the ramifications
of imposing classical tactics of investigation in cybercrime investigation. Therefore, the
first sub-question is Do cybercrimes constitute a high priority within law enforcement?
What parameters should be used to decide whether it is appropriate to investigate
cybercrime? Do the current procedures for handling cybercrime crime scene provide an
optimal approach to enhancing cybercrime investigation? How can law enforcement
personnel and, particularly, public prosecutors exercise their power to compel a cybersuspect or third party to divulge encrypted data in cybercrime investigation?
(3) How do the existing laws stand in respect to the admissibility of various kinds of
computer data as evidence? How and to what extent are judges likely to recognise
various kinds of digital evidence?
(4) How do traditional search and seizure procedures that are applicable to physical
objects apply to the intangible objects?
The courts’ decisions are intrinsic to understanding the particularity of cyberspace and
computer systems in the absence of decisive legislation. Over recent years court
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decisions which articulate cyberspace have inspired investigative authorities to draw an
admissible approach for conducting a successful investigation. However, answering this
question requires addressing issues of the applicability of traditional principles of search
and seizure to cyberspace. This leads to the following further sub-questions:

Does the computer data enjoy a high level of legal protection? Is the conventional
threshold for issuing a search warrant applicable to cybercrime searches? Is the subject
of the search warrants addressed by existing law applicable to intangible objects? How
does the concept of particularity apply in the context of cyber searches? How must a
cyber search warrant be executed? Who should execute the cyber search warrant?
When can the prosecutor seize a whole computer? Does an off-site search warrant
present an exception to the search warrant? What are the parameters used to permit offsite searches?
(5) How can a Jordanian prosecutor carry out search and seizure procedures without a
warrant? What are the exceptions that allow Jordanian enforcement officers and
prosecutors to conduct searches without warrants? How can these exceptions apply to
the cybercrime searches?
(6) How can Jordanian enforcement officers and prosecutors obtain digital evidence
located in a foreign jurisdiction, and vice versa? What are the trans-jurisdictional
concerns that are precluding international co-operation in cybercrime investigations?
What are the appropriate mechanisms to obtain digital evidence situated in a foreign
jurisdiction? How and to what extent is the existing Jordanian legal system capable of
providing mutual legal assistance in cybercrime investigation? How does a Jordanian
investigative authority respond to a search request by a foreign country for digital
evidence located on its national soil?
The answers to these sub-questions will, cumulatively, provide an answer to the central
research questions of the thesis.
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2.4

Scope of the Study and Methodology

Cybercrime investigation and techniques are multi-faceted, encompassing issues such as
surveillance, undercover operations, interview and interrogation techniques, arrest,
detention, crime scene investigation, fingerprinting, and so on. This thesis, however,
examines only some of the main challenges associated with the process of search and
seizure of computers in cybercrime investigation to establish and maintain a national
response capability to investigate this type of criminal activity. The first two substantive
chapters, 3 and 4, compare and contrast various aspects of cybercrime criminalisation in
the selected countries. Cybercrimes are mostly classified under four categories as
referred to in Chapter 1. First, the computer can be the object of the attack, as when a
computer as a piece of hardware equipment is physically damaged.162 Second, a
computer system can be incidental to the commission of other crimes; hence this role is
described as ‘computer-supported crime’, for example, using encryption or
steganography technologies to conceal information from law enforcement.163 Third, the
computer can be used as a tool for conducting or facilitating a crime,164 for example,
cyber forgery, cyber pornography, cyber identity theft, and cyberstalking. Fourth, a
computer can be the subject of a crime, when the contents of the computer or a network
itself are targeted by intangible attacks for example, TCP/IP crimes and cybersabotage.
The first category of crime, however, is excluded from this study, because search and
seizure procedures that can be applied to such crimes are precisely akin to traditional
crime scene procedures. In addition, the majority of legal scholars exclude this category
of crime from cybercrime classifications.165Although the second category is not
considered as typical of cybercrime, it will be addressed although the emphasis will
primarily be on the “target” and “tool” crimes.
The subsequent two chapters, 5 and 6, are concerned with issues influencing the
performance of cybercrime investigation. Cybercrime investigative models and digital
evidence are a new phenomenon in Jordan, although they have been widely used in
Australia and the USA for many years with some degree of success in investigating and
prosecuting cybercrimes. Law enforcement officers face a difficult task in investigating
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cybercrime as the approach to a cybercrime scene is different from a traditional crime
scene, mainly with respect to strategies used to collect evidence that is used to establish
conclusive evidence of cyber wrongdoing. Therefore, in examining a Jordanian
investigative model for cybercrime, this thesis addresses also those models developed
by Australian and US law enforcement agencies (Australia and the USA have longstanding experience of handling several substantive and procedural cybercrime laws
including judicial expositions) and distinguished scholars. Jordanian law enforcement
officers and general prosecutors have the benefit of learning from the experience of
developed countries and scholars in this regard. In addressing the investigative models,
the thesis endeavours to determine the characteristics of an optimal investigative model
for cybercrime. An optimal formula for investigating cybercrime, however, may not be
a robust formula, unless investigative challenges, such as privacy concerns and
encryption are addressed. This study is not concerned, however, with technical
challenges; the study only focuses on the legal aspects of how investigators handle
privacy and encryption problems during the investigation process.
The last three chapters of this thesis, which are dedicated to studying search and seizure
procedures including cross-border searches, attempt to establish the arguments that the
traditional procedures of search and seizure are not fully applicable and a different
approach may be necessary for cyber searches. The European Cybercrimes Convention
is considered as the sole international accord for addressing online offences and
cybercrime’s international co-operation procedures. Thus, the final chapter addresses
the Convention in the terms of international mutual legal assistance in cybercrime.
To achieve the objectives of the research, it is important first to study the Jordanian
practice of cybercrimes investigation, and then compare and contrast Jordan’s approach
to criminal procedures with developed countries’ approaches, especially Australia and
the USA. By studying the criminal procedures of developed nations, both positive and
negative experience, reasons will be found to create, change or maintain the current
Jordanian approach to cybercrimes investigation. Therefore, a combination of methods
and approaches will be used in this research.
The main problem of the research will be approached through splitting it into three
stages. The first stage examines and analyses Jordan’s approach to criminal
investigation and procedures of search and seizure applied to cybercrime investigation.
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This stage of the study aims at building a firm theoretical background with a critical
view of Jordanian criminal investigation procedures as applied to cybercrimes
investigation. It is expected that this will show to what extent existing investigation
procedures are ill-equipped to serve the justice.
In the second stage, a Jordanian national model of investigation will be compared with
developed countries’ models of searching and seizing digital evidence. Data analysis
will be used to elucidate the unique nature of digital evidence and particularities of
cybercrime investigation to finalise their pattern of investigation.
Finally, synthesising the results found and the particular features of cybercrime
investigations will shed light on the optimal approach to search for and seize digital
evidence in cybercrime investigation. Consequently, these findings will guide the
researcher to make recommendations for improving both law enforcement practices and
public prosecutors, which consequently leads to individual privacy protection and
digital evidence admissibility.

2.5

Significance and Benefits of the Study

This research project stems from the particularity of cyberspace and cybercrime.
Cybercrime is a subject about which many people, including legal society, know very
little. This sort of crime, which initially was known as a story in science fiction has
dramatically turned to a malignant technological epidemic threatening global
prosperity.166
In developed countries, however, a partially comprehensive framework of prevention
policy is being developed to stem the rise of cybercrime. For example, the co-operation
and coordination between the private sectors and the public sector are improving. Public
awareness and ethical online education issues are on the agenda. A group of digital
legislation instruments has been enacted to crack down on online offences and protect
data privacy. Although numerous publications (including books, surveys and articles)
have deeply detailed and widely articulated the cybercrime phenomenon, the issues of
cybercrime investigation not well understood and, in particular, searching and seizing
166
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computer systems remains rare. It is believed that the investigation process is an
important cornerstone of a comprehensive crime prevention policy. Gathering and
presenting robust evidence is not only necessary for guaranteeing a fair trial, but also for
protecting law enforcement against civil liability.
Therefore, examining cybercrimes’ investigation and analysing principles of search and
seizing tangible evidence and their compatibility with computer systems and the
Internet will enrich the literature of this area and provide national guidelines to both
Jordanian law enforcement agencies and public prosecutors. The study will shed light
on the issues of confidentiality and individual privacy in the course of the investigation
of cybercrimes. The main objective, however, is to streamline and strengthen
procedures concerning cybercrime investigation and to eliminate or lessen impediments
that hinder the collection of digital evidence to establish conclusive evidence of cyber
wrongdoing.
Internationally, cybercrimes are transnational crimes; hence, the research is a
comparative study. Examining criminal investigation procedures of cybercrimes and
launching fixed guidelines will enhance international cybercrimes investigation
consistency and cooperation.

2.6

Synopsis of the Thesis

This thesis is structured into ten chapters. Chapter 3 entitled ‘Criminalisation of
cybercrime’ introduces a fundamental overview of the most popular types of
cybercrimes and the legal response to them. Because the criminalisation of cybercrime
is an indispensable prerequisite for law enforcement personnel to respond effectively
and build, at both national and international levels, a strategy against cybercrime, it is
necessary for law enforcement agencies, particularly Cybercrime Units, to identify and
understand the various types of cybercrime. Therefore, the chapter first describes a brief
account of the recent modes used to perpetrate cybercrime and then assesses the legal
responses to them in order to assess the adequacy and insufficiency of the current laws
of Jordan, Australia, and the US.
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In Chapter 4, in which cyberspace is the object of the crime, the illegal uses of
cyberspace as a tool to engage in crimes against public trust, morality, property and
individuals are defined. The chapter describes four types of cybercrimes: cyber forgery,
pornography, identity theft, and cyberstalking. In each cybercrime, a brief account of
the recent modes of attacks used to perpetrate crime is explained and the legal response
is analysed and assessed in order to assess the adequacy or insufficiency of the current
laws.
Chapter 5 critically examines factors necessary for a successful investigation and
identifies challenges. It hypothesises that the approach model to cybercrimes
investigation which was adopted by the Jordanian Computer Crime Unit (JCCU) is
deficient in some components. Therefore, formulated protocols and models of
investigation, which are formulated mainly by the Australian High Tech Crime Centre
(AHTCC) and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and forensic experts are analysed
and compared with the Jordanian investigative approach. These models were chosen
because they are known for their robustness and include important and intricate
procedures.
Chapter 6 chapter examines the volatility, integrity, and admissibility of the evidence
extracted from computers and the Internet in cybercrime investigation. It demonstrates
the characteristic features and inherent risks associated with digital evidence from both
technical and legal perspectives. The nature and characteristics of digital evidence are
examined for their effects on evidence admissibility. The chapter then evaluates digital
evidence in terms of its legal admissibility and discusses the role of judges in evaluating
digital evidence. Therefore, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first
examines the different types of data and its volatility. The second section examines
digital evidence integrity. The third section addresses digital evidence admissibility, the
legal responses and judicial role in accepting evidence.
Chapter 7 provides a critique the conventional rules of search and seizure in the context
of the digital search and assesses their impact on conducting effective search and
seizure. It addresses the fundamental principles and rules of search and seizure set forth
under the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 as applied to searches of evidence
stored in digital formats. It deals with the traditional legal concepts of search and
seizure as established in the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 compared with
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Australian and US patterns and explores the fundamental differences between
conventional and digital search and the extent to which the present search and seizure
rules are compatible with the digital environment.
Chapter 8 deals with the traditional legal concepts of warrantless searches and seizures
as established in the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961. It addresses different
aspects of search warrant exceptions as applied to searches of digital evidence in
cybercrime investigation. It examines and assesses each exception and its applicability
and compatibility with searches and seizures of digital evidence.
Chapter 9 examines the jurisdictional hurdles that may hinder cross-border searches and
seizures and the ways in which law enforcement officers approach cross-border
searches. It discusses legal mechanisms used to obtain evidence located in a foreign
jurisdiction and Jordan’s response.
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes with a number of recommendations formulated on the
basis of the findings and summery of chapters.
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3 CYBERSPACE AS THE TARGET OF THE CRIME

Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to give a fundamental overview of the most popular
types of cybercrimes and the legal response to them. It is necessary for law enforcement
agencies, particularly Cybercrime Units, to identify and understand the various types of
cybercrime and the differences between them as well as the legal response to them,
because criminalisation of cybercrimes is an indispensable prerequisite for law
enforcement personnel to respond and build effectively, at both national and
international levels, a strategy against cybercrime. Consequently, a clear legal response
to cybercrime offences is a prerequisite to success in searching and seizing computers
and obtaining digital evidence.
Criminalisation of cybercrimes requires, first, definition of those actions involving
computerised technology which may cause harm in any way and, second, the
criminalisation of those actions. In this chapter, both the strengths and weaknesses of
these laws, the Jordanian Criminal Law 1960, Telecommunications Law 1995 as well as
the Electronic Transactions Law 2001 will be examined in addressing different aspects
of cybercrimes.
The methodology for assessing these laws involves two approaches: first, critical
analysis of the content of particular provisions; and, second, a comparative analysis
undertaken by contrasting these provisions with similar articles from cybercrime laws in
Australia and the USA. These two countries were selected because they are already well
advanced in their experiences of, and their legal responses to cybercrimes, thus
providing benchmarks for Jordan’s response.
Over the past half of a century, international society, particularly across the industrially
developed world, has experienced an unprecedented technological transformation.
Simultaneously, diverse new activities called cybercrimes have emerged in association
with this technological revolution. Legal scholars addressed these activities and
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delivered initially controversial arguments regarding the adequacy of the existing
substantive criminal law to criminalise them effectively. 167 However, it has since
become mainstream opinion that the existing criminal law was ill equipped to deal with
and to criminalise cybercrimes effectively. 168
Initially, in the late 1980s, while Western parliaments were obviously well acquainted
with a cybercrime threat, the developing world, including Jordan, was unaware of the
problem. Indeed, it took years and great efforts in many countries to persuade legislators
to enact special cybercrime legislation. Currently, a few developing countries have
either enacted cybercrime laws or have amended existing criminal laws. For example,
after experiencing problems in applying its existing criminal law to cybercrimes, the
Philippines drafted its Cybercrime Prevention Act 2001.169 That Act came into being
following the prosecution failure of the notorious ‘Onel de Guzman’ who had released
the ‘Love Bug’ computer virus in 2000.170 To keep abreast of developments, China
amended its criminal law in 2000 by modifying articles 285, 286, and 287 of the
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China.171
However, cybercrimes are borderless crimes. The lack of cybercrime legislation in one
country can influence directly or indirectly the rest of the world by creating, for
instance, jurisdictional havens.172 The ‘Love Bug’ virus was an example. Therefore, the
legal situation in country B could affect country A or several countries.
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To examine the strength and weakness of the capabilities of the existing Jordanian laws
to address cybercrimes, this chapter will first define the various forms of cybercrimes.
These specific forms of cybercrimes are the most popular, being recorded all over the
world including Australia and the USA, so it might be useful for lawyers, law
enforcement personnel, and prosecutors to be acquainted with them. Then the relevant
laws of Jordan, Australia, and the USA will each be scrutinised.
Each of these countries has taken an independent legal response. In Jordan, no
comprehensive law addresses cybercrimes, only a handful of legislative provisions that
were originally enacted to protect physical objects. These laws are either too narrow or
are inappropriate to address adequately all the forms of cybercrimes.173 In Australia, by
contrast, the parliament has enacted a comprehensive law, the Cybercrime Act 2001. In
a similar manner, the USA has addressed cybercrimes through its Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA) 1984.
Since information is a precious commodity, the integrity, 174 availability175 and
confidentiality176 of information in cyberspace is continually being compromised. The
crime is invisible and the victims as well as losses are almost intangible. Indeed, crimes
falling under this label are described as ‘new wine in new bottles’.177 Nowadays, the
most common patterns of cybercrimes under this category are what might be called
‘TCP/IP crimes’, cybertrespass, and cybersabotage.
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This chapter describes a number of cybercrimes: TCP/IP crimes, cybertrespass and
cybersabotage. In each cybercrime, a brief account of the recent modes used to
perpetrate crime is explained and the legal response to such crimes will be analysed
comparatively so as to identify the common features and differences between the three
countries in order to assess the adequacy and insufficiency of the current laws. In these
types of crimes the main problem is caused by the fact that the existing laws were
formulated in the past century, and before the arrival of the Internet revolution in Jordan
in 1998, primarily to protect physical, tangible, and visible objects against traditional
criminal acts.178

3.1 TCP/IP Crimes
The term TCP is an abbreviation for Transmission Control Protocol and IP stands for
Internet Protocol.179 They refer to one of the core elements of the set of Internet
communication protocols180 or one of the most important elements of the Internet’s core
code.181 In other words, they are the backbone of Internet communication182 and an
integral part of the four layers of Internet architecture.183

178

See, eg, Sieber, above n 87, 37. See also, Hancock, above n 167, 97.
TCP is a military designed communication protocol to support multi-network applications and to be a
highly reliable, securable logical communication protocol between interconnected computers. It is defined
as ‘a protocol used for transmitting data between computers and as the basis for standard protocols on the
Internet’. TCP/IP, msn
<http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861718624> at 22
November 2005. See also, Transmission Control Protocol Catalyst Development: Software Applications,
Components and Libraries <http://www.catalyst.com/products/socketwrench/tutorial/tcpdoc02.html> at
22 November 2005.
180
‘Communications protocols are sets of rules or standards designed to enable computers to connect with
each other and exchange data’. See, Definitions of Communications Protocol on the Web
<http://www.google.com.au/search?hl=en&lr=&oi=defmore&defl=en&q=define:communications+protoc
ol> at 23 November 2005.
181
Wikipedia, above n 179.
182
See, eg, Grandmaster Plague, Myths About TCP Spoofing (2002)
<http://www.hackinthebox.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=6394&mode=
thread&order=0&thold=0> at 21 November 2005.
183
Mctaggart divides the Internet into four layers: The first layer is the content, such as web pages; the
second is the application layer, such as software programs; the third layer is the operational layer, such as
Internet Service Providers; and fourth is the physical layer, such as hardware devices. According to this
classification, TCP/IP crimes are crimes against the second and third layers to prevent first layer from
reaching its ultimate distination (Internet users). See generally, Craig Mctaggart, 'A Layered Approach to
Internet Legal Analysis.' (2003) 48 (4) McGill Law Journal 571.
179

40

Basically, cyberspace access needs a computer provided with a modem184 connected to
a communications network such as by a phone cable or high-speed line.185 However, to
transmit information from one computer to another, a computer user, also called a
‘client’, has to start a process known as the ‘Three-way Handshake’ (TWHS).186 This
connection process starts by establishing a TCP connection to a system (or server), that
provides cyber services, such as website, e-mail, and so forth.187
The client and the server exchange a set sequence of messages. The first part of the
process is started by sending the first message (SYN message)188 by the client asking for
information from the server. Once the server acknowledges the SYN message, it sends
back a SYN-ACK message,189 which includes an Initial Sequence Number (ISN),190 to
the client as the second part of the TWHS connection process. Finally, the client
finishes the process by responding to the server’s message with an ACK message. By
completing the three parts of the TWHS connection process, the information can be
smoothly transmitted between the client and the server. Fig (3.1) illustrates this TWHS
connection process.
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Figure 3.1 TCP Three-Way Handshake191

The transmitted information is broken into datagrams.192 Each datagram is directed to
its destination and is packaged in a bundle of instructions called a packet.193 The TCP
assigns a sequence number to every byte transmitted online.194 As TCP is a connectionoriented protocol,195 it guarantees delivery of data and also that each packet will be
received without errors.196
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The IP,197 on the other hand, funnels the packets across the Internet to the right client,198
because each computer connected to the Internet has a unique IP number or address that
tells the location of the host.199
A number of serious inherent vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP system are repeatedly
exploited and misused. Although advanced security shields are regularly set up and new
versions of TCP/IP are being used, they have been continuously exposed to a number of
illegal activities, such as Denial of Service attack (DoS) and Distributed Denial of
Service attack (DDoS).

3.1.1

Denial of Service Attack (DoS)

The DoS attack is a typical pattern of cybercrime, caused by hacking programmes freely
distributed from hackers’ websites.200 The immediate victim is the Internet website that
provides cyber-services, such as e-mails, websites, and communications, but the
intended victim is the client who stands behind the compromised system.201
The DoS attack either temporarily prevents legitimate information traffic from
transmitting, or disrupts connections between two systems. For example, it prevents
users from accessing a website or a specific online service.202 Also, the infected system
might be exposed to serious intangible damage.203
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Varieties of tactics and technologies, however, may be used to launch a DoS attack. In
order to figure them out and assess the capability of the Jordanian laws to address a DoS
attack, a basic understanding of its mechanism is important.
a)

SYN Flood Attack

Basically, a SYN attack occurs by not completing the three parts of the TWHS
connection process, mentioned earlier, thereby creating a half-open connection state.204
The attacker fires off many SYN messages using spoofed IP addresses.205 When the
server sends back SYN-ACK message (part two) to the client who has already sent a
spate of SYN messages (part one) with spoofed IP addresses, the latter withholds the
final ACK message (part three).206 Consequently, the TCP capacity to handle an
overwhelming number of half-open connections overflows the buffer space207 and
denies any further incoming legitimate SYN messages. This then causes a denial of
service state.208
b)

Ping of Death

A Ping is a programme that tests whether a host is reachable and operating properly by
sending an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP).209 In a nutshell, the attacker in
this type of attack sends a spate of large ping requests to the victim system.210 The
victimised system cannot quickly handle the oversized ping requests.211 As a result, the
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targeted host or applications become very slow due to the congestion and in this way
denies service.212
c)

SMTP Flood Attack

The Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) flood attack is similar to the SYN and
ping attack methods. The SMTP, which is used for sending and receiving e-mail
messages across the Internet,213 is often misused to launch a DoS attack.214 The
computer system or the network inherently has a limited capability to handle a volume
of data sent at one time. Hence, the attacker sends a spate of oversized messages or
many e-mails to jam the SMTP mail server. As a result, the flooding temporarily
prevents users from getting legitimate access to the system.215
d)

UDP and ICMP Flood Attack

The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flood attack and the Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) flood attack methods work in very much the same manner as the SYN
flood attack.216
The UDP is an integral part of the Internet protocol suite.217 It is a protocol used to send
short messages, known as ‘datagrams’, from one computer to another.218 The UDP
flood attack occurs when the attacker sends a spate of UDP packets to specified or
random ports219 on the victim system.220 This generates a flood of traffic between the
two systems (the attacker and the server) and then the victimised server cannot quickly
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handle a large number of packets, which leads to a DoS attack or seriously slows down
the system.221
The ICMP is a protocol used between operating systems to report error messages
indicating, for instance, that a router222 is unreachable or overloaded or there is a
problem with a particular path.223 The ICMP attack is accomplished by sending such a
large number of ping requests to the target system that it cannot handle them.224 This
attack usually affects both the attacker and the victim systems unless the attacker has
used a forged IP addresses.225 Thus, the attacker will not experience congestion or a
system crash but the victimised system will clog up.226

3.1.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS)
Some of the DoS attack techniques have been crippled by installing security patches
and anti-DoS attack programmes.227 However, a new generation of TCP/IP attacks,
called DDoS is being used to multiply the effectiveness of a DoS attack.228 For
example, in February 2000, a ‘script kiddie’ successfully executed DDoS attacks
against prominent commercial websites and media, such as eBay, Yahoo, Amazon, and
CNN websites.229
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The DDoS attack techniques mainly work in the same manner as DoS attacks.230 But the
attacker, also known as the ‘Master’ in DDoS, plants a malicious computer code in as
many computers as possible, making them his ‘zombies’. 231 When the attack is
triggered, the zombies controlled by the ‘Master’ will execute the attack command and
flood the victim system with forged codes.232 The victimised system cannot quickly
handle a large number of packets, which may lead the system to suffer congestion and
denial of legitimate access.233
As described above, DoS and DDoS attacks are launched either to prevent a user from
establishing a connection or to choke legitimate data traffic. The DDoS attack involves
unauthorised access to an unwitting client system to plant a malicious computer code
which orders the system to work as a zombie, in addition to the DoS attack against a
particular system. These attacks do not cause permanent damage to a user’s data or loss
of service, but they temporarily compromise the availability of the Internet. They thwart
online service operators and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from providing secure
online services. Finally, these attacks bring not only transient service interruptions but
also cause significant financial losses and degradation of cyberspace security credibility.

Survey of Legal Responses
a)

Jordan

Basically, criminalisation of DoS and DDoS attacks in Jordan is closely akin to the
Australian and the American approaches. There is no decisive and unequivocal text
criminalising DoS and DDoS attacks. The only legal ground available to successfully
prosecute DoS and DDoS attacks is the Jordanian Telecommunications Law 1995.
Section 11 Article (72) of the Act, imposes criminal liability on ‘Any person who
230
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intentionally sabotages telecommunications installations or deliberately causes damage
thereto…the penalty shall be doubled if his act causes break down of the
telecommunications traffic’. Article (79) of the same law also criminalises ‘Any person
who uses a Public or Private Telecommunications network in an illegal way… or
hinders the delivery of services from another telecommunications network, or endangers
the national good…’
The DoS and the DDoS attackers, who intentionally launch an attack, would be liable
under Article 72 because, while they do not inflict permanent damage or sabotage of the
telecommunications installations, they cause temporary loss of communications service
and the breaking down of communications traffic. Also, DoS and DDoS attacks
constitute an act of illegal use of telecommunications networks mentioned in Article
(79). The attacker is initially liable to up to two years in prison and/or a fine of up to JD
5000.234 However, the punishment is doubled if the offence caused a communications
breakdown. For cases of negligent damage, the punishment is reduced to no more than
three months and/or fine up to JD 100.
b) Australia
The Australian Cybercrime Act 2001 is a specialised anti-hacking statute. It criminalises
many forms of illegal cyberspace activities, such as hacking, destroying, sabotaging,
and interrupting online services. Although the Act does not explicitly proscribe DoS or
DDoS attacks, it

generally prohibits unauthorised prevention of electronic

communication traffic to or from a computer system. Section 477.3 (1) (a) of the
Australian Cybercrime Act applies to whoever ‘causes any unauthorised impairment of
electronic communication to or from a computer…[where]…(i) the electronic
communication is sent to or from the computer by means of a telecommunications
service’.
The DoS and DDoS attackers who wilfully launch an attack would be liable under this
section, because impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer
includes preventing computers from establishing a connection and communications
trafficking.235 But communication prevention, which is mentioned in the Act, is
234
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undefined and a mere interception of any electronic communication is not considered a
crime.236 Nevertheless, DoS and DDoS attacks, without a doubt, temporarily force the
server to shut down and preclude the service from reaching its targeted computers.
Hence, DoS and DDoS attacks are crimes according to the above section. Moreover, the
DDoS attack, which involves insertion of a malicious ‘zombie’ into the client systems,
also constitutes cybertrespass under Section 478.1 (1) (a), which stipulates that ‘A
person is guilty of an offence if …the person causes any unauthorized access to, or
modification of, restricted data’.237
The penalties imposed on DoS and DDoS attackers fluctuate. They depend, first, on the
scale of the destruction inflicted and, second, on the criminal intention. The defendant is
initially liable to up to ten years in prison; but, if the attacker’s intention was to commit
a serious offence, for instance, to disrupt critical infrastructure, the attacker would be
liable to imprisonment for life or a period of no less than five years.238
c) USA
In a similar vein, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1984 (CFAA) in USA, which is
the backbone of the federal anti-hacking laws, has no provision explicitly addressing
DoS or DDoS attacks.
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However, the Act imposes criminal liability on ‘whoever

knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and
as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorisation, to a
protected computer’.240 The provision is used to prosecute those who launch DDoS
attacks.241 It specifically addresses the crimes of hacking which affect the integrity or
availability of data by intentionally transmitting a malicious code or planting it in a
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protected computer. Any computer connected to the Internet is a protected computer.242
Both the DoS and DDoS attacks cause the transmission of a code indirectly (by zombie)
or directly to the victim system and affect the availability of online services.
The punishment prescribed for first the conviction is up to ten years in prison and/or a
fine of up to $250,000; while a repeat offence is punishable by up to twenty years in
prison and/or a fine of up to $250,000.243 For cases of reckless damage, however, the
punishment is reduced to five years and/or a $250,000 fine and the crime is treated as a
misdemeanour if the damage was caused merely by negligence.244
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Apparently, legislators in these three countries avoided making any specific
references to DoS and DDoS attacks, but rather aimed at setting out a broad
framework addressing communications interruption and impairment. They
distinguish between serious crimes that can possibly endanger the national security
and minor crimes. However, unlike the Jordanian approach, the Australian and the
US statutes impose harsh penalties in the case of serious offences.
The Jordanian statute is so broad as to include both physical attacks, such as bomb
attacks, and virtual attacks, such as DoS attacks, because communications installations
and telecommunications traffic, mentioned in the law, refer to both physical and virtual
devices, such as modems, and TCP/IP protocols. This breadth does not differentiate
between hackers, virus writers, script kiddies, and terrorists attacking communications
systems. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it treats alike those with
differing motivations and objectives. Script kiddies breaking down a website, for
example, could be punished as severely as the writers or the distributors of the various
modes of attacks. Second, it ignores the differences between the physical and virtual
worlds in terms of the destruction and casualties that they cause; therefore, a tougher
punishment should be correlated with the severity of the crime. Jordanian
Telecommunications Law 1995 does not offer such a correlation.
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3.2 Cybersabotage
It is widely recognised that physical damage to computer systems and peripherals, such
as printers, screens, hard disks, and so on, could jeopardise a business operation and
cause pecuniary losses. Ulrich Sieber has mentioned several methods that can be used to
inflict tangible damage,245 such as the use of explosive materials, pouring a liquid into
electronic equipment or setting fire to a building where computers are operating.246 For
example, computer centres were attacked by terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigade in
Italy and Committee for Liquidation and Subversion of Computers (CLODO) in
France.247 Nevertheless, physical damage to computer systems is excluded from the
classifications of cybercrimes because traditional criminal and procedural codes already
effectively apply to physical damage. The legal problems arise when intangible
properties, such as data and programmes, are the victims.
Intangible damage to computer systems, such as information, data, and software
programmes is more ferocious, the damage more extensive, and the consequence more
dangerous than that of physical damage to computer hardware. It is more ferocious
because it comes unexpectedly and is difficult to predict as well as to recover from. It is
more extensive because it spreads instantaneously over the whole virtual world like a
malignant cancer and the consequences are potentially devastating, both operationally
and economically.
This subsection, therefore, starts by examining various techniques and methods used to
inflict logical damage and gain access to computers, Viruses, Worms and Trojan horses,
and then comparatively analyses the relevant Jordanian, Australian, and the US laws.

3.2.1 Methods of Attack
a) Viruses
The term ‘Virus’ used to be exclusive to medical circles to describe a ‘foreign agent
injecting itself into a living body, spreading and causing health problems’. 248 The same
terminology has since been transferred to cyberspace to describe malicious programmes
245
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that have the same functions as a biological virus, such as random breeding, being
uncontrollable, and causing internal damage.
A computer virus can be defined as a ‘set of computer instructions that propagates
copies or versions of itself into computer programmes or data when it is executed within
contaminated programmes’.249 Thus, it has the capacity to duplicate itself inside a
computer’s memory250 and to maliciously amend and control computer programmes, or
to reprogram computer systems, and to execute functions, such as erasing or deleting
hard drive contents.251
The proliferation of computer networks as well as the inter-operationalism of computer
systems, such as Microsoft Windows, has dramatically increased cyberspace
vulnerability to malicious programme attacks.252 For example, the number of
widespread viruses jumped to nearly 140,000 in 2003 and surveys show that between
400 and 500 new viruses are discovered monthly.253 Nevertheless, virus attacks are
decreasing in number relative to other types of malware attacks, such as worms and
Trojans, because of the criminalisation of virus attacks, and because virus attacks do not
necessarily lead to financial gain and sensitive information collection.254
b) Worms
In the same manner as viruses, worms are malicious programmes that duplicate
themselves in computer systems by exploiting the software system’s vulnerabilities.
They surreptitiously sneak from one computer to another through connected computers
networks.255 Recent worm attacks, ‘Zotob’ and ‘Mytob’256 for example, have exploited
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flaws in Microsoft’s Windows Plug and Play257 functionality.258 The worm attack is
considered the fiercest kind of malicious code and can inflict massive damage
worldwide. The ‘I LOVE YOU’ and ‘Code-Red’ worms, for instance, inflicted billions
of dollars worth of damage worldwide.259
c) Trojan Horses
The term Trojan horse is derived from the historical story of the city of Troy, which
was defended by an impregnable wall. The legend of Troy tells that Greek warriors
besieged the city for ten years260 and eventually got in by using a giant wooden horse in
which a few Greek soldiers had hidden to open the gate of the city of Troy.261 In a
similar way, the mechanism of computer horses mimics the horse of Troy.
In contrast to Viruses and Worms, Trojan horses are spyware262
surreptitiously inside the victim’s system.

263

that operate

They are dynamic, offering criminals the

capability to access, change, steal and corrupt computer systems.264 The mere
unauthorised access of computer data can easily compromise network security and harm
data confidentiality and integrity and perform other forms of illegal activities and/or
exploitation of illegal entry. Different methods are used for inserting the horse into a
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system. Social engineering methods, for example are frequently used to sneak Trojan
Horses into computer systems.265

3.2.2 Legal Analysis of cybersabotage
It can be seen that malicious codes are insidious programmes designed for a wide range
of criminal offences. For example, unleashing a Trojan horse is an indispensable step to
further illicit access. Therefore, unleashing a malicious computer programme on a
communications network without causing damage is considered ‘unauthorised access’,
also known as ‘cybertrespass’. Performing a similar action in which intangible
properties of a communication system, such as information storage, are destroyed is
considered ‘cybersabotage’. Thus, Viruses, Worms and Trojan Horses, either cause
intangible damage to computer systems or unauthorised access to people’s computers.
In this subsection, two types of cybercrimes will be analysed, namely cybertrespass and
cybersabotage. Criminalisation of cybertrespass and cybersabotage will be analysed in
order to evaluate the effectiveness of existing laws of Jordan, Australia and the USA to
address these types of cybercrimes. Because cybertrespass and cybersabotage can be
committed by the use of the same malicious codes, including Viruses, Worms and
Trojan horses, and in order to delineate each offence and its legal response, it is
important to distinguish between two forms of criminal intention. The first intention is
related to cybertrespass, and the second one will be discussed under cybersabotage.
1.

Cybertrespass

Cybertrespass tools are designed either to give the attacker the ability to display, amend,
delete, corrupt, or access and control programmes and data which are saved in the
internal hard disk or remotely in the ISP’s computer memory. Therefore, in this type of
crime, i.e. cybertrespass, the criminal intention is either to access without permission, to
exceed permission, or to alter parts of, or the entire system, or to commit further crimes,
such as identity theft. Thus, the trespasser’s intention is the real subject of inquiry,
because Trojan horses and other forms of harmful programmes can be exploited to carry
out different tasks. Therefore, to better understand the legal response, it is important to
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distinguish between the two following forms of criminal intention for trespassing
computer systems.
The first intention is wilfully and knowingly accessing without permission any
computer system, i.e. inserting a Trojan or any other forms of harmful programmes. In
other words, there is no ulterior purpose to commit further crimes. For example,
inserting a Trojan horse into a computer system and accessing it without consent.
The second intention goes further than that, i.e. inserting a Trojan horse and tampering
with operating system or data. For example, deleting a programme in a bank’s computer
memory may be intended to create a space in which to conceal a programme debiting
small fractions of the total amount of customers’ accounts.
a) Jordan
In the case of the first intention, Section 11 Article (79) of the Jordanian
Telecommunications Law 1995 imposes criminal liability on ‘Any person…who uses a
telecommunications network in an illegal way or connects his network with another
Telecommunications network without having the right to do so, or hinders the delivery
of services from other Telecommunication networks’. While this article does not specify
the meaning and scope of the illegal use and does not explicitly criminalise
cybertrespass, it can be applied to trespass, because, for example, a Trojan horse
illegally connects the attacker’s system with the victim’s whereby the former can
execute multiple activities simultaneously, such as compromising data availability,
confidentiality and integrity. Therefore, the mere trespass to networks, contrary to the
rights of the owner, is an offence under the above provision. However, this provision
does not apply if the user legitimately accessed a network, exceeds the permission, or
goes beyond a pre-determined period of time. The criminalisation provision should be
more precise and describe clearly the offence. And the above article does not address a
use that goes beyond legitimate access.
b) Australia
In Australia, in contrast, the deliberate unauthorised access into computer systems and
networks is considered a crime. Division 478.1 (a), (b) and (c) of the Australian
Cybercrime Act 2001 applies to whoever ‘(a)…causes any unauthorised access…
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(b)…intends to cause the access… [or] (c)…knows that the access…is unauthorised’.266
Thus, a person is guilty of cybertrespass once he wilfully and knowingly accesses a
computer system illegally. However, the Act requires that the access should be to a
system protected by an access control system, such as a password or any software or
hardware device installed to protect it.267
c) USA
In a different way, Section 1030 (a) (2) of the CFAA proscribes acting in excess of
authorisation so as to intentionally access a computer without authorisation, or obtain
information from a financial institution, any department or agency, or any protected
computer involved in interstate or foreign communication.
2. Cybersabotage
Cybersabotage usually occurs when a malicious code is used to access a system and
then deletes, corrupts, or damages data. A Trojan horse, for example, gives the launcher
full access to hard drives and operating systems,268 providing capability to delete and to
compromise information,269 or to launch attacks from the victim’s system against other
systems.270
In the second form of criminal intention is to wilfully and knowingly access without
permission computer systems and networks to amend, delete and damage data. The
attacker’s intention goes further than accessing computer systems without permission to
commit a further crime of sabotage.
a) Jordan
Criminalisation of cybersabotage according to the Jordanian Criminal Law 1960 poses a
problem, because of the intangible nature of programmes and data. In Jordan, nothing in
any legal provision protects intangible objects except materials protected under the
Copyright Law. Article (443) of the Jordanian Criminal Law 1960, for example, only
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protects tangible properties against physical damage. Damaging or altering a digital
property, therefore, is not punishable, unless the culpable action extended to physical
destruction, such as smashing hardware. Therefore, deleting or modifying data and
programmes without damaging the physical medium, as a Trojan horse does, does not
fall under the above provision.
However, specific aspects of cybersabotage can be prosecuted under Article (76) of the
Jordanian Communications Law 1995. It proscribes a particular breed of cybersabotage
offences, particularly illegally interrupting, corrupting, or damaging messages being
transmitted through communications network. It provides that ‘Any person who
intercepts, obstructs, alters or strikes off the contents of a message carried through the
telecommunications networks or encourages others to do so, shall be punished by
imprisonment for a period not less than one month and not exceeding six months, or by
a fine not more than JD. 200, or by both penalties.’271
Unfortunately, the meaning of ‘contents of message’ excludes any further data not
considered a part of a message. As a result, a deliberate action of sabotage which goes
beyond destruction of a mere message, such as alteration of programmes or static data
stored in a computer memory, does not fall under the above provision.
b) Australia
The Australian Cybercrime Act 2001 makes cybersabotage a felony. Section 477.2 (1)
(a) applies to whomever ‘…causes any unauthorised modification of data held in a
computer’.272 This section defines the intentional modification as any act of alteration or
removal data or an addition of data to the data held in a computer without authorisation.
The culprit would be liable under this subsection once the malicious code caused
damage.
c) USA
The CFAA, in contrast, explicitly prohibits unleashing a malicious code. The fifth
subsection, 1030 (a) (5), applies to whomever ‘knowingly causes the transmission of a
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program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally
causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer.’273
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
From the above analysis and comparison, one can conclude that the current laws
relating to cybertrespass and cybersabotage in Jordan are not satisfactory. They are
insufficient and cannot adequately deal with all aspects of cyber offences. It seems that
the current Jordanian laws have very little to do with the current situation.
The cybertrespass provision, Article (79), is not comprehensive and is intended only to
provide limited protection against physical access. It does not capture all aspects of
cybertrespass. Exceeding authorised access, for example, is not criminalised.
Furthermore, the provision does not criminalise any attempt at unauthorised access to a
telecommunications network.
Cybersabotage provisions lack protective and comprehensive safeguards against
corruption or other damage to digital objects. On one hand, the Jordanian Criminal Law
1960 has failed to protect intangible property against logical attacks. It protects only
physical property, such as hardware against any physical attacks. This is because the
current law was written so long ago; in a time before digital property was introduced in
Jordan. On the other hand, the new communication law partially addresses the issue of
cybersabotage. Article (76) only criminalises actions specifically intended to inflict
damage on the contents of a message. This narrow protection leaves many cyber
contents, such as websites, programmes and data, unprotected against other aspects of
cybersabotage.
With the pervasiveness of the Internet, and cyber offences, it becomes ever more
imperative to enact a comprehensive and developed cybercrime law. In this part, it has
been useful to learn and borrow from the experience of countries with advanced
legislation in this field. However, while there is no intention that Jordanian legislators
will follow all the details of the Australian or US cybercrime laws, it is important that
attention be given to the Australian and US counterparts and to how they are being
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implemented. Some provisions in both the Cybercrime Act 2001 and CFAA relating to
cybertrespass and cybersabotage can be adopted.
From the Australian Cybercrime Act 2001, Division 478.1 might be adopted. This
division states that a person would only commit a cybertrespass offence if he bypassed
an access control system, such as a password or any software or hardware device, such
as CCTV274 installed to protect it. This provision has no parallel in the Jordanian
Telecommunications Law 1995. The importance of this provision lies in the fact that it
distinguishes between two computer systems, protected and unprotected systems. This
distinction leads to the identification of how the unauthorised access occurred as well as
lessens the burden on investigators responding to cybertrespass. It identifies any attempt
at unauthorised access, so it can be detected and investigated; because access control
systems can capture unauthorised access attempts. In addition, adopting such a
provision would mean accessing an unprotected system is not a crime of trespassing.
From the CFAA, might be adopted the second section, 1030 (a) (2), which criminalises
exceeding authorisation.
Unlike the Jordanian one, Australian’s model for the criminalisation of cybersabotage,
Section 477.2 (1) (a), is flexible enough to include any type of sabotage action against
data held in stand-alone computers or networks. Any unauthorised modification of data
including alteration, deletion, or addition of data constitutes cybersabotage. This
flexibility is necessary because of the vast number of sabotage actions against
cyberspace as well as the subjects of sabotage, such as websites, programmes,
information, and data. The narrowness of Article (76) of the Jordanian
Telecommunications Law 1995, which exclusively protects the contents of messages
carried through telecommunications networks, can be solved by adopting a more
flexible provision. However, the adopted provision should only criminalise offences
against protected computers and networks. Thus, the desired flexibility can be adopted
from the Australian Cybercrime Act 2001 and the protection boundary from the CFAA
section 1030 (a) (5).
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3.4 Conclusion
Information and communications technology has the potential to offer unprecedented
opportunities for criminals to commit illegal acts, because of the unique environment in
which users interact with each other as well as with virtual objects. Thus, different
forms of illegal activities have emerged posing real dangers in cyberspace. The most
popular of these activities are denial of services (DoS and DDoS) attacks.275 The
seriousness of these crimes ranges from minor interruptions of insignificant web sites or
computer systems to preventing access by millions of users surfing popular Internet web
sites such as Google.com.
Cybersabotage, on the other hand, is more devastating to the victim than denial of
service attacks and is harder to recover from. The evidence extracted from this sort of
crime also takes different forms, such as code programs, metadata and log files.
These illegal activities are in continuous evolution and represent a challenge for
lawmakers to devise new laws and amend others to deal with new forms of crimes as
well as with new faces on old crimes.
While the Australian and US lawmakers continue to develop the legal response
necessary to prosecute cybercrimes - Australian legislators have enacted the Cybercrime
Act 2001 and the US Congress has introduced the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1984,
which has been revised several times to keep abreast with cyberspace illegal activities
developments, Jordanian legislators responded to cybercrimes by enacting a few articles
in the Telecommunications Law 1995, which was amended by Law No. 8 for year 2002.
The current Jordanian laws in the context of other issues indirectly address the new
forms

of

cybercrimes,

such

as

TCP/IP

attacks

and

cybertrespass.

The

Telecommunications Law 1995 was enacted before the advent of the Internet in Jordan
mainly to protect the physical components of communications infrastructure as well as
messages transmitted via telecommunications networks. However, while this law can be
applied to TCP/IP attacks yet neither the above legislation nor the Jordanian Criminal
Law 1960 apply to offences that are not directly connected to the telecommunications
networks, such as static data saved on PCs, or offences that do not interrupt
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communications traffic, or access to communications networks which goes beyond
legitimate access. By contrast, the Cybercrime Act 2001 and the CFAA effectively
criminalise all forms of TCP/IP attacks as well as cybertrespass.
No provision in existing Jordanian laws addresses cybersabotage offences, except one
provision in the Telecommunications Law 1995 which criminalises offences targeting
messages transmitted via telecommunications networks. The Jordanian Criminal Law
1960, which is the major criminal law, is incompetent to protect digital property,
because the definition of property which is eligible for legal protection under the
Jordanian Criminal Law 1960, is a physical moveable or immovable object, such as
gold, cars, houses, or lands. By comparison, the Cybercrime Act 2001 and the CFAA
sufficiently and directly address all forms of cybersabotage.
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4 CYBERSPACE AS THE MEANS OF THE CRIME
Introduction
In this chapter, in which cyberspace is the object of the crime, the illegal uses of
cyberspace as a tool to engage in crimes against public trust, morality, property and
individuals will be defined. This chapter describes four types of cybercrimes, cyber
forgery, cyber pornography, cyber identity theft, and cyberstalking. In each cybercrime,
a brief account of the recent modes of attack used to perpetrate crime is explained and
the legal response to such crimes will be analysed in order to assess the adequacy and
sufficiency of the current laws.
In similar manner to the pervious chapter, the objective of this chapter is to provide a
basic understanding of the most popular types of cybercrimes, i.e. in which cyberspace
is the object of the crime, and the legal response to them. It is necessary for law
enforcement agencies, particularly Cybercrime Units, lawyers, and prosecutors, to be
acquainted with forms of crimes, to understand them various types of cybercrime and
the differences between them, as well as the legal responses to them. This is because
criminalisation of cybercrimes is an indispensable prerequisite for law enforcement
personnel to respond and build effectively, at both national and international levels, a
strategy against cybercrimes. Consequently, a clear legal response to cybercrimes
offences is a prerequisite to success in searching and seizing computers and obtaining
digital evidence.
Cyberspace misuse takes many forms and shapes. Nowadays, the vast majority of
traditional crimes, such as forgery, pornography, stalking, and so forth can be facilitated
by computers. However, in contrast to the crimes committed against computer systems,
the majority of these types of crimes fall within the scope of traditional criminal law
provisions enacted to combat traditional offences of forgery, pornography, and so on.
Some of these statutes could be applied successfully to particular computer-related
crimes while other crimes, particularly stalking, are not dealt with at all in the traditional
provisions in a way that can address the challenges caused by information technology.
Because a wide range of traditional crimes can be facilitated by computers, cyberspace
as the object of the crime can be classified into four categories, depending upon the
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victim, for example, crimes against public trust, crimes against morality, crimes against
property, and crimes against persons.276 Under these classifications a wide rage of
crimes can be studied, though this chapter is of necessity an illustrative study, not an
exhaustive treatment of the interaction of computer technology and traditional criminal
activity. It will be divided into four subsections, dealing respectively with four major
crimes, cyber forgery, cyber pornography, cyber identity theft, and cyberstalking.

4.1 Cyber Forgery
While there is no generally accepted definition of forgery worldwide, some scholars
attempt to define very broadly documents which may be the subject of forgery to
include electronically stored information. Johan Smith, for example, has defined the
term ‘document’ as ‘any written group of letters, figures or any other symbols written
on a paper or any material and used for conveying information’. 277 According to this
definition, disks, tapes, sound tracks, or other devices on or in which information is
recorded or stored are considered to be documents.
In the context of cyberspace, Yearwood and Hayers define cyber forgery as ‘any
misrepresentations produced via computer, whether generated to a hard copy such as in
making counterfeit money or submitted electronically using fraudulently obtained credit
or credentials’.278 Another definition is ‘the input, alteration, erasure or suppression of
computer data or computer programmes, or other interference with the course of data
processing, in a manner or under such conditions, as prescribed by national law, that it
would constitute the offence of forgery if it had been committed with respect to a
traditional object of such an offence’. 279 According to these definitions, cyber forgery
takes two forms. First, it is the use of computer systems to forge computer copies of
physical records, such as birth certificates.280 Second, it is the use of computer systems
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to forge electronic or software dependent records, such as e-mails, and bank account
statements.281
a) Jordan
Traditional forgery is a felony addressed in the Jordanian Criminal Law 1960 (Chapter
2, Section 5/Articles 260, 261, and 263) under the title ‘Crimes against public trust’. It
is a crime against public confidence in formal documents. The Jordanian Criminal Law
1960 defines forgery as ‘an intentional modification of truth and data in an authentic
document or instrument having legal efficacy and resulting in physical, incorporeal, or
social harm’.282 From the definition, three legal elements should be considered in the
establishment of a forgery offence.283 The first element is the counterfeiting or
falsifying of a formal document or an instrument; the second element is that harm must
be caused by the first element; and the third element is the criminal intention to use the
false document to gain profit or status.284 Accordingly, forgery occurs when one makes
or alters a document having legal force and effect and causing harm thereby. Thus, the
definition of a document is important to determine whether Jordan’s forgery law applies
to its cyber content. In other words, if the computer generated documents have legal
force and effect, the Jordanian Criminal Law 1960 would apply.
However, while none of the forms of cyber forgery are explicitly addressed in the
Jordanian Criminal Law 1960, the Jordanian Electronic Transaction Law 2001
criminalises traditional crimes committed by computers. The first form of forgery, i.e.
forging computer copies of physical documents, does not raise the problem of the
applicability of Jordanian Criminal Law 1960 to cyber forgery, because digital copies of
physical records are considered formal documents. Scholars agree to apply traditional
forgery provisions to computer printouts as long as they comply with forgery
provisions.285 Furthermore, Article 38 of the Electronic Transactions Law 2001
provides that any traditional crime perpetrated using a computer is deemed a crime. This
provision criminalises the first form of cyber forgery. Accordingly, forging a certificate
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of marriage using a computer is a crime under Jordanian Criminal Law 1961.
Criminalisation of the second form of cyber forgery i.e. the use of computer systems to
forge electronic or software dependent records, collides with two obstacles:
Firstly, the Jordanian Criminal Law 1960 does not protect intangible assets. It is clear
from article (443) of the Criminal Law 1960 that protection is only available for
tangible properties. Therefore, intangible records stand beyond that protection.
Secondly, Criminal Law 1960 does not recognise a digital document as a formal
document. Unfortunately, Jordanian law does not define the term ‘document’.

In

addition, Jordanian scholars in defining ‘document’ have excluded disks, tapes and
other devices from the documents which have legal efficacy.286 They argue that, despite
these instruments conveying thoughts and ideas, they contain invisible letters and
symbols and, consequently, are not documents.287 They assume that the forged
modification of ‘truth in document’ which is mentioned in the legislation, takes place
either by adding or amending documents written using durable rather than digital
materials.288 Kamel Al-Seed, a prominent Jordanian legal scholar, has opined that, ‘The
United Kingdom forgery law of 1981 has failed to prosecute computer forgery, despite
the fact that it does not distinguish between a written document and a cassette or tape or
any other device, hence, undoubtedly, the Jordanian forgery law is insufficient to do
so’.289
b) Australia
The Australian law by contrast, has closed the loopholes that made it possible for a
forger to evade prosecution for cyber forgery. According to the Australian Cybercrime
Act 2001, both using computers to forge documents and using computers to forge
electronic records is criminalised. Division 477.1 of the Cybercrime Act 2001 imposes
criminal liability on any person who intentionally amends data held in a computer.290
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Data according to Division 476.1 includes information in any form; or any
programme. 291
c) USA
In the same manner of the Jordanian, the USA legislatures have not explicitly
criminalised cyber forgery. The US Criminal Code lacks any provision specifically
addressing using computers to forge documents or using computers to forge electronic
records. Some States, however, criminalise cyber forgery. For example, New York
legislation has amended the definition of written instrument to include computer data or
a computer programme. 292 In Virginia, the Criminal Code expands the definition of
forgery to include ‘creation, alteration or deletion of computer data while it is contained
within a computer or computer network’.293
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
The Jordanian definition of forgery is controversial and narrow, particularly in the
context of cyberspace and computer systems. It excludes new methods of forgery, such
as using a computer to forge documents or digital records. Scholars, therefore, exclude
digital records from the definition of document. The Criminal Law 1960, however, does
not limit methods of forgery and therefore using computers to forge a document is
considered a forgery. Article 38 of the Electronic Transactions Law 2001 criminalises
the use of computers to commit traditional crimes. And cyber forgery is a traditional
crime committed in an electronic environment. The above laws, however, are not
applicable to using computers to forge electronic records, because the nature of the
document mentioned in the Criminal Law 1960 differs significantly from digital
records. Australian law makers closed the gap when they implicitly criminalised both
forms of the cyber forgery.
Jordanian lawmakers should device adequate laws to close the loopholes that facilitate
using computers to forge digital records. The Australian approach provides a model for
Jordanian lawmakers to adopt and follow, because the Cybercrime Act 2001 addresses
the two aspects of cyber forgery.
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4.2 Cyber Pornography
The word ‘pornography’ literally means ‘the writing of harlots’.294 In this section, two
closely related issues of cyber pornography are discussed. The first is the use of
computers and, in particular, the Internet, to disseminate pornographic materials, i.e.
cyber pornography. The second is the use of computer technology to produce ‘virtual
child’ pornography.

4.2.1 Cyber Pornography
Cyber pornography is the use of cyberspace to disseminate pornographic materials.295
Government prohibition on the publication of offensive materials has been significantly
compromised by the pervasiveness of the Internet.296 With the emergence of the Internet
and other communications technologies, the Jordanian government and many
neighbouring countries have installed Internet filtering devices that block anti-regime
websites. For example, www.arabtimes.com., an Arabic news website antagonistic
towards Arabic regimes is blocked across the Arab world, including Jordan.
Pornographic materials, however, which do not pose an immediate danger to
governments, are ignored. It seems that the government is willing to rely on traditional
legal protections to combat cyber pornography and other offensive materials rather than
to set up technological protections.
In Australia and the USA, adult pornography is not a crime, thus this section only
addresses Jordan’s response to cyber pornography and the second part will address
pornography offences in both Australia and the USA.

Jordan
Jordan’s legal response towards pornography starts from a different premise than
western countries. While the latter shows a serious concern for the production, display
or possession only of child pornography, because of its harmful ramifications for both
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children and adults who watch such materials,297 the Jordanian legal system, on the
other hand, backed by cultural and religious doctrines, generally prohibits all forms of
pornography. Two provisions from the Criminal Law 1960 and a one provision from
the Electronic Transactions Law 2001 prohibit different aspects pornography.
Article 319 of the Criminal Law 1960 explicitly outlaws the intentional publishing,
selling, distributing, displaying or possessing of any offensive materials that corrupt
community morals.298 The prohibition includes both the physical materials, such as hard
copy, and intangible images, such as Jpegs, as long as the act is committed for the
purpose of selling, distributing, or publicly displaying offensive materials in any
manner.299 Thus, displaying pornographic images at a dwelling or possessing it for
one’s own personal use on a hard disk are not prohibited. Article 320 of the Criminal
Law 1960 criminalises any abusive conduct or obscene gesture displayed in a public
place or that can be seen by many people. The legislators use general terms in both
articles 319 and 320, such as ‘any offensive materials’ and ‘any abusive conduct’ to
protect the community from abusive and obscene materials.
In the realm of cyberspace, although the Criminal Law 1960 law was enacted before the
advent of computer systems and the Internet, it can arguably be applied to cyber
pornography. This would contradict, however, the core principle of every code of
criminal law, which states that criminal laws are to be construed narrowly.300 Applying
this principle would prevent any attempt to broaden the scope of the above articles to
include cyber pornography. It is a necessary condition for cyber pornography
criminalisation to insert a more specific phrase, such as ‘computerised materials’ into
Articles 319 and 320.301 However, to close the loopholes and inadequacies of the above
articles, Jordanian legislators passed the Electronic Transactions Law 2001. Most of its
articles focus on electronic transactions, but one article is a ‘catch all’. Article 38 of the
Electronic Transactions Law 2001 imposes criminal liability on ‘any person who
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commits an act that constitutes a crime pursuant to legislation in force by using
electronic means shall be subject to the penalty of imprisonment for a period no less
than three months and no more than one year, or a fine of no less than 3,000 JD and no
more than 10,000 JD, or to both penalties jointly’.302 This article, when combined with
articles 319 and 320, may be used to criminalise cyber pornography.

4.2.2 Cyber Child Pornography
Child pornography has received a great deal of attention in recent years from
sociologists, criminologists, media, and legislatures, as reflected by enacting child
pornography prevention laws. However, it appears that there is no definitive parameter
of what constitutes a child among countries, because of differences in their cultural,
social and religious values.303 For example, in the USA, the age of consent for girls is
eighteen, 304 while it is sixteen in Australia,305 and fifteen in Jordan. As a result of
significant differences in definition and criminalisation, what actually constitutes child
pornography varies considerably between countries.306
Cyber child pornography takes two forms, namely, against real human beings, usually
called ‘child pornography’, and against ‘virtual children’307 or ‘animated puppets’.
Child pornography is defined as ‘the visual or audio depiction of a child for the sexual
gratification of the user and involves production, distribution, or use of such
material’. 308 While this definition is broad enough to include a wide range of illegal
activities ranging from producing to viewing real images of child pornography, it does
not include virtual child pornography production, distribution, or possession.
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Virtual child pornography consists of computerised images including animated movies
of young children without using actual children309 engaged in sex acts or other erotic
activities with adult persons or between children themselves.310 The computerised
images are indistinguishable from real children.311 This technological innovation came
about to avoid child pornography statutes, putting the latter at risk of irrelevancy.
Criminalisation of virtual child pornography requires the updating of child pornography
statutes to keep them abreast of information technology developments and to sustain
children protection against new predators,312 because virtual child pornography poses a
high risk to both adults and children.313 Adults who watch child pornography are more
prone than others to be child molesters and pedophiles;314 also, the virtual pictures can
easily lure children and help the predators to break the ice with children.315 In other
words, it encourages the children to build a sexual relationship with adult persons.
a) Jordan
Children have been given additional protection under the Criminal Law 1960. Chapter
two, section 6, addresses crimes against the family, including crimes against children,
such as rape, kidnapping, exposing children to indecent matter, seduction, sexual
molestation, and all forms of sexual abuse against minors. The prohibition on cyber
pornography can be applied to virtual child pornography, because the laws do not
distinguish between adult and juvenile or between real and virtual images. This would
contradict the core principle of criminal law, however, which states that criminal laws
are to be construed narrowly.316 Applying this principle would prevent any attempt to
broaden the scope of the above articles to include virtual child pornography.
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b) Australia
Since the advent of Internet services a decade ago, Australian legislation pertaining to
traditional child pornography possession has been amended to include virtual materials.
For example, the Australian Broadcasting Service Amendment Act 1999, the Online
Service Amendment Act 1999 and, more recently, the Commonwealth Criminal Code
amendments in 2004 are all intended to close the gaps and loopholes that were caused
by the advent of the new technology.
The Australian Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and
Other Measures) 2004 therefore, defines child pornography as ‘material that depicts or
describes, in a manner that would in all the circumstances cause offence to reasonable
persons, a person under (or apparently under) the age of 16 years: (a) engaged in sexual
activity, or (b) in a sexual context, or (c) as the victim of torture, cruelty or physical
abuse (whether or not in a sexual context)’.317 To include the broadest range of
computerised materials, including virtual products, the same Act defines material as
‘any form, or combination of forms, capable of constituting a communication’.318
Division 474 of the same Act criminalises the act of production, dissemination or
possession of child pornography.319
Nowadays, mere possession of child pornography in a computer memory is considered
a felony in all of the Australian territories and states. Nevertheless, in some state
jurisdictions, 320 proof of knowledge or intentional possession is required as a
prerequisite to convict a person of possession of child pornography.321
c) USA
In the USA, child pornography is undoubtedly prohibited, but a legal conflict arose
between the federal government and the Free Speech Coalition and American Civil
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Liberties Union over the banning of virtual child pornography.322 The conflict
culminated in the elimination of a portion of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 (CPPA) that had expanded the definition of child pornography to include
computerised images.323 In 2003, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End
the Exploitation of Children Today Act (the PROTECT Act) was introduced in order to
correct the language of the CPPA and avoid any inconsistency with the First
Amendment’s objectives.324 The PROTECT Act imposes criminal liability on ‘any
person who intentionally distributes, offers, sends, or provides to a minor any visual
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer generated image
or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, where
such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct’.325 It specifically addresses computer generated images or pictures, in other
words, virtual child pornography. In the event of conviction, the offender would be
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years or a period of no less than
five years.326
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d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Western governments which regulate cyberspace content usually experience significant
challenges. Finding the balance between protecting individual privacy, allowing
freedom of expression, and protecting children from sex offenders is especially difficult,
as was obvious in the USA experience. Jordan’s situation is completely unlike that of
Australia or of the USA in terms of banning offensive Internet content. Jordan did not
face any serious challenge from any party to its prohibition of all forms of the
dissemination of pornography. In contrast to Australian and US laws, in Jordan there is
a loophole that needs to be addressed if the Criminal Law 1960 pornography provisions
are to remain effective. Jordanian laws do not distinguish between virtual child
pornography and other forms of pornography, or between child pornography and adult
pornography. This loophole ignores the fact that child pornography threatens the
physical and psychological well-being of the children; the punishment must be
proportionate to the crime. Finally, Jordan and some Australian state jurisdictions
require proof of knowledge and intention to punish the crime. This is laudable because
hacking techniques, which are widely used, facilitate remote accessing and planting of
such materials in a person’s computer and without the latter’s knowledge.

4.3 Cyber Identity Theft
Cyber identity theft has been described as the ‘crime of the new millennium’, 327 and the
‘greatest threat to business after terrorism’. 328 It is ‘one of the fastest growing financial
crimes in the USA’. 329 Cyber identity theft can be defined as unauthorised access and
use of someone’s personal information, such as name, address, and credit card details,
or social insurance number, in an illegal way. 330 Its negative impact on victims can
include profound harm that extends beyond financial losses.331 For example, an identity
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theft scenario was depicted by the movie ‘The Net’,332 where the victim who was
completely stripped of her identity by another woman, suffered not only monetary
losses, but also non-monetary harm including emotional distress.333
The illegal use of identity information has increased exponentially in recent years.334 In
fiscal year 2005 alone, the USA Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received
approximately 686,000 complaints of fraud (63%) and identity theft (37%).335 While
Internet auction fraud336 was the most common form of fraud crime, credit card fraud
was the most common form of reported identity theft complaint. 337
While in both Australia and the USA statistics show that through cyber identity theft
and fraud, annual large-scale monetary losses are being caused, Jordan’s situation is
significantly different. The use of the Internet for credit cards transactions is still in its
infancy.338 Jordan’s official cybercrime statistics indicates that only 29 cybercrimes
were reported in 2001 and that none of them was a cyber identity theft or a fraud
crime,339 because the value of personal information transmitted via the Internet, such as
national identification number, has little value to identity thieves. However, there are no
genuinely reliable statistics on cybercrimes in Jordan that can be used to determine how
common identity theft and Internet fraud really are, due to the lack of law enforcement
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agency expertise and to weak public and private sector support for studies pertaining to
cybercrimes.
Identity thieves exploit a variety of ploys to acquire personal information and commit
their crimes.

4.3.1 Cyber Identity Theft Tactics
Cyber identity theft can be accomplished by using low-tech methods, such as
scavenging (dumpster diving) a password and other electronic access code from actual
physical garbage or by highly sophisticated methods, such as hacking into web sites and
computers storing consumer information, including credit card details. 340 Spoofing is
one of the most common cyber identity theft tactics. Web spoofing, Domain Name
System (DNS), TCP, and IP spoofing, are popular tactics used to steal identity and
commit fraud.341
A basic understanding the mechanism of those attacks is essential in order to ascertain
the applicability of criminal provisions to this kind of cybercrime.
a) Web Spoofing
In the virtual world, the ‘term spoofing applies to actions that make an electronic
transaction appear to originate from somewhere that it does not’.342 This sort of
chicanery is increasingly common in cyberspace, because there are a number of serious
security flaws inherent in the TCP/IP protocol suite.343
Web spoofing is a technique used for convincing an Internet user that a particular
website is legitimate, where in reality it is not.344 It is usually accomplished through
both technical and social engineering tricks which attract gullible users to visit and
engage with a phoney website.345 The tactic starts with buying a domain name346 that is
340
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similar but slightly different to that of a popular company, such as by putting in a single
extra letter or a lower case character instead of a capital letter.347 Consequently, Internet
users browsing the web may unwittingly visit a fraudulent website and enter personal
data.348 Because technical tricks alone are not sufficient to lure Internet users, spoofers
might employ social engineering tactics, such as sending Phishing e-mails349 to many
users at one time. Phishing e-mails (figure 4.1) ‘lead consumers to a counterfeit website
(figure 4.2) designed to trick recipients into divulging financial data, such as credit card
numbers, account usernames, passwords and social security numbers’. 350 Figures 4.1
and 4.2 respectively demonstrate the phishing and web spoofing technical and social
engineering techniques.351
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Figure 4.1 An example of a Phishing E-mail
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Figure 4.2 An example of a Spoofed Website
b) DNS Spoofing
Using a different technique known as DNS Spoofing, the attacker positions himself
between the victim machine and the rest of the WWW.352 This is accomplished by the
use of URL-rewriting.353 The URL-rewriting technique mechanism has been delineated
in five steps as follows:354
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1) The victim's browser requests the page from the attacker's server.355 For
example, the attacker server is http://www:attacker.org and the victim wants to
visit www: commbank.com.au. The URL-rewriting application will take him to
the http://www: attacker.org/http://commbank.com.au.
2) The attacker's server requests the page from the real server;356
3) The real server provides the page to the attacker's server;357
4) The attacker's server rewrites the page;358
5) The attacker's server provides the rewritten version to the victim.359
From a technological perspective, a slight difference between Web and DNS spoofing
can be noticed. The former does not require unauthorised access to be accomplished,
while DNS spoofing involves unauthorised access to the victim’s system. Hence, DNS
spoofing may be punishable under the provisions of unauthorised access.360
c) TCP Spoofing
TCP sequence number prediction attacks, known as ‘the man in the middle attack’361 or
‘TCP Spoofing’, are commonly implemented by taking advantage of the inherently
weak trust relationship present in the TWHS connection process.362 The attacker
interferes and hides between the client and the server in the second part of the TWHS363
process by predicting or guessing the server’s correct sequence number and then spoofs
that TCP segment,364 which will be accepted by the client who assumes that the segment
originated from a legitimate server source.365 Once the spoofed TCP segment is
accepted, the attacker can surreptitiously read, insert and modify messages cycling
between the two parties (the client and the server). In such a position the identity thief
355
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can not only steal passwords, but also compromise confidentiality, integrity or
availability of information.366
d) IP Spoofing
IP spoofing involves the creation of IP packets with a forged (spoofed) source IP
address.367 IP spoofing is primarily used to anonymously gain initial access to the
Internet.368 Once the IP is spoofed, the attacker can initiate several types of crimes
associated with IP including unauthorised access and impersonating a legitimate e-mail
to make it look like it originated and was sent from a legitimate source.369

4.3.2 Survey Legal Responses
a) Jordan
The Criminal Law 1960 addresses two pictures of identity theft, namely, use a false
identification and impersonating law enforcement officers.370
First, Articles 212 and 213 of the Criminal Law 1960 criminalise any person using a
false identification during proceedings before a magistrate, prosecutors or other law
enforcement officer. This picture of identity theft, therefore, aims at protecting justice
and maintaining the integrity of the investigation process. Second, Article 266
criminalises the act of impersonating an officer or employee of the government.371
None of these pictures of identity theft address cyber identity theft, because they focus
only on physical identity theft and protect a particular type of person’s identity, such
public employees.
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b) Australia
In Australia, the response to cyber identity theft is relatively mature, with many
provisions addressing different aspects of identity theft offences. Legislation at both
federal and state levels is adequate for combating the various forms of cyber identity
theft.
At the federal level, the Cybercrime Act 2001 and the Criminal Code Amendment
(Theft, Fraud, Bribery & Related Offences) Act 2000 omit any direct reference to cyber
identity theft, but provide enough protection against identity thieves. The Cybercrime
Act 2001 concerns cyber identity theft only indirectly.372 Section 477.1 (d) criminalises
unauthorised access to computer systems with intent to commit or facilitate an offence,
such as identity theft. Accordingly, DNS, TCP and IP spoofing forms can be prosecuted
under this division, because unauthorised access to the computer system is essential for
the spoofers to steal identity and financial data. However, web spoofing cannot be
prosecuted under the same provision, because it does not require access to the victim’s
system. Therefore, sub-sections 478.3 and 478.4 establish the legal basis for prosecuting
those who possess, control, produce, supply, or obtain data with intent to commit a
computer offence. As a result, obtaining data through web spoofing to commit cyber
identity theft is also criminalised under the same Act.
In the same manner as the Cybercrime Act 2001, the Criminal Code Amendment Act
2000 criminalises obtaining property and financial advantage by deception (Chapter 7
Division 134.1 and 2). Deception is defined as ‘an intentional or reckless deception,
whether by words or other conduct, and whether as to fact or as to law, and includes…
(b) conduct by a person that causes a computer…to make a response that the person is
not authorised to cause it to do’.373
At the Australian state levels, identity theft and fraud offences are prosecuted under
common law and statute law. However, South Australia is the only state that has
enacted specific legislation regarding identity theft. This law makes it an offence to
intentionally use another persons’ identification to commit, or help to commit, a serious
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crime.374 Furthermore, the new legislation aims at assisting identity theft victims to
restore their reputation after the damage inflicted upon it by the offenders.375 Section 54
for example, gives the victims of identity theft the right to apply for a certificate. The
certificate is to give details of the offence and the name of the victim and any other
matters considered by the court to be relevant to restore his reputation.376
c) USA
In the USA, cyber identity theft and fraud schemes can be prosecuted under several
laws. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 1998 (ITADA) has made
identity theft a federal crime. The statute makes it an offence for a person ‘knowingly,
transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of
another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony
under any applicable state or local law’.377 A ‘means of identification’ is broadly defined
to include a wide range of personal identifying information.378 It ‘includes any name or
number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify
a specific individual, including any name, Social Security Number (SSN), date of birth,
official state or government issued driver's license or identification number, alien
registration number, government passport number, or employer or taxpayer
identification number’. 379
The ITADA was criticised for failing to provide preventive measures.380 It is a reactive
law rather than a proactive one. It addresses identity theft only after a crime has
occurred.381 The act was amended in 2004 to broaden its scope and expanded the range
of conduct that may be considered identity theft to include any misuse of identification
that may cause harm to an individual or entity.382
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The legislator adopted preventive legal measures against identity theft in the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act 2003 (FACTA). It provides that customers holding
credit cards, such as Visa and MasterCard, have the right to request a free consumer
report every 12 months from major credit reporting agencies.383 This mechanism
encourages customers to conduct self-monitoring. Furthermore, customers can place an
alert on their credit files that puts potential creditors on notice that they must proceed
with caution when granting credit.384
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Cyber identity theft presents a unique environment of theft that requires an effective and
efficient law. Pertaining provisions of the Criminal Law 1960 only address particular
pictures of the identity theft, such as use of a false identification card during a criminal
investigation or judicial proceeding, or impersonating a public employee. Thus, no form
cyber identity theft can be prosecuted under the Criminal Law 1960 unless a physical
appearance or I.D. card has been used to deceive specific individuals. By contrast, the
Cybercrime Act 2001 criminalises all the forms of cyber identity theft. On the other
hand, because cyber identity theft causes substantial harm to the victim's reputation or
credit record, South Australian identity theft provisions provide the victims of identity
theft with a certificate for cleaning up their credit records and maintaining and restoring
their reputation.
However, neither the Criminal Law 1960 nor the Cybercrime Act 2001 is equivalent to
the ITADA and FACTA because, while the latter provides not only reactive, but also
proactive responses, by granting the customers the right to obtain annually a free copy
of their credit report, the ITADA directly and specifically criminalises identity theft.
Thus, there are no obstacles to prevent the Jordanian legislator from enacting a cyber
identity theft law that provides sufficient protection against spoofers and cyber identity
thieves as well as restoring identity theft damage.
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4.4 Cyberstalking
There are various definitions of cyberstalking. Bocij simply defines cyberstalking as
‘the use of information and communications technology (in particular the Internet) in
order to harass individuals’. 385 This definition clearly emphasises the conventional
character of a stalking crime, i.e. as harassment, and that the internet is not the only
means of harassing the victims. Computers, fax machines, cell phones and other
devices, for example, are used to commit stalking crimes, but the Internet now provides
the most convenient platform for stalkers.
Cyberstalking takes many forms and the victims are people of all ages and genders.
However, whilst stalking is a long-established behaviour,386 mainly committed by a
male against a female, anecdotal statistics indicate that cyberstalking is a significant and
growing problem targeting a specific person and motivated by hate, revenge, racism,
and so on.387 The report of an American organisation, called Working to Halt Online
Abuse, for example, shows that, between 1 January and 31 December 2005, it handled
443 cases of cyberstalking.388 Sixty seven per cent of the cases involved female victims;
389

43.5% of the cases involved harassment by a male; 21.5% of the harassers were

female.390 This seems inconsistent with the stereotype that stalking is solely a crime
perpetuated by men against women involving violence that appears serious and would
result in death or grievous bodily harm.391 Although not all types of cyberstalking
involve sexual harassment or even malicious behaviour, such as a simple ‘love
obsession’,392 cyberstalking gradually scales up from a remote threat to actual physical
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harm or injury.393 For example, in the four cases of cyberstalking studied by Bocij, the
victim in each was first digitally stalked and soon afterwards physically harmed by their
cyber-stalker.394

4.4.1 Survey Legal Responses
a) Jordan
In Jordan, neither actual physical nor cyberstalking behaviour has been observed. This
is primarily because tribal and religious traditions govern the response to sexual
behaviour within the Jordanian community. Moreover, the paucity of personal
information transmitted via the Internet, and the relatively rare use of computers to save
personal information, particularly by females, prevents cyberstalking incidents.
However, cyberstalking and online harassment are escalating rapidly because of
increased internet use. Actual physical stalking is not a named crime in the Criminal
Law 1960 but related types of crimes are. For example, Articles 305 and 320 criminalise
physical sexual harassment against a female or a juvenile male, and sexual harassment
conducted in a public place, respectively. Article 38 of the Electronic Transactions Law
2001 criminalises conventional crimes, such as sexual harassment committed by using
electronic means. The Internet can be considered as a public place because many users
can simultaneously share different activates. Thus, cyberstalking involving sexual
harassment against a female or a juvenile male can be criminalised under article 320 of
the Criminal Law 1960 combined with article 38 of Electronic Transactions Law 2001.
However, this would contradict the core principle of criminal law, which states that
criminal laws are to be construed narrowly.
b) Australia
The laws concerning cyberstalking and harassment in Australia vary between federal
and state levels, as well as among the states. At the federal level, there is no
overreaching statute that is specifically concerned with cyberstalking. The Federal
Criminal Code 1995, updated through the Crimes Legislation Amendment
(Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures) Bill 2004 provides that individuals
http://www.novabucks.org/info/stalking.htm > at April 2 2006. See, eg, Stephen Andert and Donald K.
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393
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using telecommunications services in a way that reasonable persons would regard as
being, in all the circumstances, menacing, harassing or offensive, would be liable under
Section 474.17 of this Act.
At the state level, the first anti-stalking law was enacted by the State of Queensland in
1999 (Criminal Code (Stalking) Amendment Act) and a few other states have enacted
cyberstalking offences. Victoria, Queensland, and South Australia are the only states to
include the use of the Internet in their legislation. Section 19AA of the South Australian
Criminal law Consolidated Act 1935 for example, specifies an offence when ‘… any
person communicates with the other person…by way of mail, telephone (including
associated technology), facsimile transmission or the Internet or some other form of
electronic communication in a manner that could reasonably be expected to arouse
apprehension or fear in the other person…’395
c) USA
In the USA, specific legal tools have been designed to combat cyberstalking. At the
federal level, it is a crime, punishable by up to 20 years in prison and a fine of up to
$250,000, to transmit any communication in interstate or foreign commerce containing
a threat to injure and harass the person of another.396
At the state level, the Illinois state Criminal Code, for instance, makes harassment of
another person through the use of electronic communication a felony, punishable by up
to ten years in prison and a fine of up to $100.000.397 However, while, the Illinois anticyberstalking law applies to communications of threat of immediate or future bodily
harm, and also to comments, requests, and suggestions or proposals which are obscene,
the federal code applies only to communication of actual threats. Therefore, the federal
law is inadequate to enable law enforcement agencies to take pre-emptive measures to
address the looming danger of cyberstalking.
In 2006, President Gorge W Bush signed the ‘Violence against Women and Department
of Justice Reauthorization’. This law amended section 223h of the Communications Act
1934. Section 113 provides that whoever ‘…utilizes any device or software that can be
395
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used to originate telecommunications or other types of communications that are
transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet…without disclosing his identity and
with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person ... who receives the
communications ... shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both’.398 The new law makes it a federal crime to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass
another person over the Internet. This legislation, however, is overly broad because it
does not define the term ‘annoy’ and refers instead to the subjective effect of the
offender conduct on the victim.399 For example, for merely sending blank messages to
someone’s e-mail box, the sender can be prosecuted under the ‘Violence Against
Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization’.400 This is because the law does not
look at the effect of the annoying abuse, threat, and harassment on the victims.
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
The Jordanian law concerned with sexual harassment and related issues addresses only a
subset of potential cyberstalking activities. This is because the law focuses on the
physical aspects of sexual harassment and avoids addressing the offence of stalking.
Thus, cyberstalking which escalates into physical harm can be prosecuted under the
current Jordanian laws. For example, in cyber-love obsession stalking, there will be no
punishment unless in conjunction with physical violence. Inflicting physical harm is
necessary for the criminal prosecution of a cyber stalker. Australian Federal and State
laws, South Australia in particular, have introduced models that effectively criminalise
cyberstalking by addressing the use of the Internet in a way that would be expected to
cause fear or apprehension on the victim. The new US legislation provides protection
against cyberstalking that is too broad, as the term ‘annoy’ is subjective, because there
are various opinions about what constitutes annoyance.

4.5 Conclusion
Information and communications technology has offered criminals unprecedented
opportunities to commit traditional crimes via computer systems. The commission of
398
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the old crimes supported by new tools leaves cyber fingerprints that provide law
enforcement with a wide range of digital evidence that can be used to establish
conclusive evidence of wrongdoing. Digital images, video clips, information content,
internet forums and so on can provide digital evidence sought obtained from cybercrime
scenes for the purpose of establishing criminal liability.
Forgery, pornography, identity theft and stalking are traditional crimes but need to be
re-addressed in the context of cyberspace. These crimes are increasingly occurring in
cyberspace, particularly cyber pornography and identity theft crimes. Their impact on
Internet users, children, and internet development is profound.
The existing legislation does not recognise the data stored in a PC as a property having
legal efficacy, nor is the term ‘document’ which is mentioned in the law meant include a
digital object. As a result, the Criminal Law 1960 is incompetent to address cyber
forgery unless digital data is given a legal efficacy or the use of computers to forge
digital records or documents directly criminalised.
In the context of cyberspace, pornography and identity theft take different forms and
different routes from those of the classical patterns. Cyber pornography, for instance
takes different forms, such as adult pornography, child pornography, and virtual child
pornography. While the first form is not a crime in Australia or in the USA, the other
forms are classified as serious crimes in both countries. Australia’s pornography
legislation, at both federal and state levels, parallels American legal safeguards against
child pornography. In both jurisdictions, offenders are subjected to harsh punishment.
However, on the contrary, most of the Australian States adopted fanatical laws that
made a crime the mere possession of child pornography stored on one’s personal
computer. By contrast, the current Jordanian laws prosecute any of the pornography
forms without differentiating between them. However, to avoid any problems due to the
lack of specific terms, such as computerised images, amendment is necessary to keep
the law current with evolving technology and crimes tools.
In a similar manner, cyberspace has changed tremendously the pattern of identity theft
offences. New methods of identity theft involving highly sophisticated techniques were
effectively addressed and appropriate measures were taken to prevent cyber identity
theft. The South Australian Criminal Law consolidation Act 1935, amended by
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Criminal Consolidation Act 2004 for example, was crafted to provide appropriate
protection from identity theft, while Jordanian laws, by contrast, are incompetent to
criminalise cyber identity theft. This is because the Criminal Law 1960 criminalises
specific conceptions of classical identity theft. Those conceptions are completely
different from the ones used by spoofers and cyber-offenders.
Cyberstalking differs from the variety of forms of physical sexual harassment. The
Criminal Law 1960 failed to address cyberstalking, where the latter does not escalate
into physical harm, and addresses only physical harm. Nevertheless, there is no a barrier
to preventing Jordanian legislators from taking deterrent legal measures to protect cyber
users by enacting cybercrime legislation including cyberstalking.
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5

CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION APPROACHES AND
CHALLENGES

Introduction
Streamlining and strengthening procedures in cybercrime investigation and eliminating
or reducing impediments to law enforcement efforts are important prerequisites to
successful investigation. An effective response to cybercrime requires a two-pronged
solution: criminalisation itself and the approach to investigation. The criminalisation
response, which was addressed in the previous chapter, shows that traditional
substantive laws, which were formulated to deal with real-world crimes, were
insufficient to address all forms of cybercrimes. It was suggested that a comprehensive
substantive law is needed. Promulgating a comprehensive law, however, is only half of
the solution. The other half is the existence of an effective and efficient investigative
approach to cybercrime. This approach requires, first, identifying the optimum
investigation models and, second, responding to the legal challenges that hinder law
enforcement’s ability to investigate cybercrimes.
The objective of this chapter is to streamline the investigation process and harmonise
policies and procedures designed for investigating cybercrimes. Also, it examines the
factors necessary for successful investigation and identifying and eliminating legal
challenges. It hypothesises that the approach model to cybercrime investigation adopted
by the Jordanian Computer Crime Unit (JCCU) is deficient in some components.
Therefore, formulated protocols and models of investigation, which were formulated
mainly by the Australian High Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC) and the US Department of
Justice (DOJ) and by forensic experts, will be analysed and compared with the
Jordanian investigative approach. These approaches were chosen because they are
known for their robustness and their ability to handle different sorts of cybercrimes.
Furthermore, they include important and intricate procedures.
The Jordanian government recognises the importance of Information Technology (IT)
as a key element to improve administration as well as security. Policies and procedures
that specifically aim at strengthening economic performance and internal security were
adopted, the Electronic Government Initiative, for example. The Jordanian Public
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Security Directorate (PSD), a public organisation in charge of internal security, and the
General Prosecutorial Department (GPD) both play a vital role in thoroughly evaluating,
applying and monitoring criminal policies, directives and criminal procedures. The PSD
is assigned to investigate criminal cases, gather information, including searching for and
seizing evidence, and then to hand over the case to the GPD. The GPD, which is a part
of judicial system, is one of the main divisions of judicial authority conducting further
investigation, analysing and labelling the crimes, and finally standing before the court to
seek conviction for offences.
Since the establishment of the PSD in 1958, it has experienced remarkable advances,
intended to overcome investigative challenges and keep abreast of IT developments.401
This has translated into growth of quality and quantity of police departments, and in the
appointment of specialised criminal investigation officers and detectives dealing with
particular crimes.402 In recent years, for example, the PSD has established numbers of
new departments, such as the Environmental Police Unit (EPU), as well as the JCCU.403
The latter, which is a part of the forensic laboratories division, investigates cybercrimes
and provides laboratory services in the inspection and analysis of digital evidence. For
this purpose, the JCCU has formulated a sketchy guideline for the procedure to be
followed in dealing with cybercrimes scene and digital evidence.404 Nowadays,
however, law enforcement agencies during their day-to-day duties are very likely to
encounter crimes where computers are the target, the storage medium, or the tools of
crimes.405 The novelty of cybercrime challenges traditional models of law enforcement
investigation. Therefore, the absence of diligent investigation guidelines in Jordan,
401
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coupled with legal impediments that inhibit the investigation process, poses significant
problems for law enforcement in investigation of cybercrimes.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first is concerned with the investigation
approaches and the second identifies investigation challenges. The first part is further
divided into two sections. The first will address the importance of cybercrime
investigation, and investigation priorities. It examines the need for a mechanism that
quantifies and assesses which cybercrimes are to be considered significant and, thus,
worth investigating. The second section will address the investigation approaches of
Jordan, Australia, and the USA and comparatively analyse the component structure of
each model with the Jordanian guideline, noting any strengths or weakness that would
affect an investigation. Investigation approaches formulated by scholars Seamus O
Ciardhuain and Eoghan Casey will also be examined and compared with the Jordanian
approach. Part two examines the legal and technical problems that arise in cybercrime
investigation, focusing on privacy and encryption. Then the legal response to such
impediments will be surveyed and assessed in order to arrive at an optimal response.

5.1 Cybercrime Investigation Approaches
Fostering and strengthening cybercrime investigation is a two-pronged process. The
first is to implement administrative procedures within the investigation unit to ensure
effective control over cybercrime cases. The second is to formulate forensic models or
guidelines to perform successful investigation.

5.1.1 Priority Investigations
An investigative priority for certain categories of cybercrimes is important because the
capability of Cybercrime Units to perform a variety of cybercrime investigations is
limited compared to the investigation of traditional crimes.406 This is for two reasons.
The first is because the volume and diversity of cybercrimes have increased
significantly in recent years. For example, statistics published by the CSI/FBI Computer
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Crime Survey in 2005,407 and the Australian Computer Crime & Security Survey in
2006,408 foresee a continuing increase in the number of complaints and crimes. The
second reason is because trivial traditional crimes, such as misdemeanours and traffic
violations, need much less time and fewer resources to be investigated. Meanwhile,
trivial cybercrimes require more investigative resources, such as first responders,
technical teams, forensic experts and equipment commensurate with serious
cybercrimes.
There are several factors used to determine whether a crime is a trivial or a high profile
crime. Traditionally, law enforcement agencies and the mass media held the key to
determining which crime is a high profile case. Twenty years ago, heinous and violent
crimes always had priority over cybercrimes.409 Meanwhile, the latter was not a priority
for law enforcement or to the mass media worldwide for a number of reasons, among
them that internal police culture places a lower value on catching non-violent
offenders,410 and that investigative priority is primarily set according to the scale and
significance of the complaints and their physical damage. For example, Ken Hunt, a
former Australian Federal Police (AFP) detective superintendent, said: ‘Most of my
colleagues, most of the other people at my level, thought computer crime was a wank.
And that I should be out there investigating “real crime”.’411 This situation, however,
407
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has been changed entirely by the rapid and continuing expansion of cybercrimes,
because of the prevalence of cybercrime offences and the establishment of Cybercrime
Units which have significantly contributed to the positive change in both knowledge and
attitudes to the seriousness and priorities of cybercrimes.
Basically, traditional violent crimes are ranked in seriousness as either felonies or
misdemeanours, depending upon the severity of the crime and the maximum
punishment that can be imposed. Law enforcement agencies place serious crimes on the
front line. For example, in the USA, the ‘Quality over Quantity’ programme was
ordered by Clarence Kelley, the director of FBI in 1975, to establish parameters for
prioritising traditional crimes.412 Serious and important crimes were put on the front
line, and less serious crimes were placed on the back burner.413 By contrast, different
types of cybercrimes are not ranked as felonies or misdemeanours, and therefore,
Cybercrime Units must apply internal guidelines, measures, or policies to ensure that
serious cybercrimes are investigated immediately.
a) Jordanian Computer Crime Unit (JCCU)
The JCCU has not established parameters that specify which cybercrimes are worthy to
be investigated.414 Conversely, the Unit investigated all the reported incidents.415 This is
because the number of the cases investigated so far is very small and the Unit has not
received complaints about all the criminal activities committed within cyberspace.
b) Australian High-Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC)
By contrast, the AHTCC established a guideline that quantifies and assesses which
cybercrime is to be investigated first. The AHTCC assigns an investigative priority
based on four different criteria: level of affect, sophistication of the attack, nature of
target, and target significance.416 The first criterion, i.e. level of effect, assesses the
severity of the attack and damage inflicted on the victim which is either human or
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computer systems or networks.417 For example, online auction fraud, spamming and
spreading viruses are excluded from the AHTCC priority of investigation,418 because
they do not inflict serious harm. Meanwhile, child cyber-pornography offences have
received extreme attention, such as ‘Operation Auxin’ led by the Australian Federal
Police (AFP) and ‘Operation Cathedral’ led by the National Crime Squad, a British
police organisation, and which was the world’s largest policing operation against cyber
paedophiles.419 Sophistication of the attack, criterion number two, scales security
breaches and discovers who is behind the attack.420 For example, attacks launched by
organised crime or terrorist organisations receive a higher priority than hacking attacks.
The third and fourth criteria assess the importance and the value of the victim. 421 How
big is the target? How big was the impact? For example, attacks targeting an
unprotected network receive a low priority.
c) USA
In the USA, Cybercrime Units also rank cybercrime investigations. They exclude
several sorts of cybercrimes from their investigation priorities and focus more on
particular types of cybercrimes. For instance, some investigators placed online gambling
and cyber prostitution near the very bottom of their list of investigations;422 meanwhile,
intellectual property and child pornography offences have received a high priority.423 In
addition, federal cybercrime units have set three criteria that need to be met before
launching an investigation. The first criterion is the magnitude of the pecuniary losses
caused by a cybercrime.424 The threshold set is $5000 or more worth of damages or
losses caused. Accordingly, cybercrime units decline to conduct a criminal investigation
if the threshold value is not reached; however, if the same crime were committed
against several victims, the agency accumulates them to reach an amount above the
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investigative threshold.425 For instance, if one hundred victims each lost $100; the
centre will treat them as a $10,000 case, taking them over the threshold. However, in
September, 2008 the Congress revised the CFAA in order to give federal prosecutors
the ability to use the statute in a wider variety of cases. The amended revision of the
statute removed the $5000 requirement from § 1030 (a) (5). The second criterion is that
the crime has been committed within the limits of the jurisdiction of the agency. Finally,
cybercrime units sketch out a preliminary investigation to determine whether the crime
is solvable by studying the scene of the crime,426 and prosecutable by applicable USA
law,427 otherwise terminating the investigation process.428
d) Comparative Analysis
The five criteria set by the AHTCC are reliable in yielding accurate information about
priority of crime investigation. Investigators come to know and expect a level of effect
in a wide range of cybercrime. It is well known, for example, that DoS attacks against
popular websites such as eBay have more negative effects than unpopular websites.
The application of the US criteria is problematic, because there is no mechanism that
can be applied to ensure that the complaints are genuine and the financial losses
attributed to the crimes are accurate. Furthermore, sketching out a preliminary
investigation is time-consuming and expensive, because it involves technical and legal
issues, such as evidence collection, and analysis.
Ranking specific crimes with a high or low priority enhances law enforcement
investigation management, by freeing resources such as staffing and equipment, to
investigate high-profile crimes.429 Furthermore, it provides more consistency and clarity
in the investigation process across the national and international level. On the national
level, it helps the Cybercrime Units to make the links among investigation
responsibilities, and to assign the job to the right department. On the international level,
425
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the general picture worldwide is that cybercrime investigation priorities vary widely.
While, for example, the USA and Australia show extreme interest in pursuing,
capturing, and prosecuting paedophiles,430 JCCU shows no interest even in co-operation
in investigating such cases. This highlights the importance of liaising among the
Cybercrime Units and Interpol in order to define a mission statement identifying
objectives, goals, resources, and investigation priorities among the Cybercrime Units
worldwide. Therefore, while the ‘Quality over Quantity’ programme was applied to
traditional crimes, such as murder and other violent crimes, it optimises cybercrime
investigations too.

5.1.2 The Particulars of Cybercrime Investigation Approaches
This section addresses the legal aspects of computer forensic approaches that have been
formulated by law enforcement agencies and by computing experts. It examines the
emergence of computer forensics fields and selected models of cybercrime
investigation. Then it assesses what an optimal model for handling digital evidence
should look like. But first it is helpful to give a brief description of computer forensics.
5.1.2.1 Computer Forensics
The origins of computer forensic science can be traced back to the mid-1980s, when a
few computer hobbyists devised software programmes to solve some particular
pragmatic problems associated with individual cases.431 Within the next few years, and
in response to the escalation of cybercrimes,432 investigation of computer crimes took
shape as an independent discipline called ‘computer forensics’.
Computer forensics has witnessed dramatic developments in recent years. It is now a
separate and firmly established area of specialisation within law enforcement agencies.
For example, law enforcement agencies in Australia and the USA established
specialised teams for handling digital evidence, such as crime scene technicians,
430
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collection teams, examiners processing the acquired evidence, and digital investigators
analysing all available evidence to build the case in question.433
While there is no consensus on a definition of the term ‘computer forensics’, many
experts consider computer forensics as one aspect of a broader concept called ‘data
discovery’. They restrict ‘computer forensics’ to data recovery. Data recovery according
to Kay refers to ‘any process in which data from a particular computer or network is
sought, located, secured and searched with the intent of using it as evidence in a civil or
criminal legal case’.434 This definition is similar to Ieong’s. He defines computer
forensics as ‘the process to determine and relate extracted information and digital
evidence to establish factual information for judicial review’.435 Erin Kenneally defines
computer forensics by stating that:
Since forensic science is the application of a scientific discipline to the law, the essence of all
forensic disciplines concerns the principles applied to the detection, collection, preservation, and
analysis of evidence to ensure its admissibility in legal proceedings. Computer forensics refers to
the tools and techniques to recover, preserve, and examine data stored or transmitted in binary
436

form.

However, some computing experts, such as Kruse and Heiser, refrain from defining
computer forensics. They agree with many other experts that the basic aspect of
computer

forensics437

‘involves

the

preservation,

identification,

extraction,

documentation and interpretation of computer data’.438 Other experts argue that
computer forensics should include three fundamental elements. These elements,
according to Matthew and Christopher Stippich, are:439
1) Proper acquisition and preservation of computer evidence,
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2) Documentation, examination, analysis, and authentication of
collected data for court presentation; and
3) Recovery of all available data, including deleted files, unallocated
file space, slack space440 and other forms of digital trace evidence.
Despite the fact that the three components of the computer forensic process mentioned
above are not presented in chronological order, because the recovery process must come
first, then analysis and court presentation at the end, they remain the backbone for
structuring the cybercrime investigation process. As is discussed below, they are
essential to what might be called a ‘Cybercrime Scene Investigation Approach’.
5.1.2.2 Cybercrimes Scene Investigation Approaches
The newborn science of cybercrime investigation has evolved441 and investigation
models have been formed by governmental agencies,442 such as the USA Department of
Justice (DOJ) and by non-profit organisations, such as the International Organisation on
Computer Evidence (IOCE),443 the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence
(SWGDE),444 and the International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists
(IACIS).445 These organisations, and many others, have developed different types of
legal models and techniques for computer forensics. Furthermore, prominent computing
figures like Eoghan Casey, Seamus O Ciardhuain, Brian Carrier, Kruse and Heiser have
significantly contributed to the process. These models vary in their structure; however,
they must comply with specific criteria outlined by Carrier and Spafford as follows:446
1) The model must be based on existing theory for physical crime investigations.
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2) The model must be practical and follow the same steps that an actual
investigation would take.
3) The model must be general with respect to technology and not be constrained to current
products and procedures.
4) The model must be specific enough that general technology requirements for each phase
can be developed.
5) The model must be abstract and apply to law enforcement investigations, corporate
investigations, and incident response.

The existing models must comply with all of these criteria, because they address both of
the legal and technological perspectives of cybercrime investigation. The first and the
second criteria, for example, address the legal aspects of computer forensics, i.e. the
chain of custody that should be established for evidence. The third and fourth criteria,
on the other hand, focus on the technological aspects of computer forensics. The last
criterion ensures that the model can be easily applied to private and public
investigations. However, while the legal criteria - chain of custody - of cybercrime
investigation models apply to various cybercrimes, such as TCP/IP crimes,
cyberstalking, and others,447 the technological features of each model vary considerably
from crime to crime. For example, forensics programmes might be designated to
investigate specific types of cybercrimes, such as intrusion software forensic
programmes which are different from cyberstalking forensic programmes. In other
words, each model agrees on its essential legal elements but differs in some
technological details.
According to Kruse and Heiser, forensics investigation models consist of three basic
steps: acquiring, authenticating, and analysing the evidence.448 Stephenson has also
divided them into three phases. The first is called ‘launch activities’ which involves
protecting the cybercrime scene from contamination, hypothesising how the attack took
place, and collecting evidence.449 The second phase analyses the incident and consists
of three different steps: reconstructing the crime scene, conducting trace back
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investigation, and performing detailed analysis.450 The final phase of investigation is
evidence analysis and report preparation.451 These steps are intended to provide
incontestable proof that the digital evidence was not contaminated and that it remained
intact during the computer forensic process.452 Therefore, the major goal of these
models is to yield admissible digital evidence.
In this section, the investigation models applied by the JCCU, AHTCC, and the USA
DOJ will be identified as well as the models formulated by two prominent forensic
scientists, O Ciardhuain and Casey.
a)

Jordanian Cybercrime Investigation Model.

The JCCU’s model is entitled ‘Computer & Cyber Crimes Digital Evidence’.453 It
consists of two phases. The first one describes the physical procedures that should be
adopted at the crime scene. This phase consists of the following steps: securing the
crime scene to prevent loss, contamination and destruction of evidence, and
preservation of the state of the physical scene.454 The second phase consists of nine
generalised instructions for the first responders who are affiliated with the JCCU.455 It
describes procedures that should be taken in the crime scene as follows:456
1) Documentation; which involves recording the complete details of the crime scene, such as
whether the computer is plugged in or not.
2) Identification; which involves systematically numbering each computer and peripheral
device found at the crime scene. If the investigators find a computer and its peripheral
equipment is in more than one room, each computer and the attached peripheral equipment
should be given a unique number, such as computer A, scanner A1, printer A2, etc
3) Identification and documentation of storage devices, such as CDs and DVDs found in the
crime scene.
4) Photographing the crime scene.
450
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5) Preservation of digitalised materials.
6) Preservation of printouts and hard copy documents found at the crime scene.
7) Preservation of hardware materials.
8) Recovery process by printing pending documents, i.e. documents wait in the print queue.
9) Transportation of the collected evidence.

b)

Australian Cybercrime Investigation Model

The AHTCC has adopted ‘HB 171: Guidelines for the Management of IT Evidence’
model for the preservation and collection of digital evidence.457 The guideline is part of
the Commonwealth Government E-Security National Agenda.458 It consists of six
phases:459
1) Designing for evidence; which involves identifying the evidence, author, time and data of
evidence creation and alteration, establishing the authenticity of evidence, and reliability of
computer programmes.
2) Producing records; that ensure that the system producing evidence is reliable. For example,
organisations should be able to demonstrate that a computer programme which produced
evidence was operating correctly.

460

3) Collection; involves search and locate all relevant information and documentation of digital
evidence.

461

4) Analysing; looks at the examination products for its significance and probative value to the
case.

462

5) Reporting and presentation that involves writing a final report showing that all previous
463

steps done according to the best practice or law.

6) Determining evidentiary weight or the final assessment is performed by a natural
464

arbitrator.

457
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c)

The USA Department of Justice Model

The US Department of Justice model is called ‘Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A
Guide for First Responders’.465 It consists of four different stages, starting with evidence
collection, followed by examination of the collected data, then analysis, and finally
reporting.466
1) Evidence collection involves search, recognition, collection and documentation of digital
evidence.
2) Examination process is referred to as separating the wheat from the chaff via making the
evidence visible and explains its origin and significance.
3) Analysis looks at the examination products for its significance and probative value to the case.
4) A written report outlining the examination process and pertinent data recovered from the overall
investigation is the final stage.

d) Overview of the Models
There are remarkable similarities between the Australian and the US DOJ’s models,
while the JCCU’s model is mildly different. The AHTCC and DOJ models meet the
criteria outlined by Carrier and Spafford (see page 113) as well as the fundamental
elements of computer forensics, proper acquisition, preservation, documentation,
examination, analysis, authentication, and recovery of data. The JCCU’s model, by
contrast, does not include all the fundamental elements. While it addresses the proper
acquisition and preservation of computer evidence, as well as documentation, it does not
address recovery of all available data, including deleted files.
The JCCU’s guideline provides basic instructions for the first responders on how to deal
with the cybercrime scene and then more detail for investigators. The responders collect
evidence and send it to the JCCU’s lab for analysis by forensics staff. The examination
process, analysis, and reporting are not mentioned anywhere in the guideline, but step
nine orders the first responders to dispatch the collected evidence to the JCCU for
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examination, analysis, and finalising a report.467 Meanwhile, the Australian and the
DOJ’s models are more technical and require more advanced computer forensic skills.
They require the highly skilled forensics investigators to collect evidence and send it to
the lab for further investigation. However, the DOJ’s model has been criticised for the
following reasons: 468
1) It does not give much attention to the examination and analysis
process.
2) Its scope is limited by not including the earlier and later stages of
investigation, such as Awareness, persuasion and testimony.
To avoid the above criticism, forensic computing experts, such as O Ciardhuain and
Casey each developed what is claimed to be an optimal model for cybercrime
investigation.

e) Models Developed by Computing Experts
O Ciardhuain Model
Seamus O Ciardhuain developed a model called ‘An Extended Model of Cybercrime
Investigations’ which takes into account not only the processing of digital evidence
- the middle part of the process of investigation - but also the earlier and later stages of
investigation, such as awareness, testimony, and dissemination of information. The
model has the following key steps:469
1) Awareness: that involves setting up a system recognises the need for investigation. This
awareness created by events external to the organisation.
2) Authorisation: which involves either having informal authorisation, such as simple verbal
approval from company management, or formal authorisation, such as s search warrant.

467
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3) Planning: which involves several information flows to the investigating team from outside the
organisation, such as policies, regulations, and legislation or from inside it such as internal
policies which must be followed by the investigators.
4) Notification: which means informing the subject of investigation or other concerned party that
the investigation is taking place.
5) Search and identification of evidence: which involves locating, or tracing the evidence.
6) Collection.
7) Transport: which involves physical transport of the collected evidence.
8) Storage of the collected evidence.
9) Examination of the evidence collected.
10) Hypothesis: which involves the reconstruction of the incident to establish a clear picture of what
occurred.
11) Presentation of the hypothesis.
12) Proof/Defence: involves preparing a contrary hypothesis and supporting evidence.
13) Dissemination: that entails disseminating information from the investigation to the public.

Eoghan Casey Model
Eoghan Casey, on the other hand, developed a professional digital forensic process
consists of ten components:470

1) Accusation or incident alert: which involves setting up an alarm system, such as intrusion
detection system, multiple security sensors, network mentoring system reporting the incident to
law enforcement.
2) Assessment of worth: which involves conducting initial investigation in order to measure the
seriousness of the incident.
3) Crime scene protocols: which involves applying physical crime scene to cybercrime scene. For
example, all the physical things, and activities attached to digital evidence must be retained, and
documented.
470
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4) Identification and seizure: which involves the separation and distinction between what should be
seized and what should not.
5) Preservation process: which ensure that the original items are untouched and an exact copy of
the original materials is scrutinised.
6) Recovery process: which involves retrieving deleted, hidden, and encrypted data.
7) Harvesting: means performing a thorough investigation into collected evidence.
8) Analysis harvested information.
9) Reporting: involves writing a final report showing that all previous steps done according to the
best practice.
10) Persuasion and testimony: involves preparing for court hearing.

Overview of the Experts’ Models
Both of the models incorporate innovative investigation components. Notification and
dissemination are, for the first time, incorporated in O Ciardhuain’s model, and
harvesting in Casey’s model. However, none of them can be considered as an optimal
model. O Ciardhuain’s model, for example, makes notification and dissemination parts
of the process of the investigation. This completely contradicts law enforcement policy
in relation to confidentiality of information that is collected during the investigation.
Casey’s model, on the other hand, places the assessment of worth in the second phase
despite the fact that initial assessment requires an investigator to undertake various
components of the investigation, such as the recovery process, and analysis. Indeed,
some phases of the models, particularly awareness and accusation, are beyond the
Cybercrime Units’ authority range, because they are not a part of the investigation
process.
f) Comparative Analysis of Models
Although computer forensics experts and investigators generally agree on the main
principles of cybercrime investigation, there is no single, widely-accepted model for
conducting and managing investigations. 471 Nevertheless, the AHTCC and the DOJ’s
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models in most respects are similar and have common features. They are applied in a
very similar fashion to collect, authenticate, and analyse digital evidence.472 Indeed, it is
difficult to assess whether one approach or the other is better suited for cybercrime
investigation, because both of them include the main features of investigative
protocols. 473 The JCCU’s model, on the other hand, is a road map which puts the onus
of collecting digital evidence on investigators who are trained to handle physical
evidence; meanwhile, computer forensic experts examine and analyse data and report
findings and recommendations.474 The findings and recommendations may subsequently
be used by someone else (such as the first responders) to develop an opinion about the
incident. Thus, the JCCU’s approach is a guideline for use by the first responders to
deal with and collect hardware devices. An advantage and drawback are highlighted
with this approach. The advantage is to provide immediate protection against evidence
contamination. According to this model, first responders are able to act swiftly and
independently to secure evidence. Meanwhile, the drawback to this is that the first
responders in most incidents lack adequate skills and training to deal with the particular
requirements of cybercrime scenes, the first element of computer forensics.
In his article ‘The Digital Investigative Unit: Staffing, Training, and Issues’ Malinowski
lists a number of challenges confronting law enforcement that need to be addressed in
order to train skilled investigators, who are capable of managing cybercrime scenes. For
example, investigators investigating cyberstalking need to be familiar with Internet
terminology, applications, netiquette, emoticon, and acronyms.475 Jordanian law
enforcement officers (first responders) lack the opportunity to participate in special
training programmes designed to enhance and maintain law enforcement agencies’
skills for investigating cybercrime. Such training programmes are expensive, costing at
least $10,000 for each participant.476 Nevertheless, although JCCU forensics
investigators know a great deal about software and hardware issues, for example, the
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normal function of the operating system in question, the internals of the operating
system, the various file systems and technological aspects of cybercrime investigation,
they lack legal knowledge to deal with a real crime scene. Thus, the development of
human resources is critical to the success of efforts to improve Jordanian cybercrime
investigation.
In addition, to the two phases included in the JCCU’s model, the guideline should be
developed to clarify more aspects of cybercrime investigation. Examination process,
analysis and reporting should be incorporated in the model.

5.2 Cybercrime Investigation Challenges
In the previous sub-section it was demonstrated that an accurate investigation priorities
and robust investigative model grant investigators more latitude in managing
investigation resources and reducing caseloads as well as strengthening the investigation
process. However, officers investigating cybercrime often confront tremendous
impediments associated with issues concerning privacy and encryption.
This section addresses and analyses legal and technical issues, which investigators may
encounter during investigation process.

5.2.1 Privacy
With the rapid growth of information technology over the past decade, privacy,
confidentiality, and cyberspace have gained considerable importance,477 because they
are essential to the functioning of democratic societies, governmental performance, and
robust economics.478 For example, privacy and cyberspace promote creativeness,

477

In his inquiry into the law enforcement implications of new technology before the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on the National Crime Authority, Crompton states that ‘Privacy is clearly perceived by
Australians as a fundamental human right, and a right we are eager to preserve in a rapidly changing
global environment.’ See, Malcolm Crompton, Inquiry Into the Law Enforcement Implications of New
Technology (2001) Parliament of Australia
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/acc_ctte/completed_inquiries/199902/itlaw/submissions/sub27.doc> at 22 November 2006.
478
See, Richard W Downing, Drafting Procedural Laws: Empowering Law Enforcement with the Legal
Tools Needed to Investigate and Deter Cybercrime (2002)
<http://www.cybersecuritycooperation.org/moredocuments/Drafting%20Cybercrime%20Laws/Procedura
l%20LawsText.pdf> at 22 November 2006.

108

innovation, and competitiveness,479 as well as a necessary pre-condition for the
development of individual autonomy, and a prosperous community.480
However, privacy is slowly dissolving with the emergence of technology and security
concerns. Four decades ago, Professor Greenawalt, a member of the civil rights
committee of the New York City Bar Association and its subcommittee on wiretapping
and eavesdropping, raised three questions about the legitimacy of using tapping and
bugging devices by law enforcement agencies. 481 Thirty-five years later, Crompton
raised similar questions about when and how such devices are to be used while
respecting the values of the community, including its privacy482 values.483 Nowadays, it
assumed that the use of tapping and bugging devices is a common practice in broader
types of investigation.
The marriage between cyberspace and privacy creates a problematic situation and poses
a serious threat to individual privacy as well as to law enforcement for many reasons.484
That happens because cyberspace is not only used as a classic repository medium or
communication tool, but also as a medium for transactions, data mining, and data
aggregation.485 Information on credit history, sexual or political orientation, goods
purchased, sites visited,486 and bills paid online, are collected from various sources, and
aggregated by different organisations, in both private and public sectors. The aggregated
data provides indispensable sources of information for law enforcement agencies and is
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vital for investigating cybercrimes. For example, from online credit card transactions
and sites visited, law enforcement is able to collect information to track cyber offenders.
Thus, cyberspace becomes a vital environment for law enforcement agencies to combat
cybercrimes. Nevertheless, law enforcement agencies which probe into cyberspace must
conform to the privacy principles as set out in the privacy laws.
Investigating cybercrimes, however, requires more than just probing into static
databases that have finite information. Mining dynamic data, web mining,487 and
exercising ongoing timely cyber-surveillance to collect evidence of cyber wrongdoing,
such as monitoring chat rooms, are important in the virtual environment to sustain
ongoing investigation or to benefit a case.488 They are important as well to lead law
enforcement investigators to recognise and discover patterns of criminal activity. For
example, multiple sources of data, including mined data, help law enforcement to sketch
a chart or a map showing a paedophile’s orientation, or to establish a relationship
between a suspect and a physical location.489 Therefore, law enforcement agencies are
continuously urging the implementation of aggressive approaches, maintaining their
capability to collect, survey, and monitor cyber traffic as well as to be able to compel
ISPs to disclose subscribers’ information without requiring a warrant or any other legal
document.490 Nevertheless, law enforcement demands are likely to be hindered by
privacy laws. The capability of privacy laws to impede cybercrimes investigation varies
from country to country.
a) Jordan
In Jordan, and up till now, there is no particular law concerning privacy. However, there
are different provisions concerning privacy, even though none of them can be used
487
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specifically to protect individual privacy in full. 491 Private premises are generally
protected by Article Ten of the Jordanian Constitution. This protection is derived from
Shariah principles, the foundation of the Jordanian legal system.492 The Holy Qur’an
primary source of the Shariah law for example, addresses the right of an individual not
to be bothered in his home. 493 It prohibits entering the property of another without the
owner’s consent. Consequently, Article Ten of the Jordanian Constitution came to
mimic the Quranic verse as well as to fulfil the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which sets a common standard for individual privacy rights.494 It stipulates that
‘Dwelling houses shall be inviolable and shall not be entered except in the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law.’495 Furthermore, in 2003, the
Jordanian legislature passed unprecedented legislation that bars companies from public
disclosure of private information, including a person’s name, national security number,
age, nationality, residency, current and previous work places, social status, education,
address and wife’s name.496 This legislation also prohibits the private sector or
organisations from releasing information concerning an individual’s financial situation
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and medical information.497 Nevertheless, the Act exempts law enforcement agencies
and government entities from that prohibition.
Communication privacy in Jordan is established and maintained by the constitution in a
limited way.498 Article 18 states that ‘postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications
are protected and shall not be subject to censorship or suspension except in
circumstances prescribed by law’.499 This article provides a preliminary sketch of
privacy protection for dwellings, and specific types of electronic communications.
There is no legislation or regulation that specifically addresses the rules of cyberspace
surveillance, searches and seizures. Jordan’s Telecommunications Law of 1995 and
Electronic Transaction Law 2001 include no provisions or mechanism to guide law
enforcement officers on when they may install and run surveillance systems or tracking
devices for investigation purposes. The Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961,
however, only prohibits searches and seizures of physical items without a warrant.
b) Australia
To date, although Australian does not have a Bill of Rights, various aspects of privacy
right are contained in a variety of Federal and State legislative provisions.500 Since
2004, this privacy legislation has witnessed major modifications. Prior to 15 December
2004, there were laws in place that protected privacy and restricted law enforcement
access to personal information and communication systems, including personal
computers.501 The Telecommunications (Interceptions) Act 1979 and Privacy Act 1988,
until recently, protected individual privacy against illegal communications interception,
alteration, and disclosure of personal information. The former prohibits the interception
of communications502 carried on telecommunication systems and a warrant must be
issued for law enforcement to intercept communication systems.503 After December
2004, ‘the balance has been shifting away from privacy protection to allowing greater
497
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access and surveillance by law enforcement agencies’.504 This ‘shifting’ can be
observed in the forms of new and amended legislation.505 The Surveillance Devices Act
2004 and amended Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 now
provide law enforcement agencies with significant investigative powers.
The Surveillance Devices Act 2004 grants law enforcement officers the authority to
install and run key logging devices, surveillance506 or tracking devices507 on suspects’
systems on the grounds that:508
1) One or more relevant offences have been, are being, are about to be, or are likely to be,
committed; and
2) An investigation into those offences is being, will be, or is likely to be, conducted; and
3) The use of a surveillance device is necessary in the course of that investigation for the purpose of
enabling evidence to be obtained of the commission of the relevant offences or the identity or
location of the offenders.

In June 2006, the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 was amended and
renamed as the Telecommunications (Interception & Access) Act 1979.509 The Act
allows law enforcement officers to apply for two types of interception warrants.510 The
first type of interception warrant is a telecommunications service warrant. Under this
type of warrant, law enforcement officers can apply to an eligible judge or nominated
AAT member511 for a warrant in respect of a particular telecommunications service
being used either by the suspect or another person to communicate with the suspect at a
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given time.512 The second type of interception warrant is called a ‘named person’
warrant.513 This type of warrant is more comprehensive than the telecommunications
service warrant. It authorises law enforcement officers to intercept all the
communications services being used by the suspect, such as e-mail, chatting, MSN
Messenger service…and so on.
c) USA
In the USA, the relationship between privacy groups and law enforcement agencies is a
pressing topic. Lack of trust, coupled with ineffective anti-terrorism strategies and flaws
embodied in Carnivore,514 forced privacy groups to challenge law enforcement efforts
on fighting cybercrimes.515 For example, the FBI launched an initiative called the
‘Federal Intrusion Detection Network’ (FIDNET), designed to fight cybercrime by
monitoring government computers for security breaches,516 and the controversial
‘Carnivore’ Internet surveillance system collided with the principles of privacy advocate
groups.517 The latter argued that such initiatives, which aim to curb illegal activities on
cyberspace, would weaken privacy and had amorphous limits, 518 despite the legitimate
need to tap and monitor Internet traffic.519 The core problem is that no parameters are
set to guide the scope of surveillance systems, such as Carnivore. This is despite the
fact that there are laws, including constitutional and legislative articles, protecting
privacy rights.
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Constitutionally, the well-known concept of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, which
was derived from the Constitutional Fourth Amendment,520 primarily serves as a
defensive instrument against warrantless search and seizure of private property and also
against illegal Internet surveillance.521 The Fourth Amendment protection for physical
objects, was extended to include intangible assets, such as conversation and Internet
activities, by the United State Supreme Court’s prominent decision in Katz v. United
States.522 Katz ‘was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in
violation of a federal statute’.523 The information ‘was overheard by FBI agents who
had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth where Katz had made his calls’.524 The Court found by seven votes to
two that525 ‘The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.’526 Nevertheless, the concept
of a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, which was first formulated by Justice Harlan
who deliberated in the case,527 has become a test of privacy. This test requires an actual
subjective expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognise as acceptable,528 as
well as a balance between the people’s right to privacy and the government’s interest in
520
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crime prevention.529 The same concept has also been applied to protect individual
privacy on the Internet and in all aspects of the virtual world. Consequently, as a general
principle, individuals enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in governmental
treatment of their computerised personal information and data concerning different
aspects of their cyberspace applications, such as e-mails, as long as they show caution
and a concern not to divulge this information to others.530 This test is applied by the US
courts in each case when law enforcement officers search and seize evidence without a
warrant. If there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, the evidence obtained without a
search warrant will be inadmissible.
This principle, however, creates a state of confusion in which law enforcement is
disorientated about how to apply the aforementioned concept in a dynamic
environment.531 Hunsucker listed the difficulties associated with applying this concept
to a dynamic environment. He concluded that law enforcement officers are not aware of
parameters for a reasonable expectation of privacy.532
Legislatively, the PATRIOT Act, which was enacted to protect and support law
enforcement agencies efforts in fighting terrorism and other illegal activities, provides
law enforcement with broad powers to perform surveillance and retrieve information.533
It allows ISPs to voluntarily disclose users’ information and other content in case of
emergency.534 It increases and enhances the ability and the power of law enforcement to
track suspects with ‘roving wiretaps’ which may be placed on communications devices,
such as the Internet.535 Also, it provides law enforcement the ability to secretly install
software on individual computers or deliver surveillance software by Trojan horse.536
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d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Though communications privacy is encompassed in the Jordan Constitution, protection
of the right of individual privacy in cyberspace is not enshrined in the constitution.
Article 18 of the Jordanian Constitution cannot be extended to cyberspace, because
cyberspace is something different from telegraphic and telephonic communication;
different aspects are accentuated in each. On one hand, ‘Telegraphic’ is defined as ‘of or
relating to or transmitted by telegraph’537 and ‘telegraph’ is defined as ‘A machine for
communicating intelligence from a distance by various signals or movements previously
agreed on; which signals represent letters, words or ideas which can be transmitted from
one station to another, as far as the signals can be seen.’538 ‘Telephonic’, on the other
hand, is defined as ‘of, pertaining to, or happening by means of a telephone system’539
and ‘telephone’ is defined as ‘an apparatus, system, or process for transmission of sound
or speech to a distant point, especially by an electrical device’. 540 Thus, telegraphic and
telephonic communications are characterised as the transmission of writings, signs,
signals, pictures, and sounds over distance. Meanwhile, cyberspace is not only used for
transmission of writings and voices, but used for a much broader array of
communications and transactions. Furthermore, the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’
concept has no parallel in Jordanian legal thought. Jordanian law enforcement officers,
therefore, can monitor cyberspace and install and run key logging devices without being
liable for breaching privacy laws or concern for privacy advocacy groups.
By contrast, in Australia and the USA, the importance of enacting laws protecting
privacy on one hand, and of implementing monitoring and surveillance systems in
cyberspace on the other hand, always poses a considerable dilemma not only for law
enforcement, but also for civil liberties groups. In the words of legal scholars Grabosky,
Smith and Dempsey:
Personal privacy has become and is destined to remain one of the most strongly contested areas
of public policy in democratic societies. It seems likely that government access to personal
information will remain strictly circumscribed, at least in theory. While governments will
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continue at least to play lip service to the importance of privacy, they will maintain that a degree
541

of access to personal information is essential for law enforcement…

It is highly likely that the schism between law enforcement and privacy advocates about
the parameters of the cyberspace surveillance system will continue to grow as the
Carnivore Internet Surveillance System is misapplied,542 and government anti-terrorism
tactics are perceived as ineffective or unacceptable methods to prevent terrorism.543 In
Australia, for example, the recent two cases involving respectively the terrorist suspects
Mr. Haque

544

and Dr. Haneef have highlighted the credibility of the law enforcement

counter-terrorism policy.545 Nevertheless, the investigative power as provided in the
Australian Surveillance Devices Act 2004, division two, is not narrowly confined. Under
this provision, law enforcement officers are less likely to worry about close scrutiny and
obtaining permission to install surveillance devices like tracking cookies on the
suspect’s PC. This is because the phrases ‘offences are likely to be committed’ and
‘investigation is likely to be conducted’ are phrased to grant a law enforcement officer
the potential latitude and power to install and run key logging devices. Accordingly, a
mere suspicion is sufficient to justify installing and running surveillance devices.

5.2.2 Encryption
Encryption546 is an integral part of information technology and pertains to information
security, authentication and access control.547 In 1991, Phil Zimmermann, a prominent
541
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programmer, was the first to release a sophisticated form of encryption programme
called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) online.548 To understand encryption as a cybercrime
investigation impediment, however, it is important first to explain the basic concepts of
encryption technology.
Encryption is the science of converting readable data into an unintelligible form, or
turning plain text into cipher text, that cannot be read or understood by unauthorised
persons,549 to protect the confidentiality, privacy and to prove integrity.550 It has become
pervasive in the private sector and between individual users,551 because encryption
programmes are freely available online and are easy to download and install from
several websites for personal use.552 For example, encryption is commonly used in
commercial electronic transactions, such as ATM transactions, net banking, and Internet
multi-services.553 Strong encryption technology is a two-edged sword combining
potential benefits with potential harms.554 On one hand, it can be legitimately used to
protect the fundamental human rights of both privacy and freedom of speech and to
provide integrity, authentication, and confidentiality to electronic transactions.555 On the
other hand, it can be used by criminals to conceal incriminating data or/and to send
encrypted messages and photographs without being intercepted or accessed by law
enforcement. In the latter case, the primary goal of law enforcement therefore, is to
ensure that encryption technology not being used to encrypt illegal content or hamper
investigators’ ability to conduct effective investigations. Nevertheless, law enforcement
officers investigating cybercrime often encounter an encrypted crime scene which
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hinders the investigation process and criminal prosecution.556 Therefore, law
enforcement officers should be provided with the necessary power to deal with
encrypted crime scenes.
a) Jordan
Encryption programmes - their production, trade and use - are not regulated by the law
in Jordan. Encryption consequences in crime investigation have not yet come to the
attention of the Jordanian authorities. Thus, law enforcement has no power to apply for
an order to enforce a suspect or a third party to reveal his private encryption keys.
However, article 39 of the Criminal Procedure Law 1960 authorises law enforcement
officers and prosecutors to hire experts. For example, in cybercrime investigation a
general prosecutor can hire computer forensic experts to decrypt the encrypted data and
to provide technical assistance.
b) Australia
In Australia the picture is different. Law enforcement engaged in a criminal
investigation involving encryption has recently been given the power to compel a
defendant or third party to divulge encryption keys.557 Under section 3LA of the Crimes
Act 1914, investigators can apply for an order requiring the computer owner or a user to
reveal encryption keys or any other information enabling the investigators to access
information held on the computer. Failure to comply with the order is punishable with
up to six months’ imprisonment.558
c) USA
In the USA, controversial debates have been entertained concerning the right of public
authorities, such as law enforcement, to possess or access devices or codes that decrypt
encryption algorithms. The Clinton administration, for example, proposed legislation to
enable law enforcement agencies to effectively decode algorithms by building
‘backdoors’ into encryption products,559 or to force users to provide a copy of
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encryption keys to a third party or public authorities.560 However, none of those
attempts were successful because, inter alia, they were expensive and technologically
difficult to implement and, more importantly, they lacked international co-operation and
consistency.561 For example, if the proposed statute had been adopted, criminals could
avoid using or buying American encryption products with a built in ‘backdoor’ key to
read encrypted applications and turn, instead, to other impregnable foreign products,
such as provided by Russian technology.562 Instead, a guideline has been presented for
presidential approval setting out three initiatives that the government should undertake:
first, to establish the right of law enforcement to get swift access to the encrypted
information stored in a third party; second, to provide law enforcement with the latest
advanced technologies and tools to decrypt illegal data; and, finally, build a relationship
of trust between the encryption industry and law enforcement.563 These initiatives, if
adopted, would strengthen law enforcement’s capacity to deal with encryption.
Amazingly, Title 18 of the USA Code and the PATRIOT Act, which shifted the balance
towards law enforcement, each provide no power for law enforcement to obtain
encryption keys because to do so could be inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment,
which protects individuals against compulsory self-incrimination.564 Nevertheless,
section 404 of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act 2003 (DSEA) imposes penalties
on those who knowingly and wilfully use encryption during the commission of, or the
attempt to commit, a federal felony.565
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
The Jordanian legislature did not take legal action to backup officers investigating
cybercrime when they encounter an encrypted crime scene. The only tool available to
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investigators encountering an encryption problem is to obtain forensic computing
experts in the field of encryption. The Australian Crimes Act 1914 amendment is
advantageous, because it provides law enforcement with a strong mechanism to deal
with encrypted data. It even extends law enforcement power to third parties, such as the
users who share the computer with a suspect. In many cases, however, the amendment
has negligible influence over the suspect, because the sentence upon conviction for a
felony which the suspect would face, if he chose to abide by the order and divulge the
key, is tougher than the six months maximum sentence if he did not comply with the
order and thereby avoided conviction for the felony.
Although the USA administration is one of the world’s strongest proponents of tight
controls on encryption products exports,566 it can be clearly seen that its attempts to
acquire powers to combat criminal uses of encryption have failed. US initiatives and the
Australian amendment have no parallel in Jordan. Hiring forensic experts to do the job
is the only tool, but it is expensive and time consuming because, in some cases, it takes
a long time to decrypt the data. Law enforcement must be provided with the appropriate
power in Jordan to force third parties to divulge the encryption keys, as in Australia.
The first and the second proposed initiative in the USA, to draft guidelines, are critical
for law enforcement to conduct effective investigation, but the third initiative is
inapplicable, because Jordan has no encryption industry. Jordanian lawmakers should
simply impose additional penalties on those who knowingly and wilfully use encryption
during the commission of, or the attempt to commit and conceal, a crime.

5.3 Conclusion
Cybercrime investigation is an evolving science that covers complex technological
issues that have legal implications. Computer forensics initially emerged as a new
forensic science and developed gradually into a legal process. This legal process has
taken shape in the form of various investigation models developed by governmental and
non-governmental organisations and among computing experts. These models have
been formulated in accordance with classical investigation procedures, particularly
566
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relating to evidence admissibility doctrines. Four of these models were selected and
examined and compared with the Jordanian model. Optimality was not evident in any of
these models as there was no benchmark available to measure the models’ robustness.
However, weaknesses and strengths were identified in each, and the lack of
comprehensiveness and the omission of significant steps were identified in the
Jordanian model.
Building a robust model for cybercrime investigations is necessary in order to present
admissible and reliable evidence and, moreover, technological development is intrinsic
to the investigation process. Prevailing computer forensic software, investigation
models, and the ever-growing motivation among law enforcement agencies to work
together cooperatively to fight cybercrime will provide grounds for more consistency in
handling cybercrime investigations. Therefore, it is conceivable that a comprehensive or
an optimal model will be identified and subsequently adopted by law enforcement
agencies worldwide.
Privacy restrictions and encryption technology are obstacles to effective investigation.
Law enforcement and privacy advocacy groups are continue to be involved in a bitter
quarrel over approaches to cyber-surveillance. Law enforcement agencies are needed
for a stronger approach to cyber-surveillance and access to encrypted data. Law
enforcement investigating cybercrimes in both Australia and the USA have benefited
from ani-terrorism legislation. Investigation capabilities prior to 2001 were not
appropriate to suit cyberspace’s unique environment. Australian law enforcement has
been provided with new search warrants and surveillance powers, and the legal
mechanism to deal with anyone hiding or refusing to reveal encryption keys, whereas
the USA PATRIOT Act and DSEA expanded law enforcement powers to surveillance
and retrieve information. In Jordan, on the other hand, the Constitution specifically
recognises a limited right to privacy, because though it does not address cyberspace.
Therefore, law enforcement conducts electronic surveillance or e-mail opening but this
power is hindered by the lack of knowledge and an available legal instrument regarding
encryption, such as the legal power to force a holder or a third party to divulge
decryption keys.
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6

DIGITAL EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY

Introduction
Evidence takes two major forms: the first is the traditional form, such as testimony of
witnesses, oath, physical evidence, and so on. The second form is non-traditional
evidence, commonly known as digital evidence. Each of them varies in its integrity and
admissibility. While the first form of evidence has been scrutinised and analysed
thoroughly, digital evidence is not widely understood, because it is new and has little
precedent, particularly in Jordan.
Digital evidence plays a critical role in the prosecution of cybercrime cases as well as in
other sorts of classical crimes, such as drugs trafficking and terrorism. 567 It either
supports or refutes allegations in a wide range of crimes, from high-profile murder cases
to obscure investigations into cybercrime. For example, one serial killer who called
himself “BTK” has been sentenced to ten consecutive life terms in prison for killing ten
people following the electronic recovery of deleted files on a floppy disk by the criminal
on a church’s computer.568 This role has evolved with the growth of information
technology. ‘Digital evidence is becoming a feature of most criminal cases,’ says
cybercrime scholar Susan Brenner.569 For example, digital evidence is becoming
prevalent among many types of cybercrime including child pornography cases. In their
report, ‘Digital Evidence in the Courtroom: A Guide for Law Enforcement and
Prosecutor’, the USA’s Department of Justice (DOJ) reported ‘that it is rare to find a
child pornography case that involves anything other than digital images (and
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occasionally printouts of the digital evidence)’. 570 Therefore, reliable digital evidence
will contribute strongly to the success of cybercrime prosecutions as well as many types
of traditional crimes.
In the developed world, such as Australia and the USA, for instance, the numbers of
trials that have involved digital evidence have increased enormously, because of the
rapid escalation of cybercrimes.571 Australian and US lawmakers responded positively
by addressing technological developments that affect the existing laws, and adopted
provisions that recognise digital evidence. Their Jordanian counterparts have not yet
responded effectively to the digital revolution. Indeed, digital evidence is still alien to
the Jordanian legal system. Lawmakers have not yet shown a willingness to
comprehensively address the admissibility of some types of digital evidence. Existing
rules of criminal procedure and evidence were drafted to regulate the admissibility of
physical evidence. The most important issues concerning digital evidence that Jordanian
law enforcement and prosecutors are likely to encounter is the integrity and therefore
the admissibility of evidence extracted from computers and the Internet. The integrity
and the admissibility of digital evidence play a critical role in cybercrime investigation,
because in many cybercrime investigations, digital evidence is the only evidence
presented to the court. Thus, Jordanian lawmakers will have to move quickly to make
sure that digital evidence receives the same attention as physical evidence.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the volatility, the integrity, and the
admissibility of the evidence extracted from computers and the Internet in cybercrime
investigation. It demonstrates the particular characteristic features and inherent risks
associated with digital evidence from both technical and legal perspectives. The nature
and characteristics of digital evidence will be examined for their effects on evidence
admissibility. The chapter then evaluates digital evidence in terms of its legal
admissibility and discusses the role of the judges in evaluating digital evidence.
Therefore, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the different
types of data and their volatility. The second section examines digital evidence integrity.
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The third section addresses digital evidence admissibility. The legal responses and
judicial role in accepting evidence will also be analysed.

6.1 The Volatile Nature of Digital Evidence
The commission of cybercrime leaves digital imprints or cybertrails.572 Unlike physical
evidence, these cybertrails are invisible or virtually visible, volatile and reside in two
different memory storage systems: permanent storage units, such as hard disks, CDs,
and network servers or/and temporary storage units, such as Random Access Memory
(RAM) and Read-Only Memory (ROM).573 Cybertrails take three different forms:
active files, archival data, and latent data or deleted files. 574
First form, active files: these are dynamic and visible forms of information that need no
particular skills or forensic tools to display them and are usually not passworded or
otherwise protected from view.575 This type of data can be detected by the naked eye576
and includes temporary Internet directories, cookies, and history files.577 They are
retrieved without using any forensic tools, but by searching and browsing data and then
opening the required files.578 However, forensic tools such as SafeBack579 are used to
copy and analyse them. These files are very volatile and need more care and diligence in
their handling to achieve the highest possible standard of integrity and admissibility.
They are extremely susceptible to contamination, because they often reside in the
temporary storage memory that requires a consistent power supply. This memory holds
the data as long as the computer is on; therefore, it is more volatile than its storage
counterpart, i.e. hard disk drives, due to the transient nature of the data.580 Scholars of
digital forensics describe the methods that are used to recover and extract evidence from
572
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the temporary system memory as non-traditional digital forensic techniques, as
compared with techniques used to collect digital evidence that resides in hard drives and
other digital media, such as CDs and USB.581 Active data often provides highly valuable
digital evidence, either while a crime is actually being committed,582 or soon after its
commission,583 concerning matters such as loaded libraries, logged-in users, and open
files.584 Investigating this type of data requires implementing enabling forensic tools to
provide better means of data collection and analysis. FATKit, for example, is an
innovative forensic tool designed to handle volatile system memories and transient
data.585
The second form, archival data, consists of backed up and data residing in permanent
storage units, such as CDs, floppy disks, network servers or on the Internet.586 In a
similar manner as the active data, archival data are visible and need no particular
forensic tools to copy the required files.587 Archival files, however, are less volatile than
active data, because they reside in permanent storage units and can be printed out in
hard copy form.
The third form, latent data, comprises files which have been deleted files but can still be
retrieved using forensic tools.588 Contrary to popular belief, deleted files and files
emptied from recycle bins have not completely vanished, but are automatically and
temporarily stored in a particular part of the electronic storage devices known as slack
space. 589 However, they stay there until new data or files are written and saved over the
deleted files. In many cases, nevertheless, the old and overwritten files can be
completely or partially recovered if the new files do not take up all the space occupied
581
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by the deleted files.590 This is because the capacity of a cluster591 is up to 16 kilobytes
(16 KB), and therefore, when a file of 32 kilobytes is stored on a hard drive, it will take
up two entire clusters. Later, if this file is deleted and another file that is only 20
kilobytes in size is saved over the old file (32 KB), this will leave 12 KB from the old
deleted file recoverable using forensic data recovery software, such as Encase.592 Figure
6.1 illustrates the slack space and cluster.

Figure 6.1
Source: Thailand’s Computer Forensics and Incident Response
<http://trirat-puttaraksa.blogspot.com/> at 17 June 2007.

The three forms of data differ markedly with respect to their location on electronic
storage devices, and their volatility. The forensic process should be carefully handled to
avoid damage or alteration, because the information is fragile and can be easily lost.
Therefore, law enforcement officers must not perform any type of forensic process on
590
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the original data, but a mirror copy593 must be used to make a record of the original
data. The unique nature and location of the digital evidence raises difficult questions
about the integrity of evidence. The investigators’ responsibilities are not only to
uncover the incriminating evidence, but they must do it in an efficient and effective
manner to maintain evidence integrity and admissibility in court.594

6.2 Integrity of Digital Evidence
Evidence integrity is vital to the success of any criminal investigation and successful
persecution. But in cybercrime investigation, digital evidence integrity is of the utmost
concern due to the volatile nature of digital evidence.595 Because the latter is fragile, it
can be easily tampered with, accidentally modified, or contaminated. If any of these
actions occurred, evidence would be inadmissible. Therefore, computer forensic
investigators, first responders, and prosecutors are responsible for ensuring that digital
evidence is handled in an appropriate manner to minimise the potential risk of evidence
contamination. The possibility of digital evidence being lost or altered is extremely high
as Brenner and Frederiksen opined ‘the simple act of starting a Microsoft Windows
system will destroy more than 4,000,000 characters of evidence, and the spoliation will
be far greater if the system is used to run any programs’.596 Therefore, digital evidence
is more prone to be suppressed due to the potential risk of contamination. Robert Moore
described two scenarios in which a defendant can challenge digital evidence integrity.597
In the first scenario, a defendant might argue that the file access time stamp was
changed during the forensic process, because every time the computer was turned on
593
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and the files were viewed, the files’ access time stamps were changed accordingly.598
The second scenario is more a common one. The defendant might challenge the
integrity of the files, claiming that the investigators changed or altered the content of the
evidence or that the digital evidence was tampered with.599
The first scenario does not focus on the content of the evidence; but on the handling
process. It emphasises the importance of not using the original version of the evidence
in the forensic process, particularly collection and recovery. For this reason, the forensic
investigators must always assure that the original version of the evidence is kept intact
and make a mirror image copy of it.600 The mirror image copy can assist the
investigators by showing that the original version of the evidence is untouched and is an
exact copy of the original hard drive, and the only material subjected to the forensic
examination.
The second scenario encompasses situations in which the defendant argues that digital
document contents are altered intentionally or inadvertently or that the duplication of
those materials, i.e. the mirror copy, is conducted improperly or incompletely. In either
case, however, digital technology provides a critical means for forensic investigators to
identify and authenticate digital evidence. Metadata and hash value601 provide pivotal
evidence regarding the evidence integrity. Forensic investigators use them to
authenticate and verify its integrity, because they provide precise information that is
essential for determining the authenticity of the evidence. 602

598

Ibid.
Ibid.
600
See, eg, Patzakis John, Maintaining the Digital Chain of Custody, Infosecurity Europe
<http://www.infosec.co.uk/files/quidance_software_04_12_03.pdf> at 2 June 2007. See also, Philip
Craiger, Computer Forensic Procedures and Methods, National Center for Forensic Science <
http://ncfs.org/craiger.forensics.methods.procedures.final.pdf> at 5 May 2008.
601
Hash value is generated by using an algorithm called a hash algorithm, or hash function. In fact, there
are quite a few hash functions, but the most commonly used are MD5, and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA1). See, Rashi Gupta, Windows 2000 Security (2000) 203. See also, Thompson Eric, 'MD5 Collisions and
the Impact on Computer Forensic' (2005) 2 (1) Digital Investigation 36, 101-106. See also, Satoh Akashi
and Inoue Tadanobu, 'ASIC-Hardware-Focused Comparison For Hash Functions MD5, RIPEMD-160,
and SHS' (2007) 40 The VLSI Journal 3. Bruce Schneier, Opinion: Cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA: Time
for a New Standard (2004)<http://www.landfield.com/isn/mail-archive/2004/Aug/0071.html> at 19 April
2008.
602
See, eg, Cid Carlos, 'Recent Development in Cryptographic Hash Functions: Security Implications and
Future Directions' (2006) 11 (2) Information Security Technical Report 100, 105.
599

130

Metadata
Metadata is information stored automatically in documents that are prepared with office
software programmes, such as Word processors, Spreadsheet, and PowerPoint
applications. Metadata information is virtually visible without the use of forensic
tools.603 Figure 6.2 shows an example of metadata information.

Figure 6.2

Metadata provides vital information about the history of the files since their creation to
date, because it describes how, when, and by whom the files was collected, created,
accessed, or modified and how it is formatted,604 and thus all the information needed to
identify and certify the scope, authenticity, and integrity of active or archival data.605
Some examples of metadata are: a file's name, location, format or type, file size, and file
dates (for example, creation date, date of last data modification, date of last data access,
and date of last metadata modification).606 This information can be useful to
demonstrate whether the digital evidence was contaminated or tampered with after
leaving the suspect’s possession.
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Hash Value
Hash value (commonly known as hash algorithm or one way function) on the other
hand, works like a fingerprint image to authenticate the mirror copy and to determine
whether the evidence contained in the copy has been the subject of any improper
alteration.607 Hash value is a short string of random-looking letters and numbers
generated by using an algorithm called a hash function, i.e. a mathematical formula used
to encrypt and decrypt information, inserted into original electronic documents when
they are created to provide them with distinctive characteristics that will prove their
authentication. 608 Hence, each digital file has invisible and unique letters and numbers
(i.e. 37af194dda37b28f294e982aaa36db37) which function like human fingerprints, so
it is impossible to create two different files that have the same hash value.609 These
unique characteristics are embedded and hidden within the original documents, so when
law enforcement officers create a mirror copy, the hash value is also copied.
Hash value plays a critical role in computer forensics in providing a means for forensic
investigators to prove that the mirror copy in case of authenticity and integrity
challenges is an identical to the original copy.610 For example, if the hash value of the
mirror copy matches the hash value of the original copy the mirror copy is
authenticated. Thompson pointed out that ‘Changing one bit in the evidence will still
cause a cascade effect that dramatically changes the… hash result…’611 This means that
a slight discrepancy between the original and mirror copy or two different messages
having the same hash value will make the evidence inadmissible because one of the two
messages is inauthentic.612
Eoghan Casey advised that forensic investigators must take extreme care when creating
the mirror copy and must calculate the hash value code of the original disk to
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demonstrate that the mirror copy and the original version are identical.613 If a defendant
claims that the mirror image created by the forensic investigators has been tampered
with and some files have been changed, the forensic investigators can use the hash value
to prove that the original data and the mirror copy are identical and no changes
happened, because they have the same hash value. For example, the MD5 hash
function614 works as follows:615
First, if the original version of the recovered file says: ‘I have got different types of
legal drugs’ the hash value of this document would be:616
Original copy: 37af194dda37b28f294e982aaa36db37
Second, once the forensic investigator creates a mirror image copy, the latter and each
copy will contain the exact MD5 hash function.
Original copy: 37af194dda37b28f294e982aaa36db37
Mirror copy: 37af194dda37b28f294e982aaa36db37
Third, if the investigator accidentally or deliberately changes the above message by
replacing the word ‘illegal’ with ‘legal’, the hash value will change accordingly.
Original copy: 37af194dda37b28f294e982aaa36db37
Altered Mirror Copy: 041ad5e8c945959728a57414f520782c

Recently, the usage of the MD5 hash function in different applications, such as in speed
cameras, has been brought into question and subjected to court scrutiny, potentially
opening the door for challenging the credibility of the MD5 hash value as an authentic
613
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source for evidence integrity.617 In Australia, for example, in Roads and Traffic
Authority v. McNaughton, the defendant’s lawyer filed a motion to suppress digital
evidence produced by a speed camera on the ground that the MD5 algorithm used to
authenticate the evidence was weak.618 The Hornsby Court dismissed the charge
because the Road Traffic Authority (RTA) failed to find an expert willing to testify that
the photos had not been tempered with.619 By contrast, in Bursleon v. United States, the
court determined that the evidence was authentic because, among other things, the
programme or the system which processed the documents (the evidence) was known to
be trustworthy and reliable within the computer industry.620
After the Hornsby Local Court decision, Tony Morris, Security Software Engineer,
commented:
… it is quite clear from some of the comments of both the defence and prosecution that neither
really understands what a hash algorithm is…speed camera photographs are typically associated
with MD5 hash in a flawed attempt to verify integrity of the photograph. That is to say, in transit
from the camera to your letter box, integrity of the document can be (but isn't) guaranteed, since any
modifications of the document would mean that a different MD5 hash is generated upon
621

verification.

Morris’s comment highlights two critical points. The first is that prosecutors lack the
skill, experience, and understanding necessary to effectively support hash value role in
authenticating evidence. Unfortunately, this lack of expertise will open the doors for
more failed prosecutions. Law enforcement, therefore, should be provided with the
necessary tools and experts to defend hash value and prosecutors and Judges provided
with a precise picture of how and why hash value technology is impregnable or
breakable and whether it can be trusted to provide probative evidence.
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The second point is that the hash value’s impregnability is controversial. The
controversy stems from a difference in opinions concerning the impregnability of the
hash value technology. As mentioned above, law enforcement officers rely largely on
hash value to authenticate digital evidence and, therefore, it is important to assess the
current state of the hash value impregnability.
There are two different attitudes towards hash value. The majority of forensic scientists
argue that the hash value technology is very accurate, secure and is considered
unbreakable. Kruse and Heiser, argue that the MD5 hash function is as accurate, if not
more accurate than DNA testing.622 According to Eric ‘…MD5 can still be relied upon
by the forensic community to do an excellent job at identifying even the smallest change
in electronic data’.623 Bruce Schneier, a renowned computer security expert, stated:
…that it's easy to take a message and compute the hash value, but it's impossible to take a hash
value and re-create the original message. (By "impossible," I mean "can't be done in any reasonable
amount of time.") Two, they're collision-free… This means that it's impossible to find two messages
that hash to the same hash value...

624

According to this group of scientists, the level of algorithm that is utilised to produce
MD5 hash function is impregnable to attack with the current technology, because
computers are not yet powerful enough to break it successfully.
On the other hand, a group of experts from Shandong University in China and the Israel
Institute of Technology announced that they have developed new methods which are
able to break the MD5 hash value.625 This means that creating two different documents
that have the same hash value keys is possible, and therefore, experts can alter the
mirror copy by creating an identical hash value.626 This group, however, did not divulge
the methods used to break the MD5 hash value, but they developed a theoretical
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conception.627 Schneier opined ‘…no one is going to be breaking digital signature or
reading encrypted messages anytime soon with these techniques. The electronic world is
no less secure after these announcements than it was before’.628 While this opinion does
not deny that hash value technology is not unbreakable, it does provide the sort of
overview that helps identify the technology’s potential weakness, its obsolescence. Hash
value technology is prone to become obsolete in a relatively short period of time due to
newly emerging technology and, therefore, the role of hash value in authenticating
digital evidence should be subject to judicial review to decide whether the hash value
algorithm adequately sustains data integrity. In a similar manner, the metadata
information should be subject to judicial review in relation to its integrity.

6.3 Admissibility of Digital Evidence
Evidence law encompasses three key concepts: burden of proof, relevance, and
admissibility. On one hand, ‘the burden of proof concept means the necessity or duty of
affirmatively proving or disproving a particular fact or facts in dispute on an issue raised
between the parties in a case’. 629 Meanwhile, relevance means ‘evidence having the
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence’.630
Therefore, relevance has been described as the password for all evidence631 because it
affects the assessment of the probative value of evidence in the proceeding.632 In the
context of cybercrimes, the two concepts are applied to digital and physical evidence
alike, because in the former the prosecutors are the ones who carry the legal burden of
proving all facts essential to their case. This role will not be affected by the nature of
evidence, such as a physical or digital document. In a similar manner, the relevance of
evidence is assessed by a judge regardless of the nature of evidence.
Evidence admissibility, on the other hand, is actually a two-step process, legislative, i.e.
a law addressing admissibility, and judicial, i.e. judges admit reliable evidence. It begins
627
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with legal provisions that lay down the type of evidence which may or may not be
accepted. In the second step, the accepted evidence will be subject to scrutiny by a
judge to determine its probative value. The various types of physical evidence, such as
fingerprints, weapons, or blood are fully scrutinised by courts to assure admissibility; on
the other hand, digital evidence is neither comprehensively addressed by legislation nor
fully evaluated by the judiciary. This situation varies a lot from one country to another;
hard drives, Internet files, and e-mail as courtroom evidence are increasingly coming
into more frequent use in courts in Australia and the USA, whereas in Jordan, its
admissibility is yet to be scrutinised. However, Jordanian legislation addresses various
aspects of digital evidence.
This section is divided into two main subsections. The first surveys and analyses laws
passed to address digital evidence admissibility in a courtroom. The second section
examines the judiciary’s role in admitting digital evidence.
Legislatures have addressed specific aspects of digital evidence despite that fact that
there are various types of digital evidence that are subject to discovery in cybercrime
investigations. This subsection is divided into three parts. The first distinguishes
between the different types of digital evidence, and the second surveys the legal
responses of Jordan, Australia, and the USA, and the final part analyses the legal
responses.

6.3.1 Digital Evidence Types
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) categorises digital evidence into two forms;633
meanwhile forensic experts categorise digital evidence into three forms.634 According to
the DOJ’s manual, the first is computer generated evidence, such as log files, cookies,
metadata, IP addresses, and so on.635 This evidence comes in multiple formats, data and
programmes, including e-mail, websites, chatting programmes, etc.636 It needs particular
multimedia devices to be presented to the court, such as streaming video and audio. The
633
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second is computer stored evidence, such as digital photos and Word files.637 This form
can be printed out as a hard copy or visually displayed on a computer screen. Some
legal scholars, however, divide digital evidence into three forms, computer generated
evidence, computer stored, and hybrid.638 They differentiate between them from
different points of view. Orin used a human being’s involvement in the process of
producing digital evidence as a guiding principle to differentiate between computer
generated and computer stored evidence.639 He pointed out that while the latter requires
some person to interfere with the computer programmes to create the digital evidence,
such as word processing files, the former is generated without human interference from
the time the programme operates until it generates the evidence, such as metadata,
cookies, and so on.640 The third category is evidence that is a mixture of both computer
generated and computer stored evidence.641
Digital evidence should be differentiated on the basis of the level of volatility and
integrity. As discussed earlier, cybertrails take three different forms, and each form has
its own particular aspects.

These aspects can provide a good basis to distinguish

between two types of digital evidence. The first type is generated directly by computers
and the second is generated by human commands. Computer generated evidence is
virtually visible, but is not printable, such as log files, the history of web site visits, and
metadata. This form requires special forensic tools to collect, examine and present in
courts, because it is fragile and needs intensive, careful treatment. While this type of
evidence might provide more accurate data, because there is no human interference
during its establishment, it should be scrutinised more carefully to ascertain that there is
no contamination at any stage of the evidence collection and examination process. The
second type is visible and printable, such as e-mails, Word files, Excel spreadsheets or
PowerPoint slides, and digital pictures. This form of digital evidence can be printed out
exactly as it appears.
This classification is important for two reasons. First, it shows the extent to which
current legislation is able to address digital evidence. Second, it makes it easier for a
legislature to comprehend and address the whole while also understanding what is
637
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distinctive about each form. Jordanian legislation, for example, neither classifies digital
evidence nor addresses evidence forms; however, different laws have addressed
particular types of digital evidence. The Electronic Transaction Law 2001 explicitly
addressed three specific types of digital evidence, electronic records, contracts and
electronic signatures. These types can be either computer generated or computer stored
evidence.

6.3.2 Survey of Legal Responses
Due to the increasing use of computers, and the subsequent need to admit different
forms of digital evidence, legislatures have begun to recognise the importance of digital
evidence and its admissibility. In many countries, such as Australia and the USA,
different forms of digital evidence are frequently presented to courts and the frequency
is expected to increase as Internet usage continues to grow. Legislatures, therefore, have
been attempting to keep up with changes in technology by constantly enacting new laws
or revising already existing laws. The situation in Jordan is similar, but not exactly the
same, as the digital evidence usage, and frequency of cybercrime prosecutions is lower
than in both Australia and the USA.

a) Jordan
Similar to cybercrime criminalisation, digital evidence admissibility is scattered in a
variety of statutes, the Electronic Transaction Law 2001, Credit Information Law 2003,
Banking Law 2000, Evidence Law 1952 and Criminal Procedure Law 1961. Although
these laws recognise all types of digital evidence, each describes specific situations in
which digital evidence might be admitted at trial.
The Electronic Transactions Law 2001, which is considered a special statute that
applies to transactions conducted by electronic means, addressed particular types of
digital evidence that courts may admit.642 It stipulates: ‘Electronic, records, contracts,
messages and signatures shall be deemed to produce the same legal effect as written
documents…’ Accordingly, digital records, contracts, and signatures are the only three
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types of digital evidence which are admissible. Article 2 lays down what is considered
digital evidence within the meaning of the Act. It defines electronic record as a contract
or message generated, sent, received, or stored by electronic means. Also, it defines
electronic contract as an agreement that is formed by electronic means; meanwhile,
electronic signature is any letters, characters, numbers or other symbols in digital form
that a person has created or adopted in order to sign a document.
In the context of credit information disputes, the Credit Information Law addressed both
computer generated and computer stored evidence. According to article 31 (a), the
parties are able to support their claims by providing computer generated evidence and
electronic data. In a similar manner, Article 92 (b) of the Banking Law authorises the
parties in banking disputes to present evidence including electronic data and computer
generated evidence.
The existing rules of the Evidence Act 1952 and Criminal Procedure Law 1961, which
together regulate methods of proof and physical evidence, can be applied in a limited
fashion to digital evidence. The Evidence Law 1952 treated e-mails, and computer
printouts, i.e. computer stored evidence, as original documents and, therefore,
admissible unless they are uncertified or unauthenticated.643 The Criminal Procedure
Law on the other hand, did not address the admissibility of digital evidence. It enacted
one very broad provision on this topic. Article 147/2 provided judges with discretionary
power to admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.
b) Australia
In Australia, legislatures have responded positively to the growing importance of digital
evidence and some courts (for example, Supreme Courts in New South Wales and
Victoria) have issued practice notes encouraging litigants and lawyers to use technology
in civil litigation.644 Certainly, this practice was adopted after it was decided that digital
evidence could be admissible. The law of evidence in Australia, however, is a mixture
of common law and statutes that establish the rules concerning evidence admissibility.
As a consequence, there are differences in addressing digital evidence.
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At the federal level and in some States, courts apply the Commonwealth Evidence Act
1995 and the Uniform Evidence Act 1995. Federal courts including courts in the
Australian Capital Territory apply the Commonwealth Evidence Act; meanwhile, New
South Wales (NSW) and Tasmania apply the Uniform Evidence Act. These statutes are
substantially the same, but not identical.645 However, they are identical in terms of
digital evidence admissibility. The Commonwealth Evidence Law 1995 encompasses
three basic principles as part of its goal to ensure that digital evidence is admissible.646
First, it has broadly defined ‘document’ to encompass digital evidence. It defines
document as any record of information, including ‘... (b) anything on which there are
marks, figures, symbols or perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to
interpret them; or (c) anything from which sounds, images or writings can be
reproduced with or without the aid of anything else…’. 647 Second, this definition needs
to be coupled with that contained in section 48 of the legislation, which provides a
mechanism in which specific methods must be used to render the document’s content.
One of these methods, which is particularly useful for digital evidence, is to use a
device to retrieve the stored information, such as a computer.648 As a result, digital
evidence would be classed as a document, because it needs a qualified person, i.e.
forensic experts and a particular device to render its content. Third, Section 51 abolished
the ‘best evidence rule’. This rule had two negative aspects: (1) it required that the
original version of the document should be produced unless an exception applies, such
as the original has been lost; and
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(2) if the copy is admitted, then it will have a low

probative value, because it is difficult to prove that the content of the document has not
been tempered with.650 Thus, the best evidence rule used to enable a party in litigation
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to request another party to produce the original document. In the realm of digital
evidence, this would cause a problem for forensic investigators, because the latter
creates a duplicate mirror copy of the original storage device to perform their forensic
investigation processing.651 This duplication is necessary to ensure the integrity of the
original copy. Therefore, abolishing the best evidence rule is appropriate as an original
document is no longer required and digital copy is admitted into evidence in lieu of an
original copy.652
In Victoria, Queensland, and South Australia, the Evidence Act specifically states that
evidence derived from computers will be admissible, subject to certain conditions of
reliability. For example, Section 45C of the South Australian Evidence Act 1929 permits
the judiciary to rely on its own knowledge or on an expert report (‘third parties’) to
assess the nature and reliability of the device that produced the evidence. Furthermore,
Section 59B of the same Act is the primary section dealing with the admissibility of
digital evidence. It provides that for digital evidence to be admissible in court it must be
subject to the court being satisfied that:
1) The computer is correctly programmed and regularly used to produce the same kind of output.
2) The data from which the output is produced is prepared on the basis of information that would
normally be admissible as evidence of the statements or representations contained in the output.
3) There is no reason to suspect any departure from the system, or any error in the preparation of
the data.
4) The computer has not malfunctioned so as to affect the accuracy of the output.
5)

There have been no alterations to the computer that might affect the accuracy of the output.

6) Records have been kept of alterations to the computer.
7) There is no reasonable cause to believe that the accuracy or validity of the output has been
adversely affected by the use of any improper process or procedure or by inadequate.

Accordingly, digital evidence is admissible, inasmuch as it meets the requirements set
forth in Section 59B.
c) USA
The Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) provides sufficient grounds for admitting digital
evidence at trial. While digital evidence is not explicitly addressed, its coverage can be
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inferred, to a high degree of certainty, from the language of the FRE. Several rules
under the FRE can be applied to make digital evidence admissible.
First, Rule number 1001 defines evidence content as ‘writing’ and ‘recording’ that
consists of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting,
typewriting…mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data compilation’.653
The advantage of this wide definition is that it covers the two different forms of digital
evidence. Second, Rule number 1003 permits courts to admit a mirror copy to the same
extent as an original copy. Third, Rule number 901 provides illustrative examples of
evidence authentication.654 For example, digital evidence can be authenticated by the
testimony of witnesses, such as computing experts who testify that the digital data or
programmes which are used to process and produce such evidence are trustworthy and
the status of presented evidence is the same as when it was collected.
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Jordanian laws lack comprehensiveness and breadth of scope. On one hand, the
Electronic Transactions Law 2001 and Evidence Law 1952 lack comprehensiveness and
demonstrate incomplete understanding of the digital evidence because the Electronic
Transactions Law 2001 only admitted electronic contracts and messages that are
generated, sent, received or stored electronically. Meanwhile, the Evidence Law only
admitted e-mail and computer stored evidence. As a result, many types of computer
generated evidence, such as log files, metadata, and hash value are beyond the ambit of
the Electronic Transactions Law 2001 or the Evidence Law, because they are neither
electronic contracts, nor messages in the meaning of the Electronic Transactions Law
2001. On the other hand, while the Credit Information Law 2003, and Banking Law
2000 admitted the two types of digital evidence (i.e. computer generated and computer
stored evidence), their scope and application are narrow, because they are applicable to
a limited range of cases, namely, credit information and banking disputes.
In a different manner, while the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 does not
explicitly address certain forms of digital evidence, it permits judges to exercise broad
discretion and admit evidence at trial. The broad language of the Article 147/2 grants
judges the ability to consider the admissibility of digital evidence. Although this sounds
653
654
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good in theory, actual implementation and practice are affected by the fact that judges
and prosecutors lack the necessary knowledge and training in the field of cyber law and,
consequently, they will be hesitant to accept digital evidence. Furthermore, none of the
above mentioned legislation addresses the admission of the exact duplicate copy, i.e. a
mirror copy, and its probative value.
By contrast, Australian laws amply provide the basis for accepting digital evidence or
an exact copy by broadening the definition of what constitutes a ‘document’ (so as to
include different types of digital evidence) and providing judges with guidance for
validating digital evidence, such as Section 59B of the South Australian Evidence Act.
In a similar manner, the FRE lays down rules regarding evidence admissibility. Rule
901, for example, is similar to the Section 59B. It amply illustrates how digital evidence
admissibility can be assessed.
The review and analysis of Jordanian laws demonstrate the inadequacies which need to
be addressed if legislation is to achieve its objective of admitting digital evidence. The
inadequacies are both legislative and non-legislative, in both technology and litigation
support, and also education and training. From a legislative point of view, digital
evidence admissibility is scattered over a wide range of statutes which lack uniformity
and comprehensiveness. Thus, the Evidence Law 1952 must be amended to properly
accommodate all the forms of digital evidence. It should be revised to recognise
computer generated evidence and the exact copy is admitted into evidence in lieu of an
original copy. From a non-legislative point of view, courtrooms must be equipped with
advanced technological tools and facilities, because they are necessary for digital
evidence recognition and presentation. Education and training are needed so that
lawmakers and judges fully understand digital evidence.
In Jordan the court system and the judges’ knowledge on technological issues including
digital evidence features are immature, and are far from meeting the USA or the
Australian level. This is because of the rarity of studies addressing cybercrime issues
and lack of opportunity to adjudicate cases involving digital evidence.
In the following section the role of judges in accepting and evaluating digital evidence
will be examined.
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6.3.3 The Role of Judges in Evaluating Digital Evidence.
6.3.3.1 Inquisitorial v Adversarial Legal System
There are two major legal systems in the modern world, namely the adversarial or
common law system which was developed in England, and the inquisitorial system
which is commonly known as the civil law system, which developed on the continent of
Europe. The extent to which judges can be involved in evaluating and assessing digital
evidence varies in each system.
Criminal justice systems in most countries have been in a state of flux due to extensive
social, economic, and political changes aimed at improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of judicial proceedings. 655 For example, some countries have gone through
a complete transition from an inquisitorial to an adversarial legal system, Italy, for
example. 656 Other countries, such as Jordan, have abandoned Islamic criminal law in
favour of an inquisitorial system.657 In Australia and the USA, the common law prevails
because they were colonised by English settlers.658 The judicial system in both countries
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is almost the same,659 because they share a common legal inheritance as former British
colonies and both countries are federations. The colonial heritage is manifest in the
implementation of the adversarial legal system and courts structure.660
Although there are significant differences between the inquisitorial and adversarial
systems, they converge in a very specific situation.661 Historically, the inquisitorial
system has been established predominantly based on codes, statutes, and legislation.662
Meanwhile, the adversarial legal system has been based on judicial decisions, i.e. case
law and precedents,663 and, therefore, adversarial judges enjoy more discretion than
their civil law counterparts and exert somewhat more judicial authority.664 For example,
judges of the inquisitorial legal system merely apply the laws created by legislatures for
particular cases; while judges of the adversarial system take fact patterns, look to
applicable statutes and have broad discretion to apply a measure of judicial authority in
deriving the final decision of the court.665 In the adversarial system, the discretion of the
judges is fettered by judicial precedent, whilst in the inquisitorial the judge is unfettered
by previous decision, and therefore judges are free to accept or reject the views of their
superiors, but practically they feel impelled to adhere to judicial precedents that have
been set down by the superior courts, because they know that their decisions are subject
to appeal before the superior courts.666

6.3.3.2 Judges’ Role in Accepting Digital Evidence
In his article ‘Towards a Law and Technology Theory’ Cockfield has identified two
distinct approaches used by courts when dealing with technological changes that

659

Gary D Meyers and Nerida Gilbert, Primary Sources: A ‘Not-So-Anonymou’ Review of US Legal
Research Materials and Sources (2003) Research for Lawyers< http://www.researchone.com.au/primary+sources+a+not-so-anonymous+review+of+us+l.aspx> at 1 May 2008.
660
For example, in both countries a similar court system exists. The Australian High Court and the United
States Supreme Court are the highest courts. These courts have both original jurisdiction, such as cases
against the state or disputes between residents of different states, and appellate jurisdiction. The appellate
jurisdiction extends to reviewing the decisions of federal courts and state and territory Supreme Courts of
appeal. Ibid. See also, Legal Information Access Centre (LIAC)
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/liac/hot_topic/hottopic/2002/3/2.html> at 5 May 2008.
661
Kristi Kernutt, Civil Law v. Common Law Systems: Are They So Different? Oregon Review of
International Law 1 (1999) 31.
662
See, Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd ed, 2007) 46.
663
Ibid 48.
664
Ibid.
665
Kernutt, above n 661.
666
See, eg, Rheinstein, above n 658, 96.

146

challenge traditional laws. One is a rigid and backward-looking response, and the other
is a more forward-looking and flexible analysis.667 He opined that:
some legal analysts employ a forward-looking approach that considers how the law can best protect
interests and values when they are threatened by technological developments…legal analysis can
also be more ‘conservative’ in the sense that it emphasises the need to follow traditional doctrine
without fully taking into account how the interplay between law and technological developments
668

can undermine interests and values.

In Jordan, Australia, and the USA, the authority of the courts to accept evidence varies
and to a large degree is restrained by the limits described in their legal system.
a) Jordan
While the law precisely defines offences and punishments, it gives the judiciary the
power to assess and admit evidence on a case-by-case basis. The inquisitorial legal
system of Jordan grants judges in criminal cases more leeway to exercise discretion than
the adversarial system does. The Criminal Procedure Law 1961 provides judges with
the right to invite and question experts to permit the admission of evidence. Article
162/2 of the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 states: ‘A judge has the authority and
discretion to order the litigants to disclose any evidence and/or call any witness
necessary for the hearing’. Furthermore, Article 147/2 of the same Act stipulates that
‘[t]he presentation of evidence in criminal proceedings is unfettered by the ordinary
rules of evidence and a judge adjudicates according to his own discretion’. Accordingly,
judges have the authority to take steps to investigate crimes and order the parties to
release evidence. In addition, the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 provides judges with
the ability to evaluate evidence without being restrained by the law of evidence which
lists only six methods of proof: written document, testimony, judicial evidence,
confession, oath, and experience, thereby allowing judges to accept evidence beyond the
ambit of this law of evidence.
From the above articles, someone might conclude that a judge’s conception and
personal knowledge play a vital role in the case of admitting digital evidence. However,
the major concern in this field, as mentioned earlier, is the problem of insufficient
667
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literacy in computers and in information technology, not only among judges, but also
among lawyers and prosecutors. Judges, who did not grow up with computers and do
not understand the technology and the issues it raises, find that their discretionary power
is nullified. In addition, the courts system in Jordan is ill equipped to deal with digital
evidence, even at a basic level, as there is neither a level of standardisation for the
evaluation of digital evidence, nor a common set of rules for the presentation of such
evidence.
b) Australian and the US
Under the adversarial legal system, the judge plays the role of a neutral referee and,
therefore, his discretion is limited to consideration of the evidence submitted by the
parties. He does not conduct his own investigation, so he decides what the parties ask
him to decide, and decides only on the basis of the evidence and information presented
to the court.669 Thus, within the adversarial legal system, judges are restrained by the
rules of law governing evidence, which determine what evidence is to be admissible in
court. The evidence admitted to the court must fulfil two main requirements. The first
one is that the evidence must be relevant to the case;670 and the second, that it must have
a significant probative value. However, as discussed in the above section, digital
evidence is admissible by the law of evidence, and therefore, the judges are able to
assess and admit digital evidence without legal complications.

6.4 Conclusion
In less than one decade, communications technology and personal computers have
become not only a part of the conduct of criminal activities, but also part of the
evidence in their criminal prosecution. While, investigators, lawyers, prosecutors, and
judges, sooner or later, will be confronted with criminal issues involving digital
evidence, unique features of digital evidence make the classical laws of evidence
inappropriate to some degree.
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Digital evidence is delicate and can be easily contaminated during processing and
handling, thereby increasing legal complexity and a tendency towards litigation. New
complex scenarios have emerged in which defendants and prosecutors have to do battle
over evidence integrity. However, up-to-data metadata and hash value will continue to
be the most important keys that enable forensic investigators and prosecutors to both
defend and prove digital evidence integrity in a court of law. Therefore, prosecutors and
judges should be provided with the latest and most reliable information about hash
value and evidence integrity techniques.
Although the most striking feature of Jordanian legislation on digital evidence
admissibility is that it is scattered over a wide range of statutes, the lack of
comprehensiveness is evident. These laws are either too narrow, restricting judges to
accept digital evidence in a particular type of dispute or too broad, for example,
Criminal Procedure Law 1961 grants judges a wide discretion to accept evidence. This
broadness constitutes both the strength and weakness of the Criminal Procedure Law
1961. The judge will be able to evaluate and accept digital evidence, but lack of precise
provisions and guidance will make the judge much less confident to accept digital
evidence. Therefore, judges should be provided with appropriate guidance and training
on how to deal with digital evidence in the courtroom.
By contrast, the Australian and the USA legislatures amended the rules of evidence to
include digital evidence. The amendment was necessary to bring the classical rules of
evidence, such as the Best Evidence Rule into line with information technology
developments. Drawing on their experience, the Jordanian legislature must address
digital evidence, including the mirror copy, volatility, integrity, and admissibility. It
must detail all types of digital evidence and how prosecutors and judges assess them. In
addition, courts should be fitted with appropriate visual or computerised equipments
that are necessary for displaying or illustrating digital evidence.
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7 SEARCHING & SEIZING DIGITAL EVIDENCE WITH
A WARRANT
Introduction
There is a significant chasm between Jordan, Australia and the USA in relation to their
responses to computer searches and seizures.671 On the one hand, most law enforcement
officers, judges, lawyers, and prosecutors in Jordan are not aware of the extent to which
the digital world possibly impacts on search and seizure concepts or of their approach to
computer searches. This is because of the significant shortage of published Arabic
research on this topic as well as the rarity with which cybercrimes cases are investigated
and brought before the Jordanian courts.
On the other hand, Western courts, supported by the majority of legal scholars, have
identified that some corners of conventional search warrant concepts, which have been
designed to address the search for physical objects, are not effective in addressing
cybercrime searches.672 Therefore, the USA Department of Justice (DOJ) issued
Federal Guidelines for Searching and Seizing Computers. The purpose of the
Guidelines is to provide law enforcement with updated principles and optimal practice
in relation to digital searches.673 In a different but equally effective manner, Australian
federal lawmakers amended the Crimes Act 1914, in which several provisions
concerning searches and seizures of computers, entitled Law Enforcement Powers
Relating to Electronically Stored Data, have been introduced.
The objective of this chapter is to identify and demonstrate how principles for searching
private premises can be applied or amended to succeed in achieving a high level of
judicial approval in cybercrime searches. It addresses the fundamental principles and
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rules of search and seizure set forth under the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961
as applied to searches for evidence stored in digital formats. It deals with the traditional
legal concepts of search and seizure as established in the Jordanian Criminal Procedure
Law compared with Australian and the US patterns. It then explores the fundamental
differences between conventional and digital searches and the extent to which the
present search and seizure rules are compatible with the digital environment. It critically
analyses the conventional rules of search and seizure in the context of digital search and
assesses their impact in conducting an effective search and seizure operation.
The classical search and seizure procedures have been crafted to deal with search and
seizure of physical objects. The proliferation of personal computers, high capacity
digital storage media and high speed network connectivity, confronts law enforcement
officers with situations in which applying classical procedures of search and seizure to
digital environment could seriously jeopardise evidence admissibility and individual
privacy simultaneously.
Accessing computer systems, data files, and networks to obtain digital evidence
constitutes interference with privacy of individual and poses a serious threat to
individuals’ privacy. While a few countries have constitutionally maintained and
entrenched individual privacy in the course of search and seizure procedures, others
have done this explicitly or implicitly in their statutes. Jordan, Australia and the USA
have each addressed search and seizure procedures differently.
Less demanding than Australian and the US laws, Article 10 of the Jordanian
Constitution stipulates that ‘Dwelling houses shall be inviolable and shall not be entered
except in the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law’. 674 The Jordanian
Criminal Procedure Law 1961, Terrorism Prevention Law 2006 675 and the Custom Law
1998

676

are the main laws which articulate search and seizure requirements. The

Jordanian Terrorism Prevention Law 2006 and the Custom Law 1998 permit the
issuance and execution of warrants for certain offences and circumstances mainly
related to terrorism and smuggling charges. For example, in the case of suspected
terrorist activities, Article 4/A/3 of the Terrorism Prevention Law 2006 empowers
674

Jordanian Constitution Act 1952 div 2 (10).
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676
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General Prosecutors (GPs) to respond effectively by issuing a search warrant. However
as cybercrime falls beyond the scope of the Terrorism Prevention Law 2006 and the
Custom Law 1998, these laws will not be addressed by this research.
In Australia, while a Bill of Rights is not entrenched, the old common law principles
offer individuals robust protection against unreasonable search.677 However, several
laws authorise the issue of search warrants. The Crimes Act 1914 has been amended to
bring it into line with information technology developments, particularly search and
seizure issues under the title ‘Law Enforcement Powers Relating to Electronically
Stored Data’. In addition, and more particularly, the Spam (Consequential Amendments)
Act 2003 has empowered law enforcement to execute search and seizure of computer
systems, whether owned by the suspect or by the recipient of the spam.678
In the USA, the constitution and classical statutes were intensively analysed for the
purpose of reaching a comprehensive protection of data privacy as well as presenting
admissible digital evidence, seeking a reasonable balance between protecting individual
privacy and executing successful cybercrime investigations. The Fourth Amendment is
the key with respect to search warrant requirements. It stipulates that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

To identity and examine the search warrant requirements and their applicability to
digital searches, this chapter will first discuss the basic principles of search warrants and
how these can be applied to cybercrimes. The basic principles include definitions, cyber
search warrant terminology, thresholds for issuing a warrant, scope of a search warrant,
and procedures for obtaining a search warrant. The chapter will then proceed to describe
in detail the execution of a search warrant in cybercrime, including who should
accompany the officers executing the search warrant and what should be searched and
seized under the search warrant. Second, the chapter will review the search warrant
requirements that were designed to address issues unique to physical object searches,
677

See, Keith Tronc, Cliff Crawford, and Doug Smith, Search and Seizure in Australia and New Zealand
(1996) 13.
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Frontiers Australia < http://www.efa.org.au/Publish/efasubm-ssbc-search2004.html> at 9 December 2004.
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including probable cause, search warrant particularity, and search location. It compares
and contrasts the law and judicial applications relating to the search and seizure of
digital materials in Jordan, Australia and the USA.

7.1 Definition of a Cyber Search Warrant
Normally, when a crime is committed, police officers and investigators start with the
evidence. They enter private premises, search items, seize evidence, arrest, interrogate,
and detain suspects. Before entering and searching, however, police officers must obtain
permission known as a search warrant from a designated competent authority.679 The
search warrant should be sought and instructed upon the commission of a crime and
after an accusation against a person has been substantiated or when strong evidence
suggests that the search will substantially discover specified items that are important to
an ongoing investigation.680 It is a coercive power authorised by the law for the sake of
the public interest and as an exception to the legitimate rights of citizens to preserve
their privacy in order to discover evidence of crime.681 Therefore, it is not enough to
obtain a search warrant for an imminent crime or in case of mere suspicion.

7.1.1 Search Warrant Definition
The definition of a search warrant helps explain the scope and boundaries of
investigation procedures. Therefore, the doors are open for legal scholars and judges to
define a search warrant. One scholar, for example, has defined a search warrant as ‘a
search in a private place for discovering hidden things important to the investigation
being made’.682 Gino defined it as ‘a written document that represents judicial
authorisation for peace officers to enter and search a specific place for specific items
and to seize those items that are evidence to the offence, if they are found’.683 Another
definition is a ‘search warrant is a document to search a private place for evidence’.684
679

See, eg, Graham Parker, An Introduction to Criminal Law (1977) 357.
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In the USA, Freedman has defined a search warrant as ‘an order signed by a judge or a
magistrate that authorises police officers to search for specific objects or materials at a
clearly defined location at a specific time’.685 Freedman’s definition highlights the three
important aspects of a search warrant, specificity of the items to be sized, the location,
and the time of the search execution, although not its general purpose. The Supreme
Court defined a search warrant as ‘government action that violates an individual’s
reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy’. 686 The definition focuses only on the
ramifications of the invalid search warrant, the violation of individuals’ privacy.
The definitions provided above should not be considered inclusive or comprehensive
enough to account for all circumstances. They do not make a distinction between search
warrants and electronic interruption and surveillance. In addition, they consider the
warrant authorises the search for and seizure of tangible items. Therefore, cybercrime
search warrants should be defined quite separately.

7.1.2 Cybercrime Search Warrant Definition
In the context of cybercrime investigations, no legal scholar or judicial body has defined
a cybercrime search warrant. Although different legal issues related to cybercrimes
search warrants have been addressed, such as search execution practice, search location,
and so forth, no specific attention has been given to its definition. The essence of a
definition of cybercrime search lies in the particularity of the search and its unique
nature. The definition submitted here is that a cybercrime search warrant is ‘an order,
signed or authorised by a Judge or a General Prosecutor that authorises a Cybercrime
Unit’s executing officers to search on-site or off-site for digital media for specific data
at a clearly defined digital location’.

The suggested definition shows the unique nature of cybercrime and has three positive
features. First, the search could be authorised without need for a signature. This is an
important requirement as cybercrime needs immediate action because evidence is
extremely fragile and easily tampered with. Thus, a cybercrime search warrant can be
685
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obtained by phone, telex, facsimile, e-mail, or other electronic means. Second, the
search must be conducted by highly experienced officers who are Cybercrime Unit
personnel and can handle the evidence properly. Third, the definition protects
individuals’ privacy by restricting the boundaries of the search. It requires the officers
preparing the search warrant to specify the file format or extension (such as doc, gif,
mpg, txt, exe, html, mp3, and others) or to nominate a keyword search or file names, or
to search an Internet application (such as IRC logs, e-mail messages, and data found on
the Internet). Nonetheless, this specificity does not preclude a certain level of generality,
in case a precise description is not attainable.

7.1.3 Cyber Search Warrant Terminology
Another issue which should be considered is the terminology that should be used
exclusively to refer to cybercrime search warrants. In the context of a traditional search,
the terminology ‘search warrant’ is used to refer to all sorts of searches. Conversely, in
the context of cybercrime, several terminologies refer to cybercrime search warrants are
being used. ‘Digital search warrants’,687 ‘computer-related search warrants’,688 and
‘electronic search warrants’,689 for example, are often used interchangeably. Any of
them can be used to describe a cybercrime investigation and to distinguish between a
conventional search warrant and a cybercrime warrant. However, it is suggested that the
preferred terminology should be ‘computer search warrant’ as, in some cases the search
warrant is prepared to search for both physical items and computer data and ‘cyber
search warrant’ only for searching for intangible items.

687

See, Kerr Orin S, 'Search Warrants in an Era of Digital Evidence' (2005) 75 Mississippi Law Journal
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688
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7.2

Privacy Protection

Individual privacy is maintained historically by respecting private premises.690
However, confidentiality, privacy, or secrecy can be preserved in different places and
containers, such as in private property, boxes, drawers, and so on, and in different
conventional formats, such as hardcopy documents, or unconventional formats, such as
digital documents. Indeed, nowadays, most people are switching to digital formats to
save their confidential data, including e-mails, personal records, medical information,
and other confidential data. Consequently, information technology has deepened the
concern over privacy,691 because the ability of law enforcement agencies to collect,
classify, exchange and process personal information has significantly increased. As a
result, restrictions associated with search warrant issuance must be adhered to.
Search warrant restrictions, such as scope, location and reasonable cause requirements,
are meant to protect individual privacy from unreasonable search and seizure.692
Restrictions force investigators to search and seize only the items listed in the search
warrant and ensure that the items identified in the warrant are properly related to the
crime committed. Conventional search warrant issuance imposes obligations upon
investigators who prepare the affidavit and execute the warrant. These obligations are
either embedded in legislation or outlined by judicial authorities. In Parker v Churchill,
Burchett J said:
… what is required by law is that the justice of the peace should stand between the police and the
citizen, to give real attention to the question whether the information proffered by the police does
justify the intrusion they desire to make into the privacy of the citizen and the inviolate security
693

of his personal and business affairs.

690

Many countries’ constitution, including Jordan, and the USA declare and acknowledge the right of
individuals to privacy and free from unreasonable searches and unlawful seizure. Article Ten of the
Jordanian Constitution and The Fourth Amendment of the USA Constitution for example, have been
crafted to protect individuals from invasion into their personal life and warrantless search.
691
See, eg, P A Nixon et al, ‘Security, Privacy and Trust Issues in Smart Environments’ in Diane J Cook,
and Sajal K Das (eds), Smart Environments: Technologies, Protocols, and Applications (2005) 249, 256.
692
Debra Littlejohn Shinder, and Michael Cross, Scene of the Cybercrime (2nd ed, 2008) 216.
693
Queensland Law Reform Commission, The Role of Justice of the Peace in Queensland, Report No 51
(1998) 50.

156

The ultimate objective of these obligations and conditions is to protect the freedom of
individuals in their homes or premises from illegal searches and seizures. Indeed, search
warrant regimes create a balance between privacy protection and crime detection
requirements.694 As one commentator has pointed out ‘search warrants are necessary in
modern society; but courts strive to balance the competing interests of the citizen to the
inviolability of his home or premises and of the state to prevent the commission of
crime or to obtain evidence in aid of the prosecution of offenders’. 695 In order to find a
balance between privacy protection and crime detection, legislators have set out several
conditions to be fulfilled before the court or the GP issues a conventional search
warrant. These conditions concern the threshold for search warrant issuance, the
substantial search rules, and the subject matter of the search.

7.3 Threshold for Issuing a Cyber Search Warrant
Search warrants are prepared and issued for investigating different types of felonies and
misdemeanours.696 Investigating officers must obtain a warrant to search a cyber
location and seize digital evidence. This warrant must be obtained after the officers
present an affidavit to a competent authority697 or obtain oral permission from a GP,
who authorises the search.698 However, a high threshold has to be met before a
magistrate or GP authorises a search warrant. Although there is no particular system or
specific guidance for issuing cyber search warrant, a conventional search warrant may
be obtained by a police officer to search for digital evidence. Conventional search
warrant issuance entails meeting three conditions. The authorities responsible for
issuing search warrants might not authorise a search warrant unless they are satisfied by
the information provided and the supporting evidence that is laid before them that the
three elements are met.
694
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a) Jordan
Division 4 of the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 sets out a statutory framework
governing powers of search and seizure. It lists the following requirements for obtaining
search warrant.
First, a crime must have been committed.699 Thus, a GP must have reasonable grounds
for believing that a crime has been committed and is not merely imminent.700
Furthermore, the search should be for evidence-gathering, rather than crime
prevention.701 An exception, however, can be found in a case where the crime is against
the national security of Jordan,702 such as cyberterrorism. Article 108 of the Criminal
Law 1960 considers an attempt to commit a crime against the peace and national
security as a complete crime. Therefore, a warrant can be issued to search a computer
based on mere allegations of a national security threat.
Second, the crime committed must be a felony or criminal misdemeanour.703 The
Criminal Law of Jordan classifies offences into three categories:
1) Felonies, punishable by three years or more of imprisonment, or by death.704
2) Misdemeanours, punishable by a minimum of one week in prison to three years,
or by a fine not exceeding 200 JD.705
3) Petty misdemeanours, punishable by a minimum of 24 hours to one week in
prison or by a fine.706 Hence, to issue a search warrant, a cybercrime must be
categorised as felonies or misdemeanours.
Third, an allegation or suspicion of wrongdoing has been made against a particular
person.707 The investigating officers must show sufficient evidence that the person
whose premises are to be searched is either likely to be an offender or possesses
699

ﻛﺎﻣﻞ اﻟﺴﻌﯿﺪ, Explanation of the Criminal Procedure Law: Analytical Comparative Study (Alaeldin
Maghaireh trans, 2005) [trans of: دراﺳﺔ ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻠﺔ ﺗﺎﺻﯿﻠﯿﺔ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﮫ: ] ﺷﺮح ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﺻﻮل اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻛﻤﺎت اﻟﺠﺰاﺋﯿﺔ.
700
Ibid.
701
Ibid. See also, Jordanian High Court No: 842 1998.
702
Jordanian Criminal Law (1961) div 2 s (1) (108).
703
ﻗﺪري ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻔﺘﺎح اﻟﺸﮭﺎوي, above n 681. See also, أﻣﻞ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﻋﺜﻤﺎن, above n 682.
704
Criminal Law (1960) div 2 s 1 (14).
705
Criminal Law (1960) div 2 s 1 (15).
706
Criminal Law (1960) div 2 s 1 (16).
707
ﻛﺎﻣﻞ اﻟﺴﻌﯿﺪ, above n 699, 450.

158

evidential materials necessary to an ongoing investigation.708 Sufficient evidence
includes the exact location of the place to be searched and evidence to be seized.709

b) Australia
In Australia, a search warrant must be obtained from a magistrate or judge.710
Investigating officers must obtain a search warrant from a magistrate before searching
private property. The Crimes Act 1914 sets out a statutory framework governing powers
of search and seizure. Section 3E lists the following requirements for obtaining a search
warrant.
1)

Investigating officers must demonstrate that there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that there is, or there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential
711

materials on the premises.
2)

The investigating officers must show sufficient evidence that the person whose
712

premises are to be searched possesses evidential materials.
3)

Investigating officers are required to state the offence to which the warrant relates,
describe the premises, and the kind of evidential materials to be searched, the time
713

at which the warrant expires and warrant execution time.

c) USA
In a similar manner, investigating officers in the USA must obtain a warrant from a
neutral or disinterested judge before entering private property.714 The Fourth
Amendment sets out the constitutional framework within which search warrants are
issued. In making a request for a search warrant, investigating officers are required to
maintain the following conditions:
1) Investigating officers must demonstrate that there is a probable cause to
believe that the premises to be searched contained evidence.715
708
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2) Officers must describe the area to be searched, and list the items that they
expect to seize.716
3) Investigating officers are required to state the name of the officer serving
the warrant, the offence to which the warrant relates, a description of the
premises, and the kind of evidential materials to be searched for, the time
at which the warrant expires, and warrant execution time.717
Each of the above legal systems has addressed the search warrant’s requirements of
probable cause, and scope of the search. In the realm of cyber searches, investigating
officers must adhere to the requirements outlined above. But at the same time, the
search warrant must be drafted and executed in a way that adequately addresses the
particular needs of cybercrime and digital evidence. Therefore, these requirements must
be considered by the officer drafting and executing the search.

7.3.1 Probable Cause
Probable cause is the threshold level of suspicion that justifies the issuance of a search
warrant.718 It can be defined as reasonable grounds for belief in the existence of facts
that induce police officers to believe that a person is committing a crime, or has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime.719 These things must be established in the
affidavit to support the issuance of the search warrant.720 Investigators must provide
sufficient evidence or facts that support the belief that the evidence connected to the
criminal activity which is the subject of investigation will be discovered in the house of
the suspect. The GP in Jordan and the magistrate in Australia and the USA who grants
the warrant must assess the probable cause to determine whether issuing a search
warrant is reasonable and necessary for the benefit of an ongoing investigation.

716
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In cybercrime, establishing the reasonable grounds that have induced police officers to
believe that a person has committed, or is about to commit a crime, is quite different
from establishing grounds for conventional searches. In conventional searches, police
officers find no problem in establishing a factual nexus between the items described in
the warrant and the physical place to be searched.721 For example, if police officers
received reliable information containing a well-founded indication that a murder crime
is being committed, or has been committed, they will be able to prepare an affidavit
setting out the crime location and the items to be searched on the basis of which the GP
or magistrate will grant the warrant. But if the police officers receive in a similar
manner reliable information concerning a cybercrime, investigators must determine the
computer’s role in the alleged crime722 and show particularised facts manifesting how
evidentiary materials which are intangible are linked to the crime physical location. 723
The Internet Service Provider (ISP) plays a significant role in providing information to
officers establishing a factual nexus between the items described in the warrant and the
physical place to be searched.724 For example, in DoS attacks, investigators will obtain
information from the ISP concerning the Internet Protocol (IP) address that identifies
the attacker’s connection.725 Upon receiving the IP address, officers will have sufficient
proof to establish a probable cause basis for the issuance of the warrant.726
However, the nature of cyberspace which knows no physical boundaries cripples
investigators’ ability to easily establish a factual nexus between the items described in
the warrant and the physical place to be searched.727 This is what is known as the
problem of the association between the IP728 address (for example, 123.45.678.7)729 of
the alleged perpetrator of a crime and his physical location. 730
721
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The IP address plays a critical role in locating the physical address of the suspects in a
wide range of cybercrimes.731 For example, the IP address was critical in identifying a
person who allegedly posted personal details and sexually suggestive comments on the
Internet about a woman in the USA.732 However, this role varies between dynamic and
static IP addresses both of which are automatically assigned by Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) to their subscribers.733 For example, subscribers using Dial-Up
connection for Internet access are assigned dynamic IP address.734 The Dynamic IP
address offers the users anonymity by providing a temporary IP address to the user’s
device each time it connects to the Internet.735 The IP address is terminated and will be
assigned to a new user when the first user disconnects from the Internet.736 In several
scenarios, the short life time and mobility of the dynamic IP addresses make capturing
the suspect’s IP address and his physical location impossible737 and disable investigators
from tracking the physical location of the suspect. For example, if a suspect downloaded
child pornography and then disconnected while investigators were conducting an online
investigation, the IP address which leads to his physical location will be lost and
assigned to a different user. However, a probable cause can be established if the suspect
is still online.
A static IP address, on the other hand, is a unique number permanently assigned to a
computer device connected to the Internet located in a fixed physical place.738 For
example, subscribers using Broadband Internet access and public bodies such as

no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information provided to a commercial ISP. See, United
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schools, universities, libraries, are assigned static IP addresses. These addresses can lead
to the names and physical locations of the subscribers. Nevertheless, in several
scenarios, there will be a problem in establishing a nexus between the static IP address
and the physical location to be searched.739 The suspect can access the Internet from
locations associated with a static IP address, such as from a public library, to
communicate with his victim. In such a scenario, unless the suspect divulges
information about the computer used, it is hard, if not impossible, for the police to
locate the particular suspect and computer used to commit the crime. The investigator
will be able to locate the physical location, but the probable cause to search all
computers associated with the static IP address would be invalid.
Probable cause has been addressed by different legal systems.
a) Jordan
Reasonableness or probable cause has not been expressly incorporated into the law.
However, the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 provides a very simple threshold for
issuing a search warrant. Articles 46 and 48/2 of the Act obligate a GP to issue a search
warrant if there is a fair probability that the place to be searched houses a criminal, or a
suspect, or an accomplice or even a person harbouring evidence of a crime, or an
occupant of the home who has requested the search.
At the time of writing, no documented court cases have addressed the issue of IP
address and probable cause. Scholars, however, have addressed probable cause in
relation to conventional searches. They argue that the officer must be able to show that
the defendant committed a crime and that an accusation against him is substantiated
and, more importantly, that the search will reveal contraband or incriminating
evidence.740
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b) Australia
The Australian perspective is reflected both in legislative provisions governing search
warrants and in judicial expositions. Section 3E of the Crimes Act 1914 provides: ‘An
issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises if the officer is satisfied by
information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or
there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises’. To
obtain a search warrant, this Section clearly indicates that officers must demonstrate
reasonable grounds to believe that the search will uncover evidence of a crime.
There has been much argument, however, over the definition and exposition of the
‘reasonable grounds’. Courts have significantly contributed to the development of the
meaning of ‘reasonable grounds’. Justice Downes, the President of the Administrative
Appeal Tribunal, has said that ‘reasonable grounds means grounds based on reason, as
distinct from something “irrational” absurd or ridiculous’. 741 In George v. Rockett, the
High Court of Australia defined reasonable grounds as ‘an inclination of the mind
towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can
reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances,
leave something to surmise or conjecture’.742 From these definitions it becomes clear
that reasonable grounds arise either through information provided to the officers or
through the latters’ personal knowledge.
In a similar manner to Jordan, there is no case law in Australia that addresses the issue
of IP address and probable cause. However, exploring the judicial view of the USA may
be helpful in predicating how Australia will rule on this issue.
c) USA
The Fourth Amendment provides protection against unreasonable searches.743 It
imposes on law enforcement officers the requirement that the searches be based on
‘probable cause’. 744 The ‘probable cause’ benchmark has, in several cases, been
established as being that ‘a person of reasonable caution could believe that the search
may reveal evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be
741
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correct or more likely true than false’. 745 This benchmark is intended to help law
enforcement officers to prepare search warrant affidavits. The Ohio Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed this benchmark. In Beck v. Ohio the court
stated:
…officers had probable cause to make it--whether at that moment the facts and circumstances
within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient
to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an
offence.

746

Thus, the reasonable belief of a prudent man is being used as a parameter in the USA to
evaluate the reasonableness and legitimacy of the probable cause which arise during
crime investigation and require the issue of a search warrant.747
The officers’ experience plays a significant role in establishing a strong probable cause.
Thus, it is helpful to begin a search warrant affidavit with an introductory paragraph that
briefly describes the officer’s training and experience in the area or subject matter of the
investigation.748 Although the experience of the investigators preparing the affidavit is
significant in this area, some courts consider the officer’s expert opinion alone is not
enough to establish a strong probable cause. For example, in United States v. Schultz,
the court noted ‘...an officer's expert opinion that drug traffickers often keep records in
their residences’, and stated ‘but that alone will not be enough to establish a nexus
between the illegal trafficking and the residence to establish probable cause for a
search’. 749 Establishing a probable cause requires, in addition to the officer’s
experienced opinion, a nexus between criminal activity and the item to be seized, and
between the item to be seized and the place to be searched.
In the context of cyber search warrants, New York’s Court of Appeals has ruled that the
mere access or subscribing to a child pornography site is insufficient to establish
probable cause to search the suspect’s premises.750 However, different crimes require
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different ways of preparing the warrant. For example, in child pornography a probable
cause can be established based on information and images collected by the undercover
investigator posing as a minor online, or by informant reports about the receipt of child
pornography image files to law enforcement agents, who then begin an investigation.751
In this example, the investigator’s experience and facts provided create a reasonable
belief that criminal activity had taken place, justifying the issuance of a search warrant.
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Laws obligate law enforcement officers to draft a search warrant based on probable
cause or reasonable grounds. Police officers must have ‘probable cause’ as the threshold
to justify the issue of a conventional search warrant. The same threshold must be
reached to draft a cyber search warrant.
The Jordanian threshold, set by Articles 46 and 48/2, to issue a search warrant is simple
and serves justice, because the search warrant is obtainable if any one of the three
following circumstances is applicable: first, a visual observation by the officer; second,
information provided by other citizens about the crime; third, an occupant of the
property requests a search. This is applicable to cyber search warrants without any
problems. For example, an undercover investigator posing as a minor will be able to
obtain a cyber search warrant because of his visual observation of the crime. In addition,
investigators will be able to avoid the problem of IP addressing, because the law does
not require investigators to provide factual evidence linking the items to be seized and
the place to be searched. However, the threshold of probable cause set by Jordan
provides investigators with streamlined controls on how to prepare a search warrant, it
ignores privacy issues.
In contrast, the Australian and US threshold is more complex. The reasonable belief of a
prudent man is being used in both Australia and the USA to evaluate the reasonableness
and legitimacy of the ‘probable cause’ requirement for issuance of a search warrant.752
In addition, factual evidence linking criminal activity and the item to be seized, and
between the item to be seized and the place to be searched, is an important factor in
drafting a warrant. Indeed, because the reasonable belief of a prudent man is unfettered
by a fixed parameter and varies with each case and officer’s experience, courts require
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factual evidence supporting the affidavit. In different scenarios, obtaining factual
evidence is impossible, because of the problem of the IP addressing system.
The requirement of obtaining factual evidence linking the items to be seized and the
place to be searched hinders the investigation process, particularly, when officers are
able to obtain evidence remotely without the need for physical access to the suspect’s
property.

7.3.2 Subject of the Search Warrants
Search warrants have traditionally been used to search and seize tangible things, being
the fruit of the crime, the object of the crime, or the instrumentality of the crime, such as
illegal drugs, stolen property, cash, and weapons. The officers enter the nominated
premises, search evidence by entering rooms, opening drawers and looking around and
then seizing tangible objects.
In the cyber world, when the data is contraband, evidence, or instrumentalities of crime,
the subject of the search will be intangible items, such as data, images, files, and so
on.753 Investigators enter a real home or other building and search and seize data or they
seize hardware, such as hard disks, and then make a mirror copy. The investigator
acquires evidence by entering digital commands through a keyboard,754 or using
forensic tools to retrieve the requested contents from the mirror copy and sends it to an
output device, such as a monitor, printer,755 or a peripheral to display the evidence.
a) Jordan
The current laws of Jordan authorise the search and seizure of tangible things. On the
one hand, Article Ten of the Jordanian Constitution protects individuals from
illegitimate search in their houses and vicinities, such as gardens or other tangible places
associated with the premises. In addition, it protects against illegitimate search of
physical places used for residential purposes, such as hotels, condominiums, private
apartments, whether owned or rented. The invisible digital contents are not addressed by
the law and are not recognised as a commodity in their own right. On the other hand, the
753

See, eg, John Rittinghouse and Bill Hancock, Cybersecurity Operations Handbook (2003) 1205.
Kerr, above n 686, 538-540.
755
Ibid.
754

167

Criminal Procedure Law 1961 identifies that the subject of the search warrant is either a
physical place756 in which a person lives and maintains privacy, confidentiality, and
secrecy, or an individual.757 In addition, Articles 33 and 34/1 authorise General
Prosecutors and police officers to seize visible items and hard copy documents.
Meanwhile, Article 88 authorises GPs to seize letters, parcels and other mail items.
b) Australia
By contrast, Australian parliaments have enacted specific provisions to address issues
raised by digital searches. The new search powers permit Australian law enforcement
officers executing a search warrant to search not only tangible items but also intangible
materials. Section 3L of the Crimes Act 1914, titled ‘use of electronic equipment at
premises’, permits executing officers to operate electronic equipment to seize data on
electronic devices.758 Section 3C defines data as any information in any form, or any
programme.
c) USA
US statutes and courts recognise the search and seizure of data stored on electronic
devices. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) for example,
authorises law enforcement officers to access and seize digital data stored by a provider
of electronic communications service.759 The United States Supreme Court stated in
United States v. New York TEL.CO that ‘we recognised in Katz v. United States, which
held that telephone conversations were protected by Fourth Amendment, that Rule 41760
is not limited to tangible items but is sufficiently flexible to include within its scope
electronic intrusions…’761 In United States v. Biasucci, the Second Circuit Court held
that the fruits of video surveillance are ‘property’ that may be seized using a Rule 41
search warrant.762 Accordingly, data stored in electronic form is ‘property’ that may
properly be searched and seized using a Rule 41 warrant.763
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d) Comparative Legal Analysis
The law of search and seizure in Jordan is inadequate to address the specific concerns
raised by the subject of the search in digital context. The lack of recognition of
intangible data as a commodity makes the current law of search and seizure incapable of
dealing with digital evidence. According to the current provisions, law enforcement
officers can only seize visible and tangible objects. To meet this problem, the Australian
legislature has recognised the problem by enacting Section 3L, providing law
enforcement officers with resources they need to search and seize intangible evidence.
The USA Supreme Court expanded the definition of property to include digital items.
So, Jordanian law should be amended to expressly authorise the search and seizure of
intangible materials.

7.3.3 Scope of the Search Warrants
Search warrants must precisely describe the scope of the search and the items to be
seized.764 Law enforcement officers, according to the general rule of searching and
seizing evidence, must search for those evidentiary materials that are described in the
search warrant and only seize what is authorised by the warrant.765 Therefore, the search
warrant is the map that provides investigators with the guidelines necessary to execute a
precise and rapid search.
Cyber search warrants may be issued to secure two different categories of evidentiary
materials: hardware and software. Computers are composed of two vital components:
the hardware component, such as screens, hard drives, motherboards, and so on, and
digital component, such as programmes and data. While none of the two components
can work separately, they are completely different entities and require totally different
approaches in search and seizure procedures. When the data is contraband, evidence, or
an instrumentality of the crime, the digital part is the main focus of the search, because
it contains the evidence, while the other part is a compartment or container. Therefore,
when a computer system is hacked, the hardware itself will not be contraband, or
evidence or an instrumentality of the crime, but is considered to be merely a storage
764
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place for evidence of the crime, and investigators should not obtain a warrant to seize
the hardware, but to create a mirror copy. This is an important point because,
practically, seizing computer hardware is not problematic if one computer is identified
in the crime scene.766 The problem arises when the object to be seized is a complicated
network, such as several computers connected to a common Local Area Network (LAN)
in one office or in a commercial business area. Although seizing the entire networks,
and network infrastructure, PC-workstations and peripherals, is feasible and a search
warrant to seize the entire system is obtainable, seizing the entire network deprives
businesses and people, who are not associated with the offence, of the entire computer
system and, therefore, will cripple their business operations as well as invade privacy.767
The general notion of particularity,768 also known as the principle of specificity,769
means the search warrant should be issued for a particular crime, to search a particular
place, and to seize particular items.770 The Crimes Act 1914 and the Fourth Amendment
established principles that would soon restructure a search warrant particularity. First,
the search warrant must specify the particular areas to be searched.771 Second, the
search warrant must describe the particular object to be searched and things to be
seized.772
In cybercrime searches, particularity is more complicated and problematic; particularly
in relation to the scope of data to be searched. Investigators encounter incriminating
data intermingled with thousands of files with no connection to the investigation and
which cannot practicably be separated at the site of the search.773 These files either
belong to the person who is the subject of the investigation or to other persons and are
neither contraband nor evidence of criminal activity, 774 or they might be privileged files,
such as lawyers’ files. Under any of these circumstances, the core of the problem is that
766
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the scope of the search goes beyond the limits drawn in the search warrant.775 This
happens when a valid search warrant fails to include all the documents the subject of the
search because the investigators are not aware that these documents are outside the
scope of the search or because the separation between incriminating data and unrelated
documents is impractical. 776 Indeed, forensics investigators usually make a mirror copy
of the hard drive and conduct a thorough examination off-site. A mirror copy could
include innocent and confidential information with no connection to the ongoing
investigation. This problem is comparable with the traditional problem of separating the
wheat from the chaff at the physical location of the search.777 Courts and scholars,
therefore, are increasingly confronting the question of the search’s proper boundaries or
particularity. They offer two different perspectives on the issue.
First: Pro-particularity Approach
The first approach rejects the use of broad language in preparing the search warrant.
The search warrant should be drawn as specifically as possible and officers must not
open files or folders randomly. Thus, the search warrant must be specific as to the files
or data to be searched.778 This approach was obvious in different courts’ cases that
quashed mirror copy searches, and delivered judgment in favour of conducting specific
searches.779 The USA Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, declined to
validate a warrant authorising blanket removal of all computer storage removable media
for later examination.780 Other courts have considered the phrase ‘including but not
limited to’ which is mentioned in search warrants781 as failing to satisfy the particularity
requirement.782 Nevertheless, courts which adopted this approach admitted that a
comprehensive search is permissible in specific circumstances associated with the
search of commercial premises which conduct illegal business operations beyond the
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scope of the business’ registration.783 For example, if an affidavit shows that the entire
business which is the subject of a search is merely a scheme to defraud and all the
computers harbour evidence then unrestricted search is valid.784 Such a warrant
authorises law enforcement to search computers and digital records located at the crime
scene as long as police officers believe that the computers are likely to house evidence
of criminal activity.785

Second: Anti-particularity Approach
A majority of scholars support an anti-particularity approach to cyber searches.786
Franklin supports comprehensive and unlimited search warrants if there is plenty of
time and uncertainty about what evidence is being sought. However, he further advised
that a limited search warrant is desirable if the evidence can be precisely located.787 Ivan
suggests that a search warrant should include any computers and computer removable
media found in the premises the subject of the search.788 In his affidavit, Detective
Askew presented a comprehensive affidavit stating that ‘this application is to search any
computer media found therein…’789 He backed his argument with the fact that the
search specificity would incur additional time and financial cost during the search
execution. Furthermore, restraining the search would preclude investigators from
conducting complete and fruitful searches; this is because cybercriminals are more
professional and skilled in concealing incriminating evidence than criminals of
traditional crimes.790 For example, by using encryption technology, evidence could be
hidden inside any of the numerous images, videos, files and documents, and
suspiciously modified in such a way that a narrow search will likely omit incriminating
items.791 And most importantly, the search for incriminating evidence requires the
executing officer to retrieve deleted files, and therefore, the mirror copy search is
significant for retrieving relevant data.
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a) Jordan
No provisions in laws specifically deal with cyber searches and mirror copy. 792 In
addition, no court decisions or scholarly work identify and analyse the issue. Therefore,
it is highly likely that conventional search warrant procedures would be applied to cyber
searches, because they grant GPs broad authority to make a mirror copy and seize any
items necessary for ongoing investigations. Indeed, the Criminal Procedure Law 1961
entitles GPs and executing officers to search and seize anything (tangible) that might
relate to any offence.793 The same rules were applied in 1970 in the Chic Fashions case
and in Pringle v. Bremner & Stirgling.794 In these cases, the investigator seized not only
the stolen goods which had been listed on the search warrant, but also any other goods
which he believed on reasonable ground to have been stolen and to be material
evidence.795
b) Australia
In Australia, the Crimes Act 1914 Section 3F (1) (c) draws the limits of the search
scope. It stipulates that the warrant should be issued to search the premises for the kinds
of evidential material specified in. Section 3C defines ‘evidential material’ as ‘a thing
relevant to an indictable offence or a thing relevant to a summary offence, including
such a thing in electronic form’. From the definition and Section 3F it can be concluded
that executing officers are obliged to search and seize the items listed on the search
warrant, including data. Nevertheless, executing officers are entitled to make a mirror
copy as Sections 3F, 3K and 3L provide executing officers with a variety of options:
1) Bringing to the warrant premises forensic equipment to examine or process data in order to
determine whether it may be seized.
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2) Removing from the premises data to examine or process elsewhere in order to determine
whether it may be seized.
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3) Operating electronic equipment at the premises, copying the data found thereby on to a device
brought to the premises and removing that device from the premises.

798

799

4) Operating electronic equipment at the premises and then seizing it.

5) Operating electronic equipment at the premises, using facilities at the premises to create
800

documents there-from and then seizing them.

6) Securing electronic equipment at the premises so that it may be operated with the assistance of
801

an expert.

These provisions empower executing officers to rummage through data first and then
make a mirror copy and seize specified evidential material. In Kennedy v. Baker, for
example, the Australian Federal Court permitted the executing officer to conduct and
remove the hard drive image from the premises.802 The Explanatory Memorandum to
the Cybercrime Bill 2001 explained subsection 3L. It stated that:
It would enable law enforcement officers executing a search warrant to copy data held on any
electronic equipment or associated devices at search premises to a storage device where there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the data contains evidential material. This will permit
officers to copy all data held on a computer hard drive or data storage device if some of the data
contains evidential material or if there are reasonable grounds to suspect the data contains
evidential material… The existing provision only allows evidential material to be copied (Crimes
Act, paragraph 3L (2) (c)). Electronic equipment, such as a computer hard drive, can hold large
amounts of data. It is often not practicable for officers to search all the data for evidential
material while at the search premises and to then copy only the evidential material which is
found. The proposed provision would allow officers to copy all the data on a piece of electronic
equipment (by imaging a computer hard drive for example) in situations where an initial search
of the data uncovers some evidential material or where the officer believes on reasonable grounds
803

that the equipment might contain evidential material.

This explanation inspired the Judge in Kennedy v. Baker to argue that data stored in the
hard drive of a personal computer is a single thing regardless of whether it contains
different parts, such as files and documents. He further emphasised that a computer’s
797
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hard drive contains a single magnetic medium albeit that the computer can be operated
to access selectively certain parts of that data, such as particular files or documents.
Therefore, he said:
…I take the view that the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of part 3L (1A) (a) is that if the
executing officer or constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds that data from a particular
source accessed by operating a computer might constitute evidential material, he or she may copy
the data from that source to a disk, tape or other associated device brought to the premises. A
computer hard drive is, in my view, a single source of data within that meaning….I reject the
contention that…Mr Baker was not authorised by subs 3L (1A) of the Crimes Act to copy all of
the data held on the examined hard drive, thus creating the imaged hard drive, and to take the
804

imaged hard drive from the Premises.

c) USA
The Fourth Amendment and the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) protect materials and
defend individuals against broad search and seizure. The Fourth Amendment
established principles that soon restructured search warrant particularity. First, the
search warrant must specify the particular areas to be searched.805 Second the search
warrant must describe the particular object to be searched and things to be seized.806
The PPA protects digital materials which are prepared for publication on the web, as
well as documentary materials from searches and seizures unless they are contraband,
instrumentalities, or fruit of crime.
Because cyberspace is significantly different from the real world in terms of the ability
of the officers and forensic tools to distinguish between incriminating materials and
protected materials, the PPA application would pose considerable hurdles to search and
seizure procedures in cyberspace. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit in Guest v. Leis has
explicitly ruled that the incidental seizure of PPA-protected material commingled on a
suspect’s computer with evidence of a crime does not give rise to PPA liability, because
‘when police execute a search warrant for documents on a computer, it will often be
difficult or impossible (particularly without the co-operation of the owner) to separate
the offending materials from other “innocent” material on the computer’ at the site of
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the search’. 807 In another similar decision, the Tenth Court has suggested that ‘if the
executing officer comes across evidence intermingled with irrelevant documents that
cannot feasibly be sorted at the site, the officers may seal or hold the documents
pending approval by a magistrate of the conditions and limitations on a further search
through the documents’.808
This approach, however, while it facilitates law enforcement preparing and executing a
search warrant, is permissible only in particular situations. Different courts have held
that the search and seizure of ‘any and all computer hardware,’ and ‘any and all
computer software’ is permissible in certain circumstances such as where:
1) A more precise description is not feasible;809
2) The suspect made it difficult to describe particularly the items to be
seized.810
3) The items to be seized are voluminous.811
Therefore, the Tenth Court in United States v. Cary has suggested in some
circumstances that investigators ‘must engage in the intermediate step of sorting various
types of documents and then only search the ones specified in a warrant’.812 In another
case for example, where the defendant was accused of possession of child pornography,
the Ninth Circuit Court held that the detective must examine only files containing
extensions indicating pictures, such as JPEG and GIF.813 In a recent decision, however,
the same Court broke new ground in deciding that law enforcement officers are
permitted to execute non-restrictive searches if they observe the following rules:
a)

They waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine which allows them to seize
evidence which they observe is not within the scope of their search warrant:
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b)

The collected data is segregated or reduced by specialised personnel or an
independent third party:

c)

The warrant discloses the actual risks of destruction of information and describe
prior efforts to seize the information:

d) The search protocol must be designed to uncover only the information for which it
has probable cause and only that information may be examined by the investigative
agents; and
e)

Law enforcement officers must destroy or return unrelated data.

814

Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit Court proposed that in the off-site investigation,
computer examiners should be required to ‘employ several methods to avoid searching
files of the type not identified in the warrant: observing files types and titles listed on
the directory, doing a key word search for relevant terms, or reading portions of each
file stored in the memory’. 815 Some courts have gone further than this and have
restricted the issuance of search warrants upon providing the court with particular
search methods aimed at protecting the intermingled files. 816 For example, the Tenth
Circuit Court proposed that in the off-site investigation, computer examiners should be
required to ‘employ several methods to avoid searching files of the type not identified in
the warrant: observing files types and titles listed on the directory, doing a key word
search for relevant terms, or reading portions of each file stored in the memory’.817 The
same court in United States v. Brooks has refused, however, to restrain executing
officers from implementing or describing particularised computer search methods to the
defendant.818
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d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Drawing the borders of the search in advance is a daunting task because, among other
things, obtaining definite details of evidence is beyond the officers’ knowledge and
evidence can be concealed, encrypted or disguised. Thus, preventing investigators from
searching the entire data and opening files would pose considerable hurdles to searches
and seizures in cyberspace, and obstruct police investigations. Therefore, the second
approach, which permits law enforcement officers to make a mirror copy, is more
common and is frequently used by forensics investigators.
In Jordan, in the absence of provisions expressly dealing with cyber searches, the broad
language of the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 might allow officers to create a mirror
copy and conduct an unrestricted search. Police officers exercise broad latitude in
executing the search warrant. They are not restricted or bounded by particularity
principles which restrict officers to precisely search and seize items. They are granted
autonomy to seize not only the items listed on the warrant, but also any other items they
believe on reasonable ground to be material evidence. This provides investigators with a
flexible avenue in executing the search; even if it does not recognise the unique nature
and characteristics of digital evidence.
Developed countries, such as Australia, have amended their laws relating to cyber
searches to permit mirror copy searches. Sections 3F, 3K and 3L of the Crimes Act 1914
entitle the executing officer to rummage through the data using forensic tools to
determine the items that should be seized and authorises the executing officer to create a
mirror copy. Therefore, the Criminal Procedure Law must be amended by adding a text
explicitly allowing law enforcement officers and GPs to conduct exhaustive digital
searches. At the same time, the search warrant must be detailed and clearly direct law
enforcement officers to the incriminating data to avoid rummaging through innocent
data. But if a more precise description is impossible, or the suspect makes it difficult to
describe the items to be seized, or the items are voluminous, the USA perspective can
be adopted because it provides executing officers with a clearer image respecting
computer search and seizure procedures, as well as recognising the nature of digital
evidence by limiting the search as far as possible to evidential materials.
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7.4 Execution of the Cyber Search Warrants
Conventional search warrant execution refers to carrying out the search warrant by
conducting the entry and search of the specified place.819 Traditional search warrant
execution can be divided into three stages. The first stage begins with knocking and
notifying,820 then observing and marking the place to be searched in order to determine
which is the most effective and efficient pattern of search to apply to the crime scene
environment.821 For example, a ‘zone’ search would be chosen for a small space zone,
such as a bedroom, while a ‘grid’ search might be chosen for a large open outdoor area,
such as a backyard.822 The second stage involves a more thorough search, such as
rummaging and moving items, opening and emptying closed containers.823 The final
stage, which culminates in seizure of items, is the most intrusive level of search, such as
emptying every drawer in the scene and searching thoroughly through anything marked
in the first stage.824
By contrast, the cyber search warrant execution refers to the process of executing data
processing by conducting forensic analysis. This search is divided into two major
phases: the pre-digital search and the digital search.
The pre-digital phase is conducted on-site, and therefore, mimics the first stage of the
traditional search procedures.825 This phase can be further divided into two sub-steps:
The first sub-step often commences with the first stage of the traditional search
procedures, which begins with notifying and observing the physical location to be
searched, then nominating the right search mechanism and, finally, identifying the
digital devices specified in the warrant. Also, it involves procedures associated with the
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place of the search, the suspect, and other routine procedures, such as documentation,826
recording827 and video shots.828 Such procedures are imperative to prove that the first
responders did not contaminate the crime scene in any way, providing evidence in its
original state,829 as well as for chain of custody purposes, to track the evidence
collection process from its original sources to the courtroom presentation.830
The second sub-step involves particular procedures associated with the computer as a
piece of hardware, such as labelling all the connections and wires attached to the
computer and cutting off the power which is recommended by a number of forensic
investigators.831 This procedure should happen only after saving and shutting down any
programmes that might be running in RAM.832 (The RAM temporarily holds
information that is currently running and travelling between the hard disk and Internet
and switching off the power supply improperly will damage any unsaved data running
in RAM).833 Significant consideration should be given to the type of the operating
system used, for example, Windows XP, Linux, UNIX, and Macintosh, as each of these
systems uses a different mechanism for storing and running files stored in RAM.834 For
example, in a Windows Operating System, the data in RAM is immediately lost once
the power is removed from the computer.835 Labelling all the cables attached to the
computer seized is vital because it ‘facilitates the reconnection of the cables when the
computer is reassembled and restarted’.836
826

The crime scene documentation process normally involves six steps: 1) documentation of major
events relating to the search efforts that are taken by investigators to insure that an organised search is
accomplished; 2) documentation of the general appearance of the crime scene as first observed; 3)
photographing and recording the scene.4) documentation of physical evidence (computer) locations, size,
measurement, etc. 5) documentation of the recognition, collection, marking, and packaging of physical
evidence for administrative and chain of custody purposes; and 6) documentation of the recognition,
collection, marking, and packaging of lifts made of latent prints discovered at the scene. See generally,
Crime Scene Response Guidelines: Documentation Procedures <http://www.crime-sceneinvestigator.net/respon4.html> at 15 September 2007.
827
These procedures - documentation, photographing, and recording - are part of every step in the search
execution. Reyes suggests that a voice recorder is important to be used before moving onto each step of
the search execution. See generally, Anthony Reyes et al, above n 731, 145.
828
See, eg, Dagnan, above n 819. See also, Ferraro and Eoghan, above n 723, 116.
829
See, eg, Eoghan Casey, above n 428, 629.
830
See generally, Jay Siegel, Forensic Science: The Basic (2007) 43.
831
See specially, Reyes Anthony et al, above 731, 147- 149. See also, Moore, above n 597, 86.
832
Ibid.
833
See, eg, Scott Mueller’s, Upgrading and Repairing PCs (14th ed, 2002) 417. See also, Jeff Dodd,
'Memories Are Made of This: Several Types of Memory Play a Role in PCs ' (2002) 6 (7) Smart
Computing 12.
834
Ibid.
835
Jack Belzer, at el, Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology (1987) 161.
836
Moore, above n 597, 86.
180

The second phase of cyber search is digital. This stage requires no physical motion in
the execution, because it works entirely with the data. It embodies unique procedures
conducted by forensic officers off-site.837 Indeed, it is handled by different personnel at
different times using different methods to recover and discover invisible or intangible
evidence from the hardware devices that were seized in the first stage. Investigators
must be reasonably familiar with computers and be able to distinguish database
programmes, electronic mail files, telephone lists, and stored visual or audio files from
each other. Evidentiary materials searched for in this stage can be the fruit of crime
(such as the history files on the defendant’s computer showing the dates and times of
hacked access to specific pages) or the object of the crime (such as child pornography
photos, spoofed website making tools, and so on).
Although the two stages of search are apparently separate, each impinges on the other.
Procedures executed in the pre-digital phase may indirectly effect the digital search step
in a negative way. The notifying procedure, for example, which is used for informing
the suspect or other residents of the search warrant execution, must be narrowly applied
in order to prevent the suspect from having any opportunity to destroy, contaminate, or
hide incriminating evidence.838 Therefore, when applying the announcement procedure,
the first responder must firstly secure the crime scene or the place to be searched
physically and digitally.
The physical step is to keep the suspect away from the crime scene or the place to be
searched and to prevent anyone from approaching or accessing the computer via a
wireless connection or any other means of transmitting data from one location to
another, such as over a network.839 This can be done by unhooking any phone
connections, inspecting the computer for booby-traps840 and isolating the computer from
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any network connections.841 In a scenario where there is more than one terminal, Kevin
O’Shea, co-author of Cyber Crime Investigations: Bridging the Gaps Between Security
Professionals, Law Enforcement, and Prosecutors, has suggested some clues that might
be useful in identifying the physical location of the digital media that has the highest
probability of containing the evidentiary information described in the warrant.842 For
example, in a hacking investigation, where a couple of computers were found in the
suspect family’s house scattered between his bedroom and the lounge.843 The
investigator must first secure the one that was found in the suspect’s bedroom.
However, while it is hard to speculate about the intangible location of digital evidence,
because the computers are networked together, he pointed out that the type of crime the
subject of the investigation may guide the investigators to the right digital container.844
For example, in a case of an obsessive child pornography collector, the evidence can be
speculatively found in a huge container, such as hard drive or removable disks.845
Nevertheless, investigators must not rely on such indications and all the digital media
found should be examined.
It might be possible that evidence contamination can be achieved wirelessly while the
officers are present at the crime scene.846 The danger of wireless network connections
lies in the ability of any other user to control and destroy incriminating evidence
remotely by deleting files and programmes or maliciously planting incriminating
evidence. For example, piggybacking847 is new generation of cybercrime that exploits
wireless connection technology to obtain someone’s wireless connection log.848 This
technique can be used by the suspect himself to access and destroy evidence.849
trigger the automatic destruction of the computer's files. See, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section Criminal Division, above n 633.
841
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Therefore, investigators must take into their consideration evidence contamination by
wireless means and apply appropriate procedures to secure the crime scene and/or the
place the subject of the search.
a) Jordan
In Jordan, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is the only authority entitled to
prepare and execute search warrants.850 Public prosecutors within each district may opt
to carry out the search warrant personally, or assign the task to police officers and law
enforcement investigators who are exclusively listed in Article 9 of the Jordanian
Criminal Procedure Law. 851 The designated officers and investigators must obey and
adhere to the public prosecutor’s instructions about the warrant execution procedures,
its scope and its time, and the warrant must be performed according to the rules of
law.852
In regard to the pre-digital phase, GPs have been vested with the power to issue and
conduct search warrants without notifying in advance the defendant or the suspect of the
search.853 However, the warrant does require the defendant’s presence during the time
of the search warrant execution or a representative, such as a lawyer, or two witnesses,
or a local notary. One of them must attend the search execution.854 He has also been
vested with a broad discretion in deciding what appropriate procedures and measures
must be taken to ensure proper search and seizure operation. For example, the GPs can
assign the search procedures to experts.855 In regards to the digital phase, no provisions
in the law address the particular procedures that should be applied for in computer
searches and seizures.
b) Australia
The Australian Crimes Act 1914 addresses notification procedures by obliging the
officer executing a search warrant to announce that s/he is authorised to enter the
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premises to search.856 Furthermore, Section 3H clearly orders the executing officer to
hand over a copy of the search warrant to the occupier of the premises or another person
who apparently represents the occupier and is present at the premises.857 The search
warrant copy made available to the occupier must include detailed information about the
search, such as the name and description of the issuing officer and the details as to the
date or place of its issuance.858 It also obliges the executing officer to identify
him/herself to the person present at the place to be searched.859 However, with
reasonable grounds, officers have been vested with the power to enter premises without
announcement.860 Even more, under new legislation to go before Federal Parliament,
police officers will be given unprecedented ‘sneak and peek’ powers to search homes
and computers without notification.861
In the digital phase of the search, the Australian Crimes Act 1914 explicitly authorises
the officers executing the search warrant to bring to the premises equipment necessary
for protecting, examining or processing any data found at the premises in order to
determine whether it may be seized under the warrant. 862
c) USA
In the USA, Section 213 of the PATROT Act authorises the executing officers to
perform what is called a ‘sneak and peek’ search. As defined by Charles Doyle, such ‘a
search authorises officers to secretly enter (physically or electronically), conduct a
search, observe, take measures, conduct exams, take pictures, copy documents,
download or transmit, and depart without any tangible evidence or leaving notice of
their presence’.863 This search warrant gives authorities the right to search, observe,
copy, download or transmit computer files without taking any tangible evidence or
leaving notification or notifying the occupier of the premises, or another person who

856

Crimes Act 1914 div 5 S 3ZS (1) (A).
Crimes Act 1914 S 3H (1).
858
See, eg, Oke v. Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (2007) (FCA27).
859
Crimes Act 1914 P 1AA div 2 S 3H (4).
860
Crimes Act 1914 div 5 S 3ZS (2) stipulates: ‘A constable is not required to comply with subsection (1)
if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that immediate entry to the premises is required to
ensure: (a) the safety of a person (including a constable); or (b) that the effective execution of the warrant
or the arrest is not frustrated’.
861
Tom Allard, ‘New Secret Search Powers’, the Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), August 1, 2007, 1.
862
Crimes Act 1914 S 3k (1).
863
Charles Doyle, ‘Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA PATRIOT ACT’ in Alphonse B
Ewing and Charles Doyle (eds), The USA Patriot Act Reader (2005) 1, 14.
857

184

apparently represents the occupier at the premises. 864 However, the issue of a ‘sneak and
peek’ search warrant must be backed by a reasonable belief that knocking and
announcing will lead the suspect to destroy, or hide evidence, or obstruct
investigation.865
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
It is clear that applying the traditional procedures of knocking and notifying to the place
the subject of the search may jeopardise the integrity of the evidence that is going to be
discovered, because digital evidence can be quickly and easily destroyed even by
something as simple as pressing a Hotkey.866 The success of a search execution often
relies on taking the suspect by surprise or using sneak tactics so they do not hide or
destroy evidence. Therefore, the need for issuing a ‘sneak and peek’ search warrant,
instead of a classical search warrant involving knocking and notifying, is self-evident in
cybercrime investigation more than any other sort of investigation.
Jordan’s and Australia’s positions suffice for executing a search warrant without
notifying in advance the suspect. Neither of them, however, authorises the executing
officer to conduct a ‘sneak and peek’ search. Jordanian law explicitly requires the
attendance of two witnesses or a notary during the search execution. Australian law is
more complex and is not suitable for executing a sneak warrant, because handing a copy
of the warrant to the suspect significantly conflicts with sneak and peek procedures,
unless there are reasonable grounds, such as the need to conduct an effective search; in
which case the officer may enter the place subject of the search without announcement.
Australia is in the process of reforming its laws to allow a US style ‘sneak and peek’
feature. It would also be a useful step for Jordan to apply ‘sneak and peek’ to
cybercrime investigation.
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7.5 Who Should Accompany the Officers Executing the
Search?
Cybercrime searches have a unique nature and different phases. The pre-digital phase is
conducted on-site, and the digital phase is primarily conducted off-site. They require
both conventional and digital tools to accomplish their goals together with investigative
teams, such as technicians, evidence custodians, forensic examiners and forensic
analysts. They assist in carrying out the conventional and digital procedures and
conduct searches off-site. Therefore, they can be divided into two groups: the first group
is the first responders who perform basic procedures, such as securing the physical
location. The second group is the professional investigators who are trained to conduct
cybercrime as well as traditional searches, because investigators have to deal with
physical places, real suspects, and a variety of investigative tools, such as video and
audio tapes, hardware, cameras, technical equipment, etc.
a) Jordan
In the absence of any provisions concerning cyber searches, conventional search
warrant execution requirements must be observed when dealing with cybercrime.
According to the Criminal Procedure Law 1961, conventional search execution requires
the attendance of two groups of people. These are, first, police officers who execute the
warrant and, second, civilian witnesses accompanying them for the purpose of
witnessing the search.
The first group is composed of professional investigators and forensic experts led by a
GP. The GP supervises the officers’ compliance with the law. If the case needs
expertise, the GP can nominate the right experts to provide assistance in executing the
search.867 The experts declare in writing (under oath) that they will carry out their task
faithfully and impartially. 868
The second group is precisely identified in the search warrant’s provisions as persons
who must accompany the officers executing the search warrant.869 Two witnesses who
are blood relatives of the defendant or, if not available, a notary, must accompany the
867
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officers and witness the execution procedures.870 The purpose is to offer the defendant
protection and an opportunity to suppress the collected evidence, if the executing officer
misuse his authority. The designated accompanying persons must sign in at the end of
the search report; otherwise the search will be invalid.871 The Court of Cassation has
handed down judgment in favour of their attendance.872 Conducting a search without the
presence of any of these persons who are mentioned makes the search unlawful unless
the defendant is present.873
b) Australia
In Australia, meanwhile, the occupier of the premises is entitled to be present during the
search,874 and the executing officers are vested with the power to terminate his presence
if s/he impedes the search.875 In addition, the executing officer can order a specified
person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to
allow him to access, copy, or convert the data into documentary form.876
c) USA
In the USA, neither the Fourth Amendment to the USA Constitution nor Article 18
U.S.C. § 3105 require the presence of the defendant during the search. Under the current
law, the executing officer has authority to hire experts in various fields, including
computer forensics, to assist in the search.877 Also, the executing officer can accompany
the victim, or a personal representative of the victim, to the premises if he provides
persuasive reason to support the victim’s presence.878
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
In cyber searches, the Jordanian GP’s supervision in searches is limited to searches
carried out on-site. The off-site searches are carried out by the experts who have an
advanced knowledge in forensic investigation. S/he prepares the necessary report to the
GP.
870
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The second group in attendance, on the other hand, poses a problematic question as to
how off-site attendance can be achieved. The two witnesses can attend and observe the
physical searches and sign the initial report, but their attendance and observation is
unattainable off-site, because digital analysis off-site takes time to accomplish and it is
unpractical to allow witnesses to attend this digital analysis. Therefore, the Criminal
Procedure Law 1961 requirement conflicts with the special needs of cyber searches and
hinders remote searches as well. The attendance of two witnesses or a local notary is
impractical in remote searches. By contrast, Australian’s and the USA’s perspectives
provide the executing officers a more flexible approach to execute cybercrimes warrants
by not demanding the presence of witnesses during the execution of a search.

7.6 Search Location
Computers are becoming an integral part of people’s life.879 On one hand, individuals,
organisations, and public and private sectors rely on computers for daily work. For
example, communications, financial transactions, such as online banking and shopping,
social activities, such as dating and facebook websites, education and entertainment, and
many other daily activities are processed by computers. On the other hand, people are
used to seeing law enforcement officers leaving private premises and organisations
carrying off computers hardware, CD’s, floppy disks, and so on, to be further examined
off-site. As a result, various individuals and organisations are significantly influenced
by the search and seizure procedures, because digital assets are an integral part of their
business operations and interrupting or depriving the business of computer systems may
cause serious harm.
The essence of where the search is to be conducted is that most of individuals,
organisations, and businesses rely on computers for daily work. This situation makes it
harder for law enforcement officers to conduct a search on-site for long hours or
perform a search off-site. In fact, it has always been said that corporations and
businesses resist the removal of computers off-site, because of fear of intellectual
879

The Jordanian government, in an effort to boost computer literacy, has initiated an unprecedented
project called ‘computer for every student’. This project offers a monthly payment plan, allowing
university students to buy laptops at a competitive price: approximately 400 thousand laptops tax-free
will be on-sale. The project also offers home owners the chance to buy a PC. See, ‘Computer for Every
Student’, Alrai Daily Newspaper (Amman), 18 January 2008.

188

property and institutional data exposure as well as work interruption.880 Also,
conducting a search on-site for long hours causes work interruption and privacy
intrusion.881 Thus, the search location creates a dilemma between conducting the search
and seizure on-site or off-site.
The balance that should be struck between on-site searches on the one hand, and the
need to move the computer off-site on the other hand, will be described, and the legal
perspective of each view will be examined.

7.6.1 Searching Computers On-site v. Off-site
Searching a computer on-site occurs when the executing officers look through a
computer screen to see what information it may hold in relation to the search warrant.882
There is also the possibility that the search on-site may go further by opening files and
folders and viewing file properties and printing out documents.883 For example, in
cyberstalking offences, stalkers often use e-mail and chat rooms to harass their victims.
If a search warrant were issued to search the offender’s computer, the evidence in such a
case would be held in his computer’s RAM.884 Therefore, investigators must perform
and complete the search on-site, because RAM is a temporary and volatile storage
device, and cutting off the power supply to remove the data off-site will erase all the
information located on the RAM.885 On the other hand, off-site search occurs when
investigators remove computers, including documents, files, and programmes, to an offsite laboratory for a thorough search to seize evidence and then return any irrelevant
materials. 886
Forensic experts, scholars, and investigators have addressed the issue of whether
computer searches should be conducted on-site or off-site. From a technical point of
view, they argue that digital evidence recovery and analysis processes may impose
technical and logistical restrictions on the officers executing the search and make an on880
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site search impossible or impractical.887 Hence, the majority of forensic experts and
DOJ guidelines recommend that computer searches and acquisition of data must be
performed off-site.888 They argue that the conditions in the laboratory, such as
temperature, time flexibility, expert support, and other technical issues, such as
overcoming password protected systems, are better controlled in the laboratory than in
the search location.889 On the other hand, Bernner argues that cyber searches should not
be conducted off-site.890 From a practical point of view, she explained that computer
searches using Automated Search Techniques, such as a key-word search, will take less
time and effort to perform on digital containers compared with hardcopy files search.891
She said:
The benefits of electronic search techniques are that they are fast, accurate, and within the narrow
scope of their capabilities. If the officers are searching for very specific information and know
one or two exact phrases or words to search for, a comprehensive electronic search can be
892

conducted in a matter of hours…

She added that the off-site search would cripple businesses and generally causes
interruption as long as the investigation continues.893
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a) Jordan
General prosecutors and executing officers enjoy a wide measure of discretion in the
execution of search warrants. The Court of Cassation held that the GP and executing
officers play a master role in investigating crimes and executing search warrants.894
Hence, they are the only authority which determines whether the search should be
conducted on-site or off-site. However, the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 permits the
GP to hire an expert to assist in investigation and decision-making. Thus, it is highly
likely that the GP will apply the experts’ opinion on whether computers system should
be searched on-site or off-site.
b) Australia
In Australia, the Crimes Act 1914 amendment, Law Enforcement Powers Relating to
Electronically Stored Data, addresses the issue. Subsection 3K (2) (a) permits the
executing officers to move computers from premises to the forensic laboratory for
further search, examination, and analysis. The Act places limits, however, on the power
of law enforcement to move objects off-site and seize documents. Subsection 3K (2) (A)
(i) allows search off-site under two specific circumstances: first, when the on-site search
is less practicable, because it is time-consuming and very expensive and second, when
that the search needs specialist assistance which is not available at on-site. The
Explanatory Memorandum at pp 14-15 provides some more guidance as to what
parameters the executing officers should depend on to move the computers off-site for
examination. It states:
The proposed amendment would allow a thing to be moved from the search premises to another
place for examination or processing, without the occupier’s consent, where it is significantly
more practicable than processing the thing at the search premises and where there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the thing contains or constitutes evidential material. In determining
whether it is significantly more practicable to process or examine the thing at another place, the
executing officer or constable assisting must have regard to the timeliness and cost of processing
or examining the thing at another place rather than on site and to the availability of expert
assistance. In other words, the proposed amendment would permit a thing to be moved to another
place if it is significantly faster or less costly to process or examine the thing at that other place
895

or easier to obtain expert assistance to process or examine the thing at the other place.

894
895

The Court of Cassation,  ﻗﺮار ﻣﺤﻜﻤﺔ ﺗﻤﯿﯿﺰ ﺟﺰاء رﻗﻢ2004/725.
Explanatory Memoranda, Cybercrimes Bill 2001 (Cth) 14-15.

191

It is clear that the investigators must assess the possibility of conducting the search onsite and seizing only related items, or move the object, such as a hard drive, or makes a
mirror copy at the forensic lab to conduct the second phase of the search, i.e. the digital
phase.896
c) USA
Courts have upheld off-site searches to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
relying on the premise that on-site search is unfeasible. The courts have held that
conducting a search for property listed in the warrant after moving it to another site for
further examination is a legal search as long as conducting that search on-site would be
impractical. In United States v. Sissler, for example, the court held that the police were
not obliged to inspect the computer and disks at the site of the search, because they were
password protected which takes time and effort to crack as well as an expert to perform
the examination off-site.897 In another case, United States v. Hill, the court held that the
police were not required to bring with them equipment capable of reading computer
storage media and experts to operate them.898 The Court established two reasons why
the search off-site is more reasonable than the on-site search.899 It stated that the on-site
search poses two significant problems.900 The first is the risk of damaging or destroying
evidence or compromising the integrity of the evidence if the examination is carried out
at the place to be searched.901 The second problem was long time required to search files
at the scene as it will take many hours and perhaps days to accomplish.902
The 2001 Guidelines, on the other hand, explain the circumstances under which seizure
and search off-site of computer hardware containing evidence are justified:
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As a practical matter, circumstances will often require investigators to seize equipment and
search its contents off-site. First, it may take days or weeks to find the specific information
described in the warrant because computer storage devices can contain extraordinary amounts of
information. Agents cannot reasonably be expected to spend more than a few hours searching for
materials on-site, and in some circumstances (such as executing a search at a suspect's home)
even a few hours may be unreasonable. Given that personal computers sold in the year 2000
usually can store the equivalent of ten million pages of information and networks can store
hundreds of times that (and these capacities double nearly every year), it may be practically
impossible for agents to search quickly through a computer for specific data, a particular file, or a
broad set of files while on-site. Even if the agents know specific information about the files they
seek, the data may be mislabelled, encrypted, stored in hidden directories, or embedded in ‘slack
space’ that a simple file listing will ignore. Recovering the evidence may require painstaking
analysis by an expert in the controlled environment of a forensics laboratory.
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The DOJ guideline explicitly encourages law enforcement officers to move and conduct
the search off-site even though they know in advance the files they seek. Therefore, in
their affidavit for a search warrant, US executing officers must provide detailed
information of where the search will be conducted and why it should be conducted offsite.904 For example, in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, INC, the warrant
stated: ‘If the computer equipment and storage devices cannot be searched on-site in a
reasonable amount of time, then the computer personnel will determine whether it is
practical to copy the data during the execution of the search in a reasonable amount of
time without jeopardizing the ability to preserve the data’.905
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
The problem of the location search is more severe in areas where the computers,
including data, form the backbone of the businesses operations, such as banks and
insurance companies. The problem occurs when computer hardware, including data, are
removed and transferred off-site for intensive search.
Scholars and pundits have addressed the question whether to search computers on the
premises or off-site. They have approached the problem in different ways. The majority
who supported off-site searches based their arguments mainly on technical grounds.
This argument may be challenged on the ground that law enforcement officers are able
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to make a mirror copy of the entire contents of the computers on-site and examine them
carefully off-site without removing computer hardware from the work site. A mirror
copy search would alleviate the problem of seizing the entire computer and causing
work interruption. In addition, in several scenarios, on-site searches suffice. For
example, unless they are password protected or encrypted, some files can be swiftly
identified by opening and printing them out. Child pornography often takes a specific
format and can be visibly identified, such as JPEG files.
Brenner, who supported on-site search, backed her argument by showing the power of
Automated Search Techniques. This argument may be challenged on the ground that the
Automated Search, although efficient, is limited because the key word search is only
effective if the officer searches for specific information, such as names, numbers, or
phrases; otherwise, the search yields a high number of false hits.906 In addition, the
problems of encryption, deleted files, and password protected files tend to limit the
capability of the Automated Search Techniques.
Because none of the above-mentioned viewpoints is entirely accepted, the option in the
matter is left to the law enforcement officers to decide in a case-by-case manner.
In Jordan, the current procedures ignore the nature of digital evidence and the harm that
could be inflicted on businesses or a third party, because no limits have been set to
control the officers’ discretion. The Criminal Procedure Law 1961 considers the
executing officer as the master who assesses the appropriate measures for executing the
search warrant. Executing officers exercise absolute discretion in determining whether a
computer search should be conducted on-site or off-site. Though unrestricted
discretionary power is a half century old, it is applicable to cyber searches. The
application of this principle to cyber searches, however, may cause a problem if the GP
chooses to move all the equipment off-site without knowing anything about it or making
an assessment of whether on-site search is possible or not. In Australia and the USA, the
decision to investigate on-site or off-site is discretionary and depends upon the
circumstances of a case. The Crimes Act 1914 and court decisions expressly permit the
executing officers to move computers off-site if necessary. However, their discretionary
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power is not unrestricted. The Crimes Act 1914 and the JOD’s guidelines specified
particular circumstances under which the search off-site is conducted.
Thus, the matter should not be left without guidance on this critical issue. Although
Jordanian investigators should be given the necessary power to transfer the mirror copy
or any other items from the search premises for further examination, this power should
be restrained to situation where it is not reasonably practicable to conduct the digital
search at the place where the search occurs. Law enforcement officers should request in
the search warrant that a part of the search will be carried out off-site. This request must
be justified on reasonable grounds, such as the search on-site is not feasible and no other
practical alternative exists.907

7.7 Conclusion
The effectiveness and the efficiency of cybercrimes investigation processes depend
significantly on a precise criminal procedure law that identifies the unique nature of
cybercrime searches. Although criminal investigation procedures, including arrest,
interrogation, and detention have not been affected by the unique nature of cybercrime,
traditional search and seizure rules are found to be defective or inappropriate in the
cyber world. Some of the conventional search warrant procedures, however, are
efficient to meet cyber search requirements, such as the threshold for issuing and
obtaining search warrant.
Cyberspace and the digital revolution have directly influenced the different perspectives
of search and seizure procedures. Australia and the USA have responded to cybercrimes
in a more effective manner and, therefore, Australia amended particular provisions of
Crimes Act 1914 to meet cyberspace’s particularity; meanwhile, the USA issued
guidelines for search and seizure of computers. Furthermore, the judicial expositions in
both countries, specifically in relation to search warrant execution, probable cause,
particularity and search location, have contributed in shaping the search and seizure
regime in the cyber world. Meanwhile, Jordanian legislation has witnessed no changes,
because of either rarity of cybercrimes or lack of critical skills to make the distinction
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between real world and cyber world searches. Either way, the experience of Australia
and the USA in this area is important to inspire the Jordanian counterpart.
Important sections of the search procedures must be amended or appropriate provisions
be added to the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 to meet cyberspace’s unique
environment. The conventional search warrant makes no difference between searching
and seizing physical items, and data, and it ignores the unique nature of cyber search.
These discrepancies should be made to avoid the problem of intermingled documents
and guide law enforcement to the right approach. Also, the probable cause made out in
cybercrimes and the actual nexus between the physical place to be searched and IP
addresses requires law enforcement officers experienced and qualified in cybercrimes.
Therefore, guidelines should be established for this purpose.
The search scope and location in cyber world is controversial. Forensic experts urge
more flexible approach permitting an off-site search. The nature of cyberspace makes
the particularity requirements and on-site search in cybercrimes impractical and,
therefore, a flexible approach that grants executing officers more leeway on what and
where to search must be adopted. However, a mirror copy search is recommended for
computers shared by many users, such as in organisations, to lesson the harmful
consequences of the physical search.
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8 SEARCHING AND SEIZING DIGITAL EVIDENCE
WITHOUT A WARRANT

Introduction
Similar to the collection of physical evidence, the process for collecting digital evidence
must comply with the laws and judicial precedents that control the process of physical
evidence collection. The main concern of these laws and judicial decisions is to protect
individual privacy as well as to collect evidence properly. Thus, while the laws have
crafted legal instruments - subpoenas and search warrants are the most common legal
instruments - permit entering private properties and obtaining evidence, the same laws
established a number of exceptions that permit enforcement officers to enter private
property in order to obtain evidence in specific circumstances.
Although these exceptions constitute a serious infringement of privacy rights, they are
crucial in situations where obtaining a search warrant is very difficult or impracticable.
Indeed, without such exceptions it would be impractical, if not impossible, for law
enforcement officers to administer justice in a fair, timely and efficient manner.
Therefore, while legislation maintains privacy rights, it also typically provides law
enforcement officers with exceptional power for search and seizure without the need for
formal prior authorisation through the issue of an official search warrant.908
There are specific exceptions when obtaining a warrant is impracticable and would
obstruct crime prevention and, thus, law enforcement officers are authorised by statutes
and judicial precedents to enter private premises, to search for and seize incriminating
evidence, without the need for formal prior authorisation through the issue of an official
search warrant. In Jordan, Australia and the USA, search warrant exceptions are well
established in traditional searches and have been confirmed and applied in law
enforcement practice and judicial precedents. Yet each country’s approach to
warrantless search is different. The application of these exceptions to digital content is
still ambiguous, because prosecutors and judges, particularly in Jordan, lack the
knowledge and experience necessary to determine whether these exceptions are
908
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applicable to digital content, and how law enforcement officers should handle these
exceptions in the field of cybercrime. Furthermore, there are no judicial precedents,
professional or academic opinions on these issues to date.909 By contrast, Australian
and US experience in this area is expanding at an increasing rate.
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that different aspects of the current
Jordanian exceptions for warrantless search are very limited and narrowly defined to
circumstances that may not be applicable to digital searches. It deals with the traditional
legal concepts of warrantless searches and seizures as established in the Criminal
Procedure Law 1961. In the following section, the aspects of warrantless search
exceptions will be identified and discussed in both traditional and digital search
contexts. It then proceeds with an examination and assessment of each exception and its
applicability and compatibility with searches and seizures of digital evidence.

8.1 Exceptions That Allow Searching and Seizing without a
Warrant
In specific circumstances, the public interest in justice in a society outweighs personal
privacy rights. The need for a swift and efficient system of search and seizure is
globally recognised. International Human Rights Law for example, recognises that
individual privacy rights are not absolute and must be balanced with a government’s
interest in detecting and combating crimes.910 Although the Jordanian Constitution
enshrines the privacy of dwellings, it allows a limited exception in which law
enforcement officers may enter private properties without a search warrant, in specific
circumstances prescribed by the law, to protect life and property, preserve evidence, to
search for evidence or to make an arrest.
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This section examines search warrant exceptions which have been stipulated in the
Criminal Procedure Law 1961, the Australian Crimes Act 1914, and USA judicial
precedents on search and seizure of electronic devices. It assesses whether the
exceptions which have been addressed by the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 are
applicable to digital searches. The exceptions that are examined here are categorised as:
exigent circumstances, consent searches, plain view searches, and search incident to a
lawful arrest. They are examined in considerable detail by providing a general
description of traditional procedures and then comparing these to the digital context.
a) Jordan
In Jordan, the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 is the keystone that allows exceptions
against warrantless search. These exceptions were created in an attempt to balance the
protection of privacy with the need for swift enforcement action to prevent a crime or to
preserve incriminating evidence. Since its creation in 1961, a very rapid and significant
development in information technology combined with new criminal trends and their
modus operandi have emerged. In addition, unique and unusual evidence is constantly
encountered at the new crime scenes, which make the 1961 Act less responsive to the
diverse needs and circumstances of cybercrimes.
Provision 93 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides law enforcement officers with the
right to search private premises without obtaining a search warrant. It authorises officers
to enter and search any house or place without a search warrant if any of the following
circumstances occur:
1) If the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that there is a crime being
committed or has just been committed.911
2) If the dwelling owner is calling for a help.912
3) If a resident is calling for help and the officer has a reasonable suspicion that
there is a crime is being committed or has just been committed.913
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4) If the police officer is pursuing a suspect and the latter entered a house, the
police officer may search that house and the suspect.914
The Criminal Procedure Law 1961 set forth only four situations where enforcement
officers are able to enter a house or place without a search warrant. Law enforcement
officers, however, are not the only authority to conduct warrantless searches; other
governmental agencies also have been given the power to perform searches and
seizures, which are essential to the achievement of their jobs, without the need for
formal prior authorisation through the issue of official search warrants. For example, the
Customs Law 1998 authorises custom officers to carry out inspections, examine any
luggage, or to ‘stop and frisk search’ travellers.915 Prison security guards are also
authorised to perform searches and seizures inside prisons.916 Nevertheless, provision 93
of the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 is the basis which provides law enforcement
officers with the opportunity to perform warrantless searches and seizures of private
property.
b) Australia
The Australian Crimes Act 1914 has been amended to be in line with the current
practices with respect to search warrants (see previous chapter). Similar to the Jordanian
Criminal Procedure Law, but in a more detailed way, the Crimes Act 1914 Divisions 3,
3A and 4, addresses warrantless searches and seizures.
1) Division 3, entitled ‘Stopping and Searching Conveyance’,
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addresses

searches without a warrant in emergency situations. Under section 3T, on
reasonable ground, law enforcement officers have the power to search
without a warrant a vehicle of any sort.
2) Division 3A empowers law enforcement officers to stop, question and

search persons in relation to terrorist acts without a warrant. Section 3UD
authorises law enforcement officers to conduct an ordinary search or a
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frisk search of the person,918 a search of anything that is or that the
officers suspects on reasonable grounds to be under the suspect’s
immediate control.919
3) Division 4, entitled ‘Arrest and related matters’, addresses warrantless

searches incident to a lawful arrest. Section 3ZB empowers law
enforcement officers to enter premises to arrest offenders920 and search
the premises for the person in order to prevent the concealment, loss or
destruction of evidence relating to the offence.921 Also, sections 3ZE and
3ZF respectively empower officers to conduct a frisk and an ordinary
search of an arrested person. Section 3ZG permits searching the arrested
person’s premises and seizing things in plain view.
Unlike Jordan, judicial precedents in Australia also play a significant role in crafting
solutions to problems arising in searches and seizures of digital evidence.
c) USA
In the USA, courts have gradually established new standards for the application of the
Fourth Amendment to the digital environment.922 In the 1960s, the courts established
strict requirements for search warrants. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, the court stated
that ‘the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through a warrant procedure’.923 This approach protects the rights
of the criminal more than it grants the police the power needed to crack down
offences.924 In the 1970s, the trend was to provide the police with more appropriate
tools and powers to tackle crimes. Harris has opined: ‘The USA also strictly imposes
more restrictions on law enforcement practices through the exclusion of evidence than
does any other nation…slowly and carefully, the court is ceding to the police more
authority and flexibility to do their jobs effectively’. 925 Therefore, a balanced standard
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was adopted to protect individual privacy and to give law enforcement power to
investigate crimes. For example, in Katz v. United States, Franklin J. commented that
‘…the warrant is required where practical, but that the issue of practicality will often be
measured with a very narrow yardstick…if circumstances justify and if the courts have
established a clear “exception” then no warrant is required’. 926 In the post-September
11th period, law enforcement power to combat crimes and secure evidence, as well as to
conduct warrantless searches and seizures, has been reinforced. Stephens and Glenn,
opine that ‘…searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process…[are]
subject to only a few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions …the list of exceptions
now seems to include much of what is characterised as routine police activity’.927
Accordingly, search warrant exceptions seem to have become the norm and have drifted
beyond the limits of what the Fourth Amendment allowed.
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Provision 93 of the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 is the only provision for
warrantless searches and seizures. In the first exception to the requirement for a warrant,
the need for formal prior authorisation through the issue of an official search warrant is
not necessary when an exigent circumstance is present. Exceptions two and three
presume that a search warrant is not necessary if the owner of property or a person who
owns or has authority or control over the property searched requests the search. There is
a distinction between the two exceptions. In the second exception, the officer does not
have to have a reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the search if the owner agrees to
allow the property to be searched. In the third exception, the officer must have a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity if a resident but not the owner of the property
consents. Exception four presumes that a search warrant is not necessary when a search
accompanies an arrest. Although these four exceptions apply without complications to
the needs of classical crimes and physical places such as dwellings, cybercrimes and
digital evidence pose serious challenges to the application of provision 93.
Although the Crimes Act 1914 widened the scope of the power to execute search
warrants to permit the search and seizure of digital evidence effectively, 928 power to
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execute searches without a warrant was not amended accordingly. Division 3 and 3A
permit warrantless searches in narrowly defined cases. Division 3, for example, only
addresses exigent circumstances in a limited framework and in a particular context
associated with transportation searches, and Division 3A is only applicable to terrorist
offences. Unlike Jordan, however, Australian courts play a significant role in applying
some of those circumstances to digital content. The USA’s approach, by contrast, is
more advanced and highly efficient. Search exceptions were created and developed
through judicial precedents and warrantless searches and seizures were mainly guided
by the precedents of other court decisions made in similar cases.
With the advent of information technology, legislation and courts are confronted with
challenging cases associated with cybercrime and digital evidence. The Criminal
Procedure Law 1961 does not contain provisions in relation to warrantless searches and
seizures of digital evidence. Law enforcement officers and public prosecutors, therefore,
must abide by the law that governs warrantless search of traditional objects. This is like
putting the wrong key in a lock which it does not open. Meanwhile, in Australia and the
USA, courts actively addressed warrantless searches and seizures of digital evidence, so
that their decisions might be seen as a useful model for Jordan. Even with this, the
application of the search warrant exceptions to cybercrime and digital evidence can still
be described as a legal minefield.
The exceptions to the use of a warrant addressed in the Criminal Procedure Law 1961
will be examined below and discussed in detail in the context of current experience,
practices, and developments associated with cybercrime and digital evidence searches
and seizures.

8.1.1 Exigent circumstances
In the criminal procedure context, an exigent circumstance means ‘an emergency
situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to
property or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence’.929
Another definition, presented by Conser, Russell and Paynich, defines this circumstance
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as ‘conditions that create a need for immediate action to prevent the destruction of
evidence’. 930 According to Hatonn, the author of First Step: Whether Long or Short The Road Matters Not if the First Step is Never Taken, ‘exigent circumstances means
the evidence is about to be destroyed or taken away, and therefore there is not enough
time to obtain a warrant’.931 These definitions highlight the basic features of exigent
circumstances: imminent threat to life or property; imminent escape of a suspect or
destruction of evidence; and application only in serious and urgent emergencies. In
either case, exigent circumstances must be established by demonstrating specific facts
showing that urgency and necessity exists to authorise warrantless search and seizure.932
These facts are examined by courts to determine the existence of exigent
circumstances.933 Among other things, the courts examine law enforcement officers’
experience and their training and common sense, as these are the important factors that
are taken into account when determining the exigent circumstance.934
Exigent circumstances can exist in digital context. The same exigent circumstances of
physical evidence can be extended to apply to digital evidence. However, unlike most
other evidence, digital data can usually be destroyed or contaminated by the click of a
button. For example, in a case of a natural disaster, such as flooding, the exigent
circumstance permits the agent to seize the computer hardware component, but this
circumstance, according to Hugh, gives him no authorisation to conduct a digital
search.935 To conduct an in-depth digital search, a warrant must be issued because
computer forensics searches take a long period of time to be completed usually and,
therefore, off-site investigators have enough time to obtain a search warrant.936 This
point of view is the core of the exigent circumstance exception argument in digital
environments.
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Legal systems acknowledge the need for a swift response to urgent situations
encountered by law enforcement officers. Jordan, Australia and the US each approach
the identification of exigent circumstances exception differently.
a) Jordan
In Jordan, provision 93/1 of the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 addresses indirectly the
exigent circumstances exception. It clearly stipulates the right of law enforcement
officers to enter and perform an unlimited search of any property, including dwelling
houses, by force if necessary, without a warrant when they have probable cause to
believe that a crime is about to be committed, is being committed, or has just been
committed. Under any of these exigent circumstances, officers can search for evidence
or preserve evidence without a search warrant.
Although Jordan’s Criminal Procedure Law does not enunciate the purposes of a
warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception, it provides law
enforcement officers with the necessary power to enter, and perform a search without a
warrant under three certain circumstances, namely, (1) a crime is about to be
committed; (2) a crime is being committed; and (3) a crime has just been committed.
However, Kamal Al-saeed, a prominent Jordanian legal scholar, argued that these three
circumstances are illustrative only and not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive.937
The same scholar has criticised the Criminal Procedure Law for granting officers broad
power in exigent circumstances.938 He has opined that the exigent circumstances should
not permit officers to perform a search, but only to seize or perform any action
necessary to alleviate the exigent circumstances.939 However, Al-saeed’s argument was
originally made in the context of traditional searches.
In the digital context, Jordanian courts have not yet examined this doctrine; however,
exploring the view of Australia and the USA may be helpful in predicating how
Jordan’s courts will rule on this issue.
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b) Australia
In Australia, by contrast, the Crimes Act 1914 addresses two kinds of urgent
circumstances that justify searches without the need for formal prior authorisation
through the issue of an official search warrant. The first is to prevent the evidence from
being concealed, lost or destroyed. For example, section 3T (1) (b) of the Crimes Act
1914 authorises law enforcement officers to perform warrantless searches on reasonable
grounds, in order to prevent a thing from being concealed, lost or destroyed.940 The
second arises from compelling or serious and urgent circumstances. 941 For example, in
The Queen v. Michael Malloy, Crispin J stated:
I am prepared to assume for present purposes that there is a common law power of search and
seizure in exigent circumstances. Such a power might enable a police officer coming
unexpectedly upon a situation involving a grave and imminent threat to public safety to intervene
and save lives without acting unlawfully and thus exposing himself or herself to an action for
trespass. Nonetheless, the search of a person's private property and the seizure of his or her
belongings constitutes a serious invasion of privacy and any common law power to so infringe
942

the rights of others could be justified only by compelling circumstances.

This decision offers a very different view of the exigent circumstances exception. It did
not delineate exigent circumstances scenarios, but any compelling circumstances might
permit search without a warrant. Furthermore, the court’s opinion extended the
application of the exigent circumstances to search private premises and not only
conveyances as mentioned in the law.
c) USA
In the USA, exigent circumstances have long been held as a potential exception to
search warrant requirements.943 The courts have had numerous opportunities to consider
exigent circumstances in both searches and seizures of physical and digital evidence. In
Cupp v. Murphy (1973), investigators inspected and took a sample of scrapings of dried
blood under the suspect’s fingernails without the latter’s permission, because they did
not have enough time to obtain a warrant, and during the time needed to obtain a
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warrant, the suspect could have washed his hands.944 The court upheld the officers’
action.945 In digital searches, in United States v. David the fragile nature of digital
evidence led the court to authorise the search of a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA)
under the exigent circumstances doctrine.946
Courts examined exigent circumstances thoroughly and requirements have been
developed for the successful use of the exigent circumstances doctrine. These
requirements are as follows:947
1) The degree of urgency involved.
2) The amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant.
3) Whether or not the evidence is about to be removed or destroyed.
4) The possibility of danger at the site.
5) Information indicating the possessors of the contraband know the police are on their
trail.
6) The ready destructibility of the contraband or how easy the evidence is to destroy.

Furthermore, courts review the totality of the circumstances, including the severity of
the crime being investigated,948 as well as the officer’s perception of the exigent
circumstance in light of their experience and training,949 to assess the magnitude of the
potential danger.950 The courts also examine whether law enforcement officers have had
enough time to obtain a search warrant before the evidence is moved or destroyed.951
Accordingly, in many cases, courts have suppressed the evidence recovered during a
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search that was executed pursuant to exigent circumstances, because the investigators
had enough time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so.952
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Although the use of the exigent circumstance doctrine in cybercrime searches is
permitted, a controversy erupted over the scope of the search and whether the exigent
circumstances doctrine allows officers to conduct a thorough digital search or only the
seizure of the physical part.953 Hugh’s argument is that, in some scenarios, exigent
circumstances, it is quite reasonable but not in cybercrime investigations where it is not
likely to be accepted, because exigent circumstances in cybercrime and digital evidence
needs more than the seizure of the physical items. For example, where a police officer
investigating a drug related crime finds a laptop which the suspect was going to destroy,
the seizure without a warrant would protect the laptop including its digital content. In
this example, the officer is able to preserve the laptop by seizing the hardware parts and
he must then obtain a search warrant to conduct a digital search. But if the officer while
investigating a victim’s system discovers that a hacker or intruder has logged onto the
system, perhaps to destroy evidence, the officer must perform a limited search to
preserve the data in its current state. It can be seen that in the two scenarios, this
exception should not allow investigators to exercise a comprehensive or a thorough
computer search, 954 but simply prevent the imminent destruction of evidence and
preserve data.
While Jordan and Australia have not developed the application of the exigent
circumstances doctrine to digital evidence, the US courts recognised the authority of
law enforcement officers to seize electronic storage devices in circumstances in which
there is an immediate danger of losing data, or to prevent the imminent destruction of
electronic devices (hardware components). The same approach can be adopted by
Jordan, because the three circumstances that permit the search in exigent circumstance
mentioned in the law are illustrative only and not intended to be exclusive or
exhaustive.

Therefore, the traditional practice of law enforcement in an exigent

circumstance can be extended and applied to search digital evidence in which there is an
immediate danger of losing data, or to prevent the imminent destruction of hardware
952
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components. The main purpose of the warrantless search is to preserve evidence of a
discovered crime. Law enforcement officers, therefore, should be given the authority to
seize and search electronic storage devices and evidence in circumstances in which
there is an immediate danger of losing data, or to prevent the imminent destruction of
hardware devices.

8.1.2 Consent
According to Black’s Law Dictionary ‘consent’ means ‘voluntary agreement by a
person in the possession and exercise of sufficient mentality to make an intelligent
choice to do something proposed by another’.955 This definition of consent is clear in
that it includes the essential characteristics of consent. Thus, consent must include (1)
free choice; (2) ability to make a decision; (3) communication by one person to another.
In many jurisdictions, consent to search is a well recognised exception to the search
warrant requirements. Residents, occupants or owners of the premises can agree to
waive the protection afforded by the constitution or any statute and permit a warrantless
search.956 Under this exception, officers may seek to obtain explicit or implied consent.
The consent can be for limited searching of a specific object or may be for unlimited
searching of premises. 957 In addition, the consent should be obtained voluntarily from a
particular individual who has authority to approve the search.958 These main pillars of
the consent are: (1) the nature of the consent, for example, explicit or implied; (2) the
scope of the consent, for example, limited or unlimited; (3) the time of the consent, for
example, before or after the search; and (4) the status of the person who grants the
consent. Each of these is important in the consideration of the validity of the search.
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Statutes and judicial decisions in Jordan, Australia and the USA address these issues
differently.
a) Jordan
Even though the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 does not use the word ‘consent’,
provisions 93/2 and 3 permit a warrantless search of premises upon request from the
owner or the occupier of the premises. If the owner or the occupier of any building
requests help, officers may enter and search the property without the need for formal
prior authorisation through the issue of an official search warrant. This provision should
not be interpreted as a green light to conduct consent searches, because the word
‘consent’ has a different meaning from that of ‘request’. According to Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of consent, search consent is granted after negotiation between the
consenting party and police officers, and the former makes a clear decision of consent.
Meanwhile, ‘request’ means to ask for something and does not involve negotiation.
Once the requesting party seeks help, however, officers have the right to search and
seize evidential materials.
No judicial precedent has been rendered by the Jordanian courts with respect to the
nature of the consent given for a search. When there is no national precedent, however,
Jordanian courts may consider the Egyptian judicial precedents when making decisions
because both legal systems are based upon Civil and Shariah laws. Jordanian legal
scholars have, therefore, examined the Egyptian judicial precedents concerning the
nature of the consent in terms of a traditional search.959 According to Egyptian judicial
principles in this matter, the validity of the consent is determined by examining all of
the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, such as the age of the person giving
the consent.960 The consent must be explicit and freely given,961 so any threat,
intimidation, or coercion, whether explicit or implied, will invalidate the consent.962
Furthermore, the consent must be obtained before the search is conducted.963
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b) Australia
By contrast, two specific provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 address consent to search:
(1) written consent is required during a search warrant execution in order to take a
photograph of the premises or of things at the premises incidental to the execution;964
(2) written consent is required to conduct a strip search.965 The Australian Law Reform
Commission’s Report, ‘Criminal Investigation: An Interim Report,’ recommended that:
All searches and seizures be unlawful unless made pursuant either to a court order or warrant, or,
if made without a warrant, in accordance ... (b) at the invitation, or with the consent, of the
person occupying the premises or in charge of the vehicle in question,…the Commission
considers, on balance that an appropriate solution is for searches on consent to be permitted,
provided that such consent is entirely voluntary and is made after being informed of the right to
966

refuse consent.

The report highlights the importance of a consent search, providing an outline of the
main features of a consent search.
Australian courts have had an opportunity to examine the consent search exception in
terms of traditional searches. Generally speaking, the courts have held that a person may
grant law enforcement officers the right to search premises. For example, in the joint
judgment of Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Plenty v. Dillon, their Honours said: ‘The
common law has a number of exceptions to the general rule that a person is a trespasser
unless that person enters premises with the consent, express or implied, of the
occupier…’.967 From this judgment, it is clear that the consent must be voluntarily given
without express or implied coercion, intimidation, or threat. The suspect’s voluntary
consent to a search makes the warrantless search and the evidence discovered
admissible in a court of law.968 In addition, the Supreme Court of NSW has said
voluntary consent must be informed consent.969 Informed consent means that the
consenting party has knowledge of his right to refuse to give consent.970 For example,
the officer must explain to the defendant that anything seized may be produced in
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evidence to ensure that the consenting party is aware of his rights.971 Law enforcement
officers must inform the person, the subject of the search, of the right to refuse consent
unless the consenting party is legally trained, or himself a police officer or other person
known to be familiar with the search consent, and understands what is going to happen
and the consent ramifications.972
c) USA
In the USA, consent to a warrantless search has received a great deal of juridical
attention. The courts have had the opportunity to examine the nature and scope of the
consent in both traditional and digital searches. In traditional searches, the consent
exception is approached in a similar way to that found in Australia. For example, the
consent must be obtained prior to the conduct of any search.973 Also, the validity of
consent is determined from the totality of all the circumstances974 identified by the US
courts to determine the validity of the consent search. The Supreme Court has listed
factors to be examined before deciding the validity of a warrantless search conducted
upon consent.975
1) The age of the person giving the consent;
2) The person’s education, intelligence, and mental condition;
3) The person’s physical condition;
4) Whether the person was under arrest; and
5) Whether he had been advised of his right to refuse consent.
In the digital context, in Williford v. Texas, the court upheld the search of the
defendant’s computer as a result of his consent to the search.976 The defendant
complained that the search and seizure of his computer was illegal.977 He contended that
his consent to the search and seizure was tainted and, as there was no warrant, there was
971
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no probable cause.978 The court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the seizure was
proper.979
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
The Criminal Procedure Law 1961 does not recognise consent search, but it addresses
request search. The requesting party may ask the requested officers to conduct physical
or digital searches. From the general meaning of provisions 93/2&3, officers upon
request from a person authorised to search premises without a warrant, including any
computer systems found in the premises. Therefore, unlike consent search, police
officers cannot negotiate with the requesting party to obtain consent to search computer
systems. Once the requesting party makes the request, officers have the power to
conduct a full search. However, the general principles of consent search which have
been addressed by Egyptian judicial precedents and accepted by Jordanian scholars can
be applied to search and seize computers and digital evidence. For example, consent
search of computers should be conducted in accordance with a voluntary consent which
must be obtained before the search.
In Australia, consent search has been addressed by the Law Reform Commission and
court decisions. Law enforcement officers are able to obtain consent to search
computers and digital evidence. Although, an implicit consent is valid according to the
Australian courts, it is recommended here that a written or recorded consent should be
obtained. This is preferable to ensure that the consent is valid and to prevent the
consenting party from withdrawing or denying his consent. For example, if the suspect
gives the officer his password and the latter accessed the system using the given
password, the search would be valid unless the consenting party denied the given
consent.
Factors which are applied by the USA Supreme Court are also applicable to digital
searches. Jordan and Australia apply the same factors to consent searches. For example,
the age of the person giving the consent in a traditional search must be the same age as
for the digital search. The person’s education, intelligence, and mental condition are
important factors to determine the validity of the search. If consent to search computer
systems was obtained from an uneducated person, for example, the search and seizure
978
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procedures should be invalid, because the consenting person has no knowledge about
the search consequences.
The scope of the consent and third party consent, however, constitute the major
unresolved concerns pertaining to digital searches. In the following section, the scope
of the consent and third party consent are discussed.

8.1.2.1 Scope of Consent
The scope of the consent is an important factor to be considered because it has been
considered as equivalent to exceeding the scope of a search warrant.980 A suspect has
the right to delimit the scope of the search to which he consents.981 Indeed, the consent
search is a negotiable process that is entirely between law enforcement officers and the
suspect, so a limited consent it can be expanded and vice versa.982 The scope of the
consent in the context of a digital search differs from traditional search, because digital
data’s unique nature and characteristics have no peer in the real world. 983 It is well
recognised that the digital world contains a variety of objects, such as files, e-mail
messages, graphics, and so on, which need a considerable amount of time and effort to
be investigated. Although these files are often protected by passwords to prevent
unauthorised use, there is a high risk of evidence contamination because it is fragile and
can be damaged easily. So, it is important for law enforcement officers to abide by the
scope of the search as set forth in the consent.
Scope of consent takes two forms. First is the extension of the physical search to search
digital devices. For example, consent given to search an apartment is extended to search
a personal computer located in the apartment. Second is the extension of the digital
search to a search of other devices or files not specified in the initial consent (specific
digital to unlimited search). For example, consent given to examine a CD is extended to
search a PC’s hard drive or consent given to search for JEPG files is extended to search
for MP3 files.
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a) Jordan
No specific provision, legal precedent or regulation appears to guide enforcement
officers in either obtaining or extending consensual search for a physical object to
search and seizure of electronic devices, including intangible data. The absence of such
rules and regulations makes the scope of consent is imprecise. Provision 93/2 & 3,
which address a warrantless search upon request from the owner or occupant of the
premises, does not elaborate the right of the requesting party in delineating the scope of
the search. Law enforcement officers, therefore, may conduct unrestricted searches.984
Although there are no documented courts cases that have addressed this issue,985 it is a
possibility in the future. Exploring the judicial view of Australia and the USA, however,
may be helpful in predicating how Jordan’s legislature and courts will rule on this issue.
b) Australia
In Australia, the Crimes Act 1914 addresses the scope of consent in particular cases. It
addresses only the scope of consent when an officer conducting a search with a warrant
intends to widen his search. Section 3J prevents officers from taking photographs or
video recordings of the premises or of things at the premises not incidental to the
execution of the warrant without a written consent.986 Although Australian Law Reform
Commission recommended consent search, it did not address its scope.987 Tronc,
Crawford, and Smith, the authors of Search and Seizure in Australia and New Zealand,
however, have argued that the consensual search will be lawful if the search is confined
to the scope of consent.988 As a result, the consenting person can limit the scope of his
consent and officers must confine their search to the places delineated by the consent.
c) USA
In the USA, by contrast, the scope of the search is an important factor in consensual
searches.989 It can be inferred from the courts’ considerations of consent searches that
they use two criteria to determine the scope of the consent.
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First is the totality of all the circumstances.990 The courts examine the person’s
education, understanding, intelligence, and mental condition, because they are important
factors in deciding whether the person understands the differences between the physical
and digital searches and the risk that may be associated with the digital searches.991 For
example, in United States v. Snow, the court held that a person who consents to the
search of a car should reasonably expect that readily-opened, closed containers
discovered inside the car will be opened and examined.992
Second, the courts examine what is ‘objectively reasonable’.993 The Supreme Court has
explained this as what the typical reasonable person would have understood by the
information exchanged between the officer and the person consenting to the search.994
In the United States v. Lemmons, for example, the court held that the defendant’s
invitation of the officer to his trailer to look at different things including the computer,
and turning the latter on for the officer to access and search files, constituted an
unlimited consent.995 In a similar decision, the Tenth Court found that the consent given
to search a computer using particular forensic tools extends to searching the same
computer using a manual search engine, i.e. a different forensic approach.996 In a
different manner, in United States v. Blas (1990) the court found that the defendant’s
consent to examine the pager he was carrying did not extend to consent to search the
contents of the pager.997 Therefore, to avoid confusion and the possible invalidation of
consent, Moore (2003) and Berg (2005) have suggested that law enforcement officers
must present a written consent form delineating the scope of the consent.998 Moore
suggested the following information o be included in the consent form:
1) The area to be searched,
2) What it is the investigator is intending to search for, and
990
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3) The investigator’s desire to search within any computer or technological device
found within the area.
Meanwhile, Berg suggested that the consenting party:
1) has access and control over the computer and all of the data contained on the
computer
2) is not aware of any areas within the computer to which that party is not allowed
access.
3) grants authorisation to the officers to search the entire contents of the computer.
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
In the absence of any judicial precedent on this matter, or any specific legislative
definition or direction, Jordanian enforcement officers are not restrained from
rummaging through electronic devices in search of evidence. While the requesting party
permits the search, he has not been given authority to confine it. Meanwhile, the
Australian Crimes Act 1914 addresses the scope of the consent only in relation to the
execution of search with a warrant. Consent to search without a warrant and its scope
are not addressed. However, the argument about the scope of the consent presented by
Tronc, Crawford, and Smith is logical, because the search is entirely built upon consent
and, therefore, the consenting person can limit his consent. This argument also can be
applied to cybercrime investigation searches and digital evidence and, therefore, the
owner of a computer system or an authorised person can limit the scope of the digital
searches. In a similar manner, he can also limit the physical search by means which are
not to be extended to digital searches.
In the USA, by contrast, while the general concept is that officers must abide by the
terms of consent, different courts have handed down contradictory rulings on the scope
of consent. Some courts have approved the first form of consent, i.e. extension of a
physical search to search a digital device (see, for example, United States v. Lemmons).
Other courts have rejected the extension of a physical search to search for digital
evidence (see, for example, United States v. Blas). The contradiction between the two
decisions can be avoided only by adopting Moore’s and Berg’s suggestions. These
suggestions are beneficial for both forms of consent, because they precisely show the
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search limits, and how the officers will carry out the search. Also, they protect the right
of the defendant and give credibility to the consent procedures by delineating the outer
boundaries of the consent.

8.1.2.2 Third-Party Consent
Third party consent is a relatively new exception to the search warrant requirements.999
It means that, ‘under certain circumstances, individuals other than the householder
against whom evidence is sought may validly consent to a search of shared
premises’. 1000 The creation and development of this exception and certain limitations
and exceptions to it, signals the consistent path of restricting individual privacy rights
while expanding the scope of law enforcement power.1001
In the context of cybercrime investigation, third party consent is very important,
because technologies, particularly computers, networks and Internet, are shared between
multiple users, such as family members, roommates and workplaces. 1002 Investigators
usually encounter one or more computers located on private property where each
computer can be accessed by multiple users or from different locations.1003 Furthermore,
the third party consent doctrine is vital in workplaces. Employers who control or
administer their employees may consent to searches and seizure of evidence. Therefore,
third party consent in cybercrime investigations takes two categories: private household
members and workplace consents.
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8.1.2.2.1 Household Consent
Operating systems, such as Windows, allow users to create private zones protected by
passwords as well as permitting files to be shared by multiple users without
restrictions.1004 In addition, computer networks and the Internet provide users with the
capability to access remote computers and retrieve information from networked
computers. Therefore, third party consent in cybercrime investigations typically takes
two forms: local and remote consents.

First: Local Consent
Local consent refers to the geographical proximity between a third party who has the
right to make voluntary consent, and a defendant living in the same geographical
proximity with the third party. In other words, the third party and the defendant live in
the same vicinity. For enforcement officers, local consent encompasses two steps. The
first step is to enter the premises, negotiate with a person other than the householder
against whom evidence is sought, and obtain consent to physically search hardware
drives, CDs, DVDs, laptops, flash memory, floppy disks, and so on. This step is valid as
long as the consenting party has equal rights of possession and control of the property
that is the subject of the search, with the defendant. The second step is to obtain a more
specific consent to operate the equipment located inside the premises and to search the
digital contents. The second consent obtained is valid only when the digital contents are
accessible either directly, such as where no password is needed to access the system, or
indirectly because the system is password protected but the consenting party possesses
the password and has access to the files. For example, where spouses live together and
share a computer, then he or she may approve a warrantless search, and the consent
should be upheld as long as they share the same password.1005 But if the computer is
exclusively used by a spouse in such a manner as to prevent his or her partner from
accessing the whole computer or particular files then the consent is invalid for that
restricted part.1006
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Second: Remote Consent
Remote consent is unique and is only associated with digital searches. Internet and
networks make the remote search practicable. For example, to operate effectively and
smoothly, each computer network, such as a Local Area Network (LAN), needs
continuous maintenance as well as supervision.1007 So, every network has a system
administrator or system operator responsible for operating, maintaining, and developing
the system.1008 This position grants system administrators root level access,1009 which
effectively gives them complete control over the entire system they control1010 enabling
them to monitor computer users (including their Internet access).1011
The extent of the power of the third party to access a defendant’s computer is important
in determining the third party’s ability to consent the search.1012 However, the third
party consent exception is markedly different in Jordan, Australia and the USA
according to national legislation and judicial precedents.
a) Jordan
In Jordan, third party consent is not mentioned anywhere in the Criminal Procedure
Law 1961. Instead, law enforcement officers are authorised to enter and search any
private premises without a search warrant if they are accompanied by a local notary or
two native witnesses.1013 The attendance of the local notary or the two witnesses - in the
absence of a suspect - is vital to the validity of the search.1014 Their attendance is to
observe and witness the search, but not to consent to or refuse the search. Third party
consent, therefore, is not required before the officers may proceed with the search and
seizure procedures. With one exception, no judicial precedent directly addresses third
party consent. The only court decision focused on third party attendance is the Court of
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Cassation decision number 697/97.1015 The court’s decision invalidated a search because
it was conducted without the attendance of a local notary or two witnesses (who must be
the defendant’s relatives, such as family members or relatives).1016 While the attendance
of third party is vital, it is not parallel to third party consent. Exploring the judicial view
of the USA, however, may be helpful in predicating how Jordan’s legislature and courts
will rule on this issue.
b) Australia
In the absence of any judicial precedent on which to rely, the Australian Law Reform
Commission recommended that consent to a search can be made voluntarily by a person
occupying the premises or in charge of the vehicle in question.1017 Hence, consent is
invalid unless given by a person with actual authority to do so. This obligates
enforcement officers to make the necessary inquiries to ensure that the consenting third
party has the legal authority to consent. The Commission did not suggest an appropriate
mechanism to ascertain the third party’s authority to consent to the search.
c) USA
In the USA, as a general premise, third party consent is valid as long as the consenting
party has equal rights of possession and control of the property that is the subject of the
search with the defendant.1018 Or there is a relationship between the consenting third
party and the defendant.1019 However, the question arises, how can law enforcement
officers determine whether the third party consent is legitimate? Lee Cook argues that
there are four circumstances in which the third party consent should be allowed to
legitimise the search.1020 These are:
1) The third party has been victimised by the defendant’s conduct;1021
2) The third party is involved in the criminal activity;1022
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3) The defendant has abandoned the property;1023 and
4) Where obtaining the consent of all occupants of all premises is impractical, a
single consent will suffice.1024
It can be seen that these four circumstances circumscribe third party consent and,
therefore, hinder investigations, because they exclude family members, roommates, or
anyone sharing the same dwelling, unless the consenting person has been victimised by
the defendant’s conduct or is an accomplice of the defendant in the commission of the
criminal offence.
The USA Supreme Court has applied two different tests to determine the validity of
third party consent.1025 Both assess the officers’ perceptions of the facts at the time of
the search. The first is known as ‘an actual authority’ examination, and the second is ‘an
apparent authority’ examination.1026
The actual authority test is used to evaluate the validity of the third party consent by
examining whether the officer executing the search had a reasonable belief that the
consenting third party had equal rights to possess and control the property that was the
subject of the search.1027 For example, in the United States v. Matlock,1028 the court
relying on the actual authority test held that the defendant’s father, spouse and son could
grant consent to search.
The apparent authority examination, on the other hand, was used in Illinois v Rodriguez
where the Supreme Court stated that if a third party lacked actual authority to consent,
the third party’s consent could be valid if the police, at the time of entry, reasonably
believed the consenting party possessed common authority over the premises.1029
The courts do not rely on one single test. They first examine the actual authority to
determine the validity of the consent; otherwise they examine the apparent authority.
1023
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For instance, in United States v. Ray Andrus, the District Court concluded that the
defendant’s father, Dr Andrus, who gave officers consent, lacked actual authority,
because he did not know how to use the computer, had never used the computer, and did
not know the user name that would allow him to access his son’s computer.1030 Thus,
the court proceeded to consider the apparent authority.1031 It based its conclusion on the
fact that the defendant’s father had apparent authority on the following factual findings:
(1) the e-mail address bandrus@kc.rr.com, an address associated with Dr. Bailey Andrus, was
used to register with Regpay and procure child pornography; (2) Dr. Andrus told the agents he
paid the household's internet access bill; (3) the agents knew several individuals lived in the
household; (4) Ray Andrus' bedroom door was not locked, leading a reasonable officer to believe
other members of the household could have had access to it; and (5) the computer itself was in
plain view of anyone who entered the room and it appeared available for anyone's use.

1032

Local consent is obvious in this case, because the officers approached the defendant’s
father and obtained consent to access the premises and then obtained further consent to
search the defendant’s computer. Although, the defendant’s father, Dr Andrus, did not
have a password for the computer, he paid for the internet access. This was enough to
indicate that the defendant’s father possessed actual authority, because paying the bills
shows control over the Internet connection.
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
The general rules of third party consent are also applicable to digital searches. Third
party consent is valid only if obtained voluntarily and given by a competent person. But
digital searches have created a new form of third party consent. For the first time,
consent can be obtained from a person who has no common authority over the physical
place to be searched, but has common authority over the computer to be searched. The
common authority can be demonstrated by the ability of the third party to legally access
the defendant’s system. In addition, the remote access third party consent offers
enforcement officers an efficient way to obtain consent from a third party without
leaving their offices.
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The Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 does not permit the conduct of any forms
of third party consent. Pursuant to the conditions set forth in the Criminal Procedure
Law, the attendance of a local notary or two native witnesses suffices to validate a
warrantless search. A third party who shares common control or authority of the
premises to be searched, or a system operator, lacks authority to consent to the search of
a computer. Although this situation facilitates the warrantless search execution, because
officers are not required to negotiate with third parties to obtain consent, it has three
drawbacks. First, it unfairly jeopardises third parties’ privacy. Second, the local notary
or the two native witnesses may lack sufficient understanding and knowledge of
computer systems and, therefore, will be unable to observe the search execution
properly. Third, the attendance of a local notary or the two native witnesses is
impracticable in remote searches, because the latter requires swift action and inviting
them would delay the urgently needed search and seizure.
By contrast, in Australia and the USA, besides the knowing and willingness
requirements, third party consent search is valid only if the third party giving consent
has actual or apparent authority over the computer to be searched.
The application of the actual or apparent authority to local consent in digital search
would be as follows. The key to actual authority is that the consenting third party has
equal rights of possession and control of the property and, more importantly, possesses
the password and has access to the system, which is the subject of the search. Apparent
authority, on the other hand, is not applicable to search a password protected system
unless the consenting third party possesses the password. For example, a defendant’s
parents, sometimes, have authority and control over the place to be searched, but do not
have the password to get access to their child’s computer or they are not computer
literate. In such a case, they lack actual authority, i.e. equal rights of access, to
consent.1033 If the computer is not password-protected and the parents are computer
literate, however, the investigators will have a reasonable belief that one or both of the
parents have apparent authority to consent. The search will be considered valid1034
because of the apparent authority of the parents.1035
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In cases of remote consent, the actual authority is demonstrated by the ability of the
system operator to legally access the defendant’s system, but if the defendant’s
computer is inaccessible to the system operator, the later will lack actual authority to
consent. The apparent authority in remote consent cannot be demonstrated unless the
operator shows common authority over the defendant’s computer.

8.1.2.2.2 Workplace Consent
Digital technology and the Internet are increasingly being seen, particularly in the
developed world, as an integral part of workplace performance and productivity (in both
the private and public sectors). Businesses are fostered by the pervasiveness of
information technology, e-commerce and the emergence of new tools with networking
and processing capabilities.1036 The downside of this is the negative effect of
cybercrimes.1037 According to a recent Australian Institute of Criminology report on
crime, approximately half of the organisations that responded to the study had
experienced at least one type of cybercrime. 1038 Insider abuse of computer systems, such
as by disgruntled employees, was the third most common type of breach.1039 This
increased over the four year study period, from 26% in 2003 to 32% in 2006.1040
Similarly, the average loss per cybercrime for US companies escalated to $350,000 in
2007 from $168,000 in 2006.1041 From these statistics it is evident that workplace
computer stations are either the victims of cybercrimes or the tools of the
cybercrime.1042 Therefore, a workplace’s computers and networks are a critical part of
the crime scene in cybercrime investigation and law enforcement officers can take
advantage of workplace expertise to conduct searches, and more importantly, to conduct
warrantless searches.
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In Jordan, Australia, and the USA, no specific statutory provisions pertain to workplace
searches. In the USA, only a few court decisions on the subject have been reported and
there are no judicial precedents on workplace warrantless searches in Jordan or in
Australia. Therefore, the author will simply address the US perspective and then
examine whether it is optimal for Jordan.
In a workplace search a distinction must be made between private and public
workplaces. Middleton has opined that ‘the legality of warrantless workplace searches
depends on often subtle factual distinctions, such as whether the workplace is public
sector or private sector, whether employment policies exist that authorise a search, and
whether the search is work related’.1043 There are some marked differences between the
purposes of a search conducted by employers and by law enforcement officers. The
former’s purpose is mainly to make sure that the agency operates in an effective and
efficient manner,1044 while the latter’s purpose is only to gather evidence of a criminal
offence.
First: Private Sector Workplace Consent
Private workplaces employers can conduct different types of searches. 1045 The first is
non-investigatory searches, such as searching a desk or filing cabinet to obtain
documents, or computers to retrieve a needed data file.1046 The second is work-related
misconduct searches, such as for corruption investigations.1047 A third type is what is
known as a ‘mixed-motive’ search, aimed at simultaneously discovering evidence of
work-related misconduct1048 as well as evidence of a crime committed by the
employee.1049 In each of these types of searches, the employer may pass the
incriminating information and consent to law enforcement officers to search and seize
an employee’s computer.
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The underlying question is whether and to what extent private employers consent to the
government searching and seizing an employee’s computer is valid. To answer the
question it will be necessary to examine the balance between the employee’s right to
privacy and the employer’s need to know that the workplace’s policies are appropriately
applied.1050
Hackerott and Rosen have argued that the balancing act between the rights of the
employee and the employer can be made easier if the groundwork is clearly laid early in
the employment relationship.1051 For example, if the company’s privacy policy clearly
articulates the places and items that the company has the right to search, and it has a
policy of routinely searching employees’ computers, the search within the scope of the
policy would be permitted.1052 Conversely, if the company’s policy does not authorise
the employer to search an employee’s work area and protects the employee’s privacy,
the court may conclude that the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
use of his computer.1053
Kerr argued that a private sector search is equivalent to a search involving an
individual’s home and, therefore, requires a search warrant to search and seize a
computer. However, he added that employers can consent to searches of employees’
workplace computers in specific circumstances. He concluded that:
under the Fourth Amendment, private-sector employees have traditionally enjoyed Fourth
Amendment protection in the contents of their offices, including in their office computers. The
police can’t just barge in to your office and rifle through your desktop computer. Instead, the
police need either to get a warrant or to go to your employer and ask for the employer’s
1054

permission to conduct the search...

The argument is consistent with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA), as well as with the Fourth Circuit Court decision in United States v. Simons.
On one hand, the ECPA, which is the only federal statute that offers protection for
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employees in office computer privacy, does not protect employee privacy in the
workplace if actual or implied consent exist.1055 The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand,
held that the employer’s Internet usage policy, which prohibited employees from
browsing non-work related sites and permitted the employer to conduct electronic audits
to ensure compliance with this policy, dissolved any expectation of privacy.1056 The
dissolution of expectation of privacy means that employer can consent to searches.
In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in its decision in United States v.
Jeffrey Ziegler confirmed the above argument. The court ruled that:
Social norms suggest that employees are not entitled to privacy in the use of workplace
computers, which belong to their employers and pose significant dangers in terms of diminished
productivity and even employer liability. Thus, in the ordinary case, a workplace computer
simply "do[es] not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment
is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance... For these reasons, the use of
computers in the employment context carries with it social norms that effectively diminish the
employee's reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his use of his employer's
1057

computers.

The court concluded that Ziegler’s employer exercised common authority over ‘his’
office and workplace computer.1058 The common authority validates consent to search
Ziegler’s workplace computer.1059 The social norms, according to the Ninth Circuit
Court diminish the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
In sum, it can be said that conducting a warrantless search of a private workplace after
obtaining the consent of an employer who exercises common authority over the
workplace area is an admissible search.
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Second: Public Sector Workplace Consent
In public sector workplaces, employees regularly access the internet for personal use,
such as sending and receiving e-mails, and saving private files. The Supreme Court in
the USA has suggested that employees enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to the use of their computers. Indeed, the general standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy in public workplace was set by the USA Supreme Court in its
seminal decision of 31 March 1987 in O’Connor v. Ortega. The Supreme Court stated
that the ‘offices of government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within
those offices, are covered by the Fourth Amendment…therefore, search and seizure by
government employers or supervisors…are subject to the restraints of the Fourth
Amendment’.1060 However, scholars have stressed that public workplace expectation of
privacy should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.1061
In a similar manner to the private sector workplace, the office’s polices, regulations,
instructions and practices may reduce an employee’s expectation of privacy.1062 In
United States v. Simons, the Fourth Circuit held ‘that a government employee lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic files on his office computer, in light of
the employer's policy which states that employees were to use the Internet for official
government business only’. 1063 Thus, if the employer has a policy to inspect and
monitor Internet activity, the employee has no privacy regarding information on the
computer.1064 Public employers can consent to a law enforcement search if the
employees are aware of the agency’s rules which grant supervisors access to the
employees’ computers to investigate suspected employee wrongdoing.1065 For example,
in Leventhal v. Knapek the court upheld the warrantless search of a public sector
workplace, holding that the search was justified in terms of the employer’s legitimate
need for control.1066 The courts set criteria to decide whether an employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer as follows:1067 First, is the workplace
area in question assigned solely to the employee or do others have access to the space?
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Second, does the nature of the employment require a close working relationship with
others? Third, do office regulations place employees on notice that certain areas are
subject to search? Fourth, is the property searched in public or private? According to
these criteria, employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their offices,
including computers, when the access to a personal office and computer does not appear
to be frequent, widespread, or extensive.
Workplace Searches in Jordan & Australia
The Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 and Australian Crimes Act 1914,
respectively, do not address private or public sector workplace searches.
In Jordan, the problem is more complicated, because third party consent is not
recognised by the law. Instead, it requires a local notary or two native witnesses to be
present during the search execution. This requirement causes difficulty to the search
process.1068 Therefore, law enforcement officers should be able to conduct workplace
searches with the help of the employers who legally authorised the search of employees’
computers.
In Australia, third party consent is recognised, and therefore an employer’s consent to
law enforcement to search and seize evidence would be governed by consent of the
employer as a third party as long as the employees are aware of the agency’s rules that
grant supervisors the right to access the employee’s computers.
According to the USA perspective, however, the parallel between employer’s and third
party consent in certain respects is self-evident. The third party consent general concept
is that the consent should be obtained voluntarily from an individual other than the
defendant who has authority to approve the search. In workplace searches, by contrast,
the general theme is that employers (government or private) who have common
authority over their employees’ computers have authority to consent to law enforcement
searches of employees’ computers. Therefore, there should be no problem in applying
the general rules of third party consent to workplace searches.
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8.1.3 Plain view
The plain view doctrine is an American legal concept derived from three landmark
decisions, Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Arizona v. Hicks (1987), and Horton v.
California (1990).1069 Some scholars name this doctrine ‘plain view observation’. 1070 It
means that ‘anything in plain view of an officer, who has a right to be where he or she
is, may be seized’. 1071 According to Arcaro, the author of Basic Police Powers: Arrest
and Search Procedures, plain view means ‘unexpectedly finding evidence, without
having prior knowledge that the item was in the place and without physically searching
the place to find the item’. 1072 From these definitions the plain view doctrine allows
investigators to observe1073 or to seize but not to search evidence of a crime, even
though the crime is not the one for which the investigator was authorised to investigate
or to seize evidence.1074 The plain view doctrine occurs during the execution of a search
warrant or arrest, when contraband not described in the search warrant is observed and
seized. For example, if a computer pursuant to a warrant is being searched for DDoS
attack, and a single child pornography image is accidentally discovered, the agent may
seize the image without rummaging the entire hard disk. Indeed, the plain view doctrine
allows seizure beyond the scope of the search warrant and is, therefore, considered as an
exception to the general rules of search and seizure.1075
In cybercrime investigation, the core problem with the plain view doctrine is the unique
aspects of computers and forensic tools. Computers store enormous amounts of
information, such as intermingled documents, files, folders, programmes and databases.
These files and folders are either active files, or latent data.1076 Forensic tools are able to
scrutinise data thoroughly to retrieve hidden and deleted data. Therefore, the application
of the plain view doctrine to computers raises some problems. According to the classical
rule of plain view, investigators have power to seize but not to search evidence. In other
words, the seizure occurs as a result of visual observation at the time of the search
1069
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warrant’s execution. By applying this rule to computer searches, investigators executing
search warrants should only seize the active data,1077 because these data are visible
information that need no particular skills or forensic tools to display them and are
usually not passworded or otherwise protected from view. Meanwhile, seizure of latent
data and closed files in plain view raises an unresolved legal question about whether or
not it is possible for officers to seize deleted data and closed files pursuant to the plain
view exception. The problem occurs because visual observation is limited to what can
be physically seen on the computer screen, such as images, or opened files.1078 Hidden,
unopened or deleted files are not apparent immediately,1079 as forensic tools are required
to retrieve and display this sort of information. These forensic tools do not allow
investigators to see the file content, but only file name extensions, such as jpg, doc, html
and, to view such files, officers must open, download, or run specific applications.1080 In
this regard, Brenner opined:
In the cyberworld... there is no analogue of real world sight... searches of computer--files are
method--specific. As long as the officer is using a text--based search program, the contents of
non--textual files, such as JPEG files, will be opaque to him, clearly not in plain view...As the
officer uses the software program to search text files, the contents of all text files on the
computer's hard drive are in the officer's sight, but the contents of the non--textual files, the
JPEG files, are not…the JPEG files are of course visible to the officer, but they are analogous to
a closed and locked box. In order to view the contents of the locked box, an officer would have
to obtain the implements to unlock and then open the box. Unlocking and opening the box
1081

would...be a search, and so, outside the scope of the plain view doctrine.

Legal scholars have approached the plain view doctrine with quite a different set of
considerations. Brenner, Frederiksen and Kerr have suggested limiting the application
of the plain view doctrine with respect to computer searches. They argue that a
computer search using a general key word or file type that widens the search scope to
examine each individual file on the hard drive should not be allowed.1082 Kerr has added
that investigators must use targeted search tools that limit the operation of the plain
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view doctrine.1083 He has suggested three approaches that might limit the plain view
doctrine in computer searches.
The first approach focuses on the circumstances of the search where the investigator’s
intent and the forensic tools determine the validity of the plain view doctrine.1084 If the
investigator’s intention is to look for evidence described by the warrant, the discovered
materials are admissible evidence, but if the investigator ignores the warrant and starts a
different search, the discovered material is not admissible.1085 In addition, forensic tools
can play role in narrowing the plain view exception through using particular tools.1086
For example, cyberforensics tools might be designated to investigate specific types of
cybercrimes, such as intrusion software forensic programmes which are different from
cyberstalking forensic tools.
The second approach focuses on the seriousness of the offence.1087 According to this
approach, the plain view evidence can only be admissible if it was associated with
serious crimes, perhaps only terrorist offences.1088
The third approach demands the termination of the plain view doctrine in computer
searches, arguing that the plain view doctrine unduly extends the scope of the search
and is difficult to apply in the digital context.1089
The restrictive recommendations suggested by Kerr are not practicable in most
instances, as he himself explained. The first suggestion, concerning police intent, is
somewhat difficult to apply in practice since the police intent may be difficult to know
and forensic tools,1090 such as Paraben Software, are used for different types of searches
ranging from e-mails to password recovery.1091 Similarly, the second suggestion is
indefinite and ambiguous since it is difficult to draw the line between serious and less
serious offences. The third suggestion discards the plain view doctrine altogether for
computer searches. While such a recommendation is appealing from the point of view
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of privacy advocates, it would undermine law enforcement efforts in tackling
cybercrimes.
Taking a different approach, Moore has defended the use of the plain view doctrine in a
digital context.1092 He suggested that the plain view doctrine in digital searches requires
three additional parameters:
1) Access to the source of the evidence be obtained legally. To fulfil this
requirement, he recommended that law enforcement officers draft a search
warrant that contains a section discussing the nature of the electronic storage
media and the need to examine the entire contents of computer.1093
2) The apparent illegal nature of the evidence is immediately known.1094 This
requirement is contingent upon the investigators’ experience and training. For
example, files named ‘Boys.gif’ are suspicious files potentially containing child
pornography materials.1095
3) The officer not to abandon the original search. This requirement depends on the
existence of objective procedures that corroborate an officer’s action.1096
According to national legislation and judicial precedents, the plain view exception is
markedly different in Jordan, Australia and the USA.
a) Jordan
Although, the plain view doctrine is not explicitly recognised in the Jordanian Criminal
Procedure Law 1961, two provisions, 82 & 87, of the Act specifically allow officers to
search and seize items in plain view. Provision 82 authorises the General Prosecutor to
conduct a comprehensive search of the entire site to find whatever it is that might be
evidence of a crime.1097 Provision 87 allows law enforcement officers to seize anything
that is deemed to be necessary for ongoing investigation.
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Currently, no judicial precedent rendered by Jordan courts clarifies how officers should
deal with computer searches, so exploring the judicial view of Australia and the USA
may be helpful in predicating how Jordan’s legislature and courts will rule on this issue.
b) Australia
In Australia, the Crimes Act 1914 recognises the plain view doctrine. Section 3ZG
empowers law enforcement officers to seize on reasonable grounds evidential materials,
including electronic forms, if it is in plain view. Division 4, 3ZG stipulates that ‘[a]
constable who arrests a person at premises for an offence, or who is present at such an
arrest, may seize things in plain view at those premises that the constable believes on
reasonable grounds to be: (a) evidential material in relation to that or another offence;
or (b) seizable items’. Accordingly, law enforcement personnel are authorised to seize
unexpected evidence inadvertently presented in the plain view.
c) USA
In the USA, the plain view doctrine has long been used to justify seizure of
incriminating things presented in the plain view of police.1098 For example, in United
States v. Cray, the District Court for Eastern Virginia stated that:
Agents authorised by warrant to search a home or office for documents containing certain
specific information are entitled to examine all files located at the site to look for the specified
information. So it is not surprising, then, that in the course of conducting a lawful search
pursuant to a search warrant, law enforcement agents often discover evidence of criminal activity
other than that which is the subject of the warrant. If an agent sees, in plain view, evidence of
criminal activity other than that for which she is searching, this does not constitute an
unreasonable search.1099

In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court developed two elements that make evidence
obtained by the plain view doctrine admissible.1100
1) The incriminating nature of the item in plain view must be immediately apparent.
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2) The officer must be lawfully located in a position from which he or she can plainly see
the item. Thus, seizures of items in plain view incident to the exercise of a search warrant,
an arrest, or a valid exception to the warrant requirements are valid..

These elements have become key determinants in the USA in validating the plain view
doctrine either in traditional searches or cybercrime and digital evidence. Nevertheless,
the application of the Supreme Court’s elements to digital searches can cause some
problems, particularly the first element (which requires that the object be immediately
apparent). The second element can be applied to physical and digital searches
simultaneously without causing particular difficulties. For example, concerning the
second element of seizures of items in plain view, incidental to the exercise of a lawful
search, an officer legally searching for evidence of DoS attack can seize pornography
images displayed on the computer’s screen.
The USA courts, however, have adopted two different viewpoints about whether a
warrant authorising a search of a computer for a specific crime would permit the officer
to search images files that appear to contain evidence of other criminal activity. The
first viewpoint is illustrated by the judgment of the Tenth Circuit Court in United States
v. Carey.1101 That court invalidated a plain view search of child pornography images on
the ground that the investigator who obtained a warrant to search for drug trafficking
evidence, temporarily abandoned his original search when he discovered sexually
suggestive files that contained child pornography images.1102 The investigator then
spent five hours searching and downloading child pornography files.1103
The second viewpoint provides more leeway for investigators to open closed files in the
course of conducting a search under the plain view doctrine. In United States v. Cray,
the Eastern District of Virginia held that:
It is not surprising that in the course of conducting a lawful search pursuant to a search warrant,
law enforcement agents often discover evidence of criminal activity other than that which is the
subject of the warrant. If an agent sees, in plain view, evidence of criminal activity other than that
for which she is searching, this does not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth
1104
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The court based its judgment on the ground that in computer searches it is not
immediately apparent whether or not an object retrieved is within the scope of a search
warrant and therefore officers must examine the object to determine that.1105 The court
stated that digital documents, unlike illegal drugs or other contraband, may not appear
incriminating on the surface.1106 As a result, in any search for records or documents,
innocuous records must be examined to determine whether they fall into the category of
those papers covered by the search warrant.1107 Thus, an agent authorised by a warrant
to search computers or networks for files containing certain specific information is
entitled to examine all files located at the hard disk to look for the specified
information.1108
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
Jordanian law does not provide much direction on whether to seize incriminating digital
evidence discovered inadvertently. Although the two provisions are not equivalent to
the plain view doctrine, they function as an appropriate mechanism to seize evidence if
it is positioned in plain view. However, the current provisions are only meant to apply
to physical searches and seizures.
Australian law, in contrast, recognises the plain view doctrine in digital searches. The
Crimes Act 1914 explicitly states that incriminating digital evidence discovered in plain
view while conducting a lawful search can be seized. It explicitly authorises officers to
seize digital evidence not described in a warrant and presenting itself in plain view of
police.
In the USA, the courts have modelled two different types of decisions, restrictive and
non-restrictive. The restrictive view protects criminals and aborts justice because it
restrains investigators from opening files they see as suspicious. The second view takes
into consideration the unique nature of digital contents by allowing investigators to open
files to discover evidence of criminal activity other than that described in the warrant.
From these conflicting viewpoints, it is evident that the courts interpret the plain view
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doctrine in different ways and that these differences will continue to pose problems for
forensic investigators.
The unrestrictive plain view doctrine can play a significant role in computer searches.
This is because electronic storage devices are increasing in capacity and becoming
typical places where illegal and incriminating objects are stored. While, forensic
software tools are increasing in capability to rummage through thousands of files,
images and documents, the likelihood is increasing of encountering incriminating
objects not described in the search warrant. Therefore, the unrestricted plain view
doctrine serves the interest of justice. Jordanian law enforcement officers sooner or later
will encounter situations in which the plain view doctrine helps to seize incriminating
data. Requirements to obtain a warrant prior to seizing items in such circumstances
would unduly hamper efficient and effective investigations and often be impractical.
Therefore, it is optimal for Jordan to amend its law to authorise this non-restrictive
approach of plain view.

8.1.4 Incident to a Lawful Arrest
According to Clancy, arrest ‘involves a police officer chasing and graphing a known
suspect, informing him of his Miranda rights that he is under arrest, searching him and
hauling that person to the police station’. 1109 This definition shows that searching the
suspect is a fundamental procedure of arrest, but this arrest must be a lawful one. For
example, if a police officer sees a robber on the run, he may arrest the robber and search
him for evidence without a warrant. A warrantless search is permissible if it is executed
incidentally to a lawful arrest. This gives police officers the absolute right to search
premises and seize evidence if they observed the crime being committed or they believe
on reasonable grounds that the suspected person committed the crime.1110 For example,
if shortly after a murder occurred, an officer found a man carrying a briefcase around
1109
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the crime scene with blood on his clothes, a search of the suspect’s person and of the
briefcase and his immediate surrounding would be a proper search incident to a lawful
arrest without a warrant.
The purpose of the search that is an incident of a lawful arrest is twofold. First, it is to
preserve evidence of a crime. 1111 Police officers are authorised to search a suspect and
areas within the suspect’s immediate control, including containers found in his
possession, such as a laptop, a cellular phone or a palm, and preserve incriminating
items. 1112 Second, it is to protect an individual or a group of people, or the suspects or
the officers from possible danger by removing any objects nearby that may cause
harm.1113 Furthermore, two rules must be observed when conducting a warrantless
search that is incidental to a lawful arrest. First, the search must be conducted at the
time of or immediately following a lawful arrest.1114 Hence, any search that is
conducted after the arrest or if the arrest was unlawful is invalid. Second, the police may
search only the suspect and the area within the suspect’s immediate control.1115
Nowadays, it is common for law enforcement officers to find electronic devices in the
possession of a person who is arrested, because of the ubiquity and pervasiveness of
laptops1116 and other portable electronic devices, such as mobile phones, and PDAs. In
Jordan, Australia, and the USA, search as an incident to a lawful arrest is well
established in traditional searches and has been confirmed and applied in law
enforcement practice and judicial precedents. Yet each country’s approach to the
concept of search incident to a lawful arrest is different. Jordan’s courts have not yet
handled the search incident to a lawful arrest without a warrant of digital devices.
Therefore, exploring the judicial view of the USA may helpful in predicating how
Jordan’s legislature and courts will rule on this issue.
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a) Jordan
The power of search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest exception is identified
somewhat narrowly in the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961. Two provisions are
of particular concern to the search incidental to arrest doctrine. The first provision
addresses the search of properties incidentally to the arrest of the arrestee’s person, and
the second is the frisk search of a person who is arrested. First, provision 93/4 of the
Criminal Procedure Law 1961 authorises law enforcement officers to search premises
where the suspect might be hiding for the purpose of finding the suspect. In addition, it
authorises officers to search properties to preserve evidence relevant to the crime or to
protect an individual or a group of people, or the suspects or the officers from possible
danger, by removing any objects nearby that may cause harm and arrest the culprit
without a warrant. The second provision 97/1 authorises the search of a person’s body,
clothes, or belongings to preserve evidence of a crime. The frisk search must be
performed immediately at or after the arrest.
b) Australia
In Australian, the High Court in Wheare v Police had occasion to consider search
incident to a lawful arrest and stated: ‘…a constable is entitled to enter on private
property to effect an arrest within the limits of his common law power to arrest without
warrant, although he would be a trespasser if he entered or remained on the property for
any other purpose’.1117 Australian law enforcement officers, therefore, have been vested
by the common law with the power to arrest a person where they have reasonable
grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed and that he or she is the
person who committed it.1118 The Crimes Act 1914 then thoroughly defines the
parameters of a search incident to a lawful arrest.1119 Section 3UD states that ‘police
officers on reasonable grounds have the right to search and seize items that might be
connected to the offence committed or any other items that might be used against the
police or other persons’. 1120 It authorises officers to perform either an ordinary search or
a frisk search of a person1121 and his immediate surrounding area.
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c) USA
By contrast, in the USA, the rules of search incident to a lawful arrest have been
elaborated by the courts’ decisions. Courts validated the warrantless search of a person
arrested and his immediate surrounding area, because of the urgent need to remove
weapons that the person might seek to use in order to resist arrest or escape, and the
need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.1122
In United Sates v. Rafael, troopers arrested Rafael. In a search of Rafael incidental to his
arrest, officers found two mobile phones on his person and seized them and then one
officer downloaded the memory of one phone and someone else the memory of the
other.1123 Rafael contended that the two mobile phones were illegally searched without a
warrant and that the search was remote in time or place from the arrest.1124 The court
held that:
under the circumstances of this case, the government has met its burden to show that the troopers'
search of the cell phones by accessing stored numbers was justified as a search incident to
arrest…it is imperative that law enforcement officers have the authority to immediately "search"
or retrieve, incident to a valid arrest, information from a pager in order to prevent its destruction
as evidence.

1125

In its decision, the court relied on the Fifth Circuit judgment in United States v Finley in
which law enforcement officers arrested Finley on drug charges and searched his person
and found a cell phone.1126 During the questioning, another agent searched through the
phone’s call records and text messages.1127 The court upheld the retrieval of call records
and text messages from the cell phone as search incident to arrest.1128

Nevertheless,

some scholars disagree with the court’s conclusion. Toren, Moore, and Middleton have
argued that the unique nature and characteristics of digital data require a different
approach.1129 They have rejected the suggestion that the officer may inspect the entire
contents of a suspect’s electronic device as the courts uniformly held that the agent may
inspect the entire contents of a suspect’s wallet, address book, or search the content of a
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briefcase without a warrant.1130 They have emphasised that such a comparison is a
flawed, because it ignores the invasive nature of digital search.1131
d) Comparative Legal Analysis
The rules of traditional search incident to a lawful arrest are applicable to searches of
digital devices. In regard to the purpose of the search, the search incident to lawful
arrest is critical in digital searches to preserve evidence, because digital evidence is
fragile and delicate, liable to damage, and susceptible to alteration or concealment. In
regard to the time and scope of the search, digital searches incidental to a lawful arrest
are often associated with suspects who hold personal and portable electronic devices. As
a result, legislatures, scholars and judges alike agree that in deciding what is incidental
to lawful arrest, officers may immediately search the arrestee and the area within the
arrestee’s immediate control, including computers found in his possession. However,
scholars have debated whether a search incident to a lawful arrest allows officers to
conduct a thorough search of the digital contents.
Jordanian law permits search incidental to a lawful arrest without a warrant. The
officers can conduct an ordinary search or a frisk search of the person, including
portable computers. In a similar manner, the Crimes Act 1914 and some of the US
courts decisions permit a thorough search of the suspect’s person and the area within the
suspect’s immediate control, including digital devices. The courts upheld the search of
digital contents incidental to a lawful arrest. However, disagreement erupted over the
scope of the search as a thorough search of digital devices was criticised by scholars,
because it ignores individuals’ right to privacy and the risk associated with on-site
digital searches.
A thorough search of digital devices incidental to a lawful arrest on-site is not
recommended, and a warrant must be obtained to conduct a thorough search off-site by
forensics investigators to avoid evidence contamination and privacy invasion.
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8.2 Conclusion
Constitutions draw attention to the fact that individual and dwelling privacy rights are
not absolute and are subject to reasonable searches. Therefore, legislatures, courts and
scholars all recognise the permissibility of searches without a warrant in exceptional
circumstances. These exceptions fulfil the need of law enforcement agencies to have
swift and effective search powers in some specific circumstances without the need for
formal prior authorisation through the issue of an official search warrant.
The Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 and the Australian Crimes Act 1914
address a number of search warrant exceptions. These exceptions are exigent
circumstances, consent, plain view, and searches incident to a lawful arrest. Unlike
Jordan and Australia, in the USA it is court decisions that have significantly contributed
to expanding and re-defining the boundaries of the search warrant exceptions in relation
to cybercrime and digital evidence searches.
In regard to exigent circumstance, the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 and the Crimes
Act 1914 provide officers with the power to conduct a search and seizure of evidential
materials. However, some scholars have criticised the undue search power, arguing that
the exigent circumstance doctrine allows officers to take actions necessary to alleviate
the exigent circumstances but it should not allow investigators to conduct a thorough
search. Officers must obtain a search warrant to do that. The US court decisions in
digital searches show that the doctrine can be applied to search and seizure of digital
evidence when there is an immediate danger of losing data, or to prevent the imminent
destruction of electronic devices and hardware components. Because digital searches
practice jeopardises digital content, and because the digital search requires highly
sophisticated investigation skills, and well-equipped professionals, it is recommended
that in the case of an exigent circumstance, officers must not perform a search, but seize
the hardware devices and obtain a warrant to conduct digital search off-site. However,
officers should be able to search electronic storage devices and evidence in exigent
circumstances in which there is an immediate danger of losing data, or to prevent the
imminent destruction of electronic devices and hardware components.
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Consent is not expressly stated in the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 but the latter
addresses a search on request of the owner or the occupier. The request search is not
equivalent to a consent search. Law enforcement officers cannot approach a defendant’s
property unless the defendant himself asks them to do so. Meanwhile, in Australia and
the USA, law enforcement officers can always search a property if the owner or the
occupier of the property gives consent to the search. Law enforcement officers have the
opportunity to obtain consent from a person with authority to grant such consent to
search private premises including electronic devices. This opportunity is clearly
demonstrated in judicial decisions, which indicate that consensual search practices and
principles are almost the same in both traditional and digital searches, but that the scope
of the search and third party consent in a digital search should be treated differently
from traditional searches to reflect the nature and characteristics of digital searches.
The plain view doctrine is foreign to the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 but is to be
inferred from its general statutory provisions relating to the search warrant exceptions.
Australian law explicitly authorises officers to seize digital evidence not described in a
warrant yet presenting itself in plain view. Even with these provisions, cybercrime and
digital searches create a unique situation which requires a different approach from that
used in traditional searches to seize digital evidence positioned in plain view. The USA
courts have reached two different conclusions about whether a warrant authorising a
search of a computer for a specific crime would permit the officer to search for image
files that appear to contain evidence of other criminal activity. The first prohibits
officers from opening and seizing files containing evidence of other criminal activity.
The second view allows investigators to open files to discover evidence of criminal
activity other than that described in the warrant. The latter view serves the interest of
justice because electronic storage devices are increasing in capacity and in the
likelihood of encountering incriminating objects not described in the search warrant.
Search incidents to a lawful arrest are important in cybercrime and digital searches due
to the pervasive use of portable electronic devices. The purpose of the search is to
preserve evidence. Jordanian and Australian laws permit two types of searches, ordinary
and frisk searches. In the absence of legal provisions or judicial positions on the issue of
digital searches, law enforcement officers may treat digital devices with the same
familiarity as physical items. In the USA, the courts have upheld the search for digital
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contents incidental to a lawful arrest although scholars have debated whether search
incident to arrest allows officers to conduct a thorough search of the digital contents.
Some scholars have rejected the search arguing that the unique nature and
characteristics of digital data require treatment different from tangible items. The search
of digital contents incidental to a lawful arrest should be confined to the physical device
only and not to the digital contents. The argument is quite compelling not only for
privacy aspects, but for the risks associated with comprehensive on-site searches. A
warrant must be obtained to conduct a thorough search by forensics investigators to
avoid evidence contamination and privacy invasion. Therefore, law enforcement
officers can physically search and seize the electronic devices and conduct a thorough
digital search off-site, which must be supported by a warrant.
Finally, while information technology use is continually increasing and law
enforcement agencies use more advanced and sophisticated investigation tools, the
current Criminal Procedure Law 1961 is inappropriate to address search warrant
exceptions. In addition, law enforcement needs relating to cybercrime and digital
evidence are different from those relating to traditional circumstances and, therefore,
Jordanian law must be amended to bring it into line with the unique nature of digital
searches.
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9 CROSS-BORDER SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Introduction
The absence of physical borders in cyberspace undermines cybercrime investigation.
While cybercriminals are able to cross-borders and commit cybercrimes without leaving
their desks, law enforcement agencies are encumbered by physical borders. Ritter
considers the absence of geographic boundaries to be one of the greatest challenges in
cybercrime investigation. 1132 This is because law enforcement agencies over the years
have exercised their power over crimes committed in the territories located within their
own jurisdiction. But with the advent of information technologies and the Internet a
novel environment has been created where law enforcement’s investigative powers
could no longer be performed effectively without mutual assistance from other states.
As stated by Silvia Sanusian, Assistant Professor in Law of International Business
Transactions, University of Buenos Aries, ‘the advent of the Internet has radically
shattered the traditional correspondence between territoriality and legally relevant acts
and events, destroying the links between geographical location and the...legitimacy of
the efforts of a local sovereign to enforce rules applicable to global phenomena’.1133
However, even though the co-operation between law enforcement agencies is
increasing, this has not been accompanied by a similar development in a legal
perspective.1134
When a cybercrime is originated abroad and evidence is located in another jurisdiction,
local procedures would be fruitless unless accompanied by appropriate international
assistance. The previous two chapters showed that the application of traditional search
and seizure procedures to cybercrime and digital evidence poses significant challenges
and difficulties for law enforcement officers. Thus, Australia and the USA have
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amended their local laws to meet the new requirements of digital evidence. However,
the efficiency and effectiveness of the new amendments are confined by their physical
borders. With respect to search for and seizure of digital evidence located in foreign
nations, the situation is even more difficult not only for Jordan but also for Australian
and US enforcement officers because international practices in the area of search and
seizure of digital evidence are not fully harmonised at the international level.
The objective of this chapter is to clarify the legal position and compare Jordan with
other jurisdictions where international cybercrime investigation practices have been
more fully developed. It compares Jordan with Australia and the US on aspects of
international co-operation in cybercrime investigation, and identifies jurisdictional
hurdles that hinder cross-border searches and seizures and the ways in which law
enforcement officers approach cross-border searches. The key features of the
Convention on Cybercrime will be discussed, including the provisions relating to crossborder search and seizure procedures.
The legal instruments available for performing cross-border searches and seizures are
very limited and consist mainly of either Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs),
letters rogatory or domestic legislations.

9.1 Trans-Jurisdictional Hurdles
Jurisdiction refers to the power that each country has to make its own laws and enforce
them.1135 This power is exercised in the legislative, judicial, and executive spheres.1136
The legislative sphere, or ‘jurisdiction to prescribe’, includes the power of a state to
enact substantive and procedural laws applicable to particular individuals and
circumstances. 1137 The judicial sphere relates to the power of a state to subject persons
or things to the procedures of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in
criminal proceedings. 1138 The executive sphere refers to the ability of a state to
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implement its laws and enforce judicial decisions.1139 These three types of jurisdiction
are generally recognised in international law1140 and each is necessary for cybercrime
investigation. Jurisdiction to prescribe is required to enact legislation which allows for
the search and seizure of computer data. Judicial jurisdiction is required to judge and
convict cybercriminals. Executive power is vital to carry out investigations and enforce
judicial decisions.
In contrast to the way a state’s extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction is limited to a
particular person in a particular situation, 1141 the scope of its executive power to conduct
search and seizure is limited by the state’s physical and political boundaries.1142 For
example, if an Australian computer hacker hacked into the computers of the City Bank
in Jordan and obtained the password necessary to effect a wire transfer from that bank
to another bank account in the USA, 1143 then the criminal act was perpetrated in
Australia though the harmful consequences of the crime happened in Jordan. The
question that needs be asked is: can Jordanian officers search the suspect’s computer or
the service provider’s server which is located in Australia and seize evidence?
The practical procedures of search for and seizure of digital evidence are almost
identical, whether incriminating evidence is located within the national jurisdiction on
the defendant’s computer hard drive or on a foreign Internet Service Provider’s server.
The widespread accessibility of the Internet, coupled with the ease of use and power of
forensic tools, provides opportunities to view and retrieve intangible objects stored on
foreign servers, networks or the Internet.1144 In other words, law enforcement officers
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may be able to hack into any foreign computer systems to gather evidence.1145
Therefore, the Jordanian officers in the above example might be able to access and
review data and seize digital evidence located in Australia without encountering
technical problems or notifying the Australian counterpart. Nevertheless, the mere
search, by itself, would usually not suffice to support a successful prosecution and,
therefore, Jordan will need the co-operation of the Australian counterpart to extradite
the accused or to assist in the prosecution. Furthermore, unilateral foreign search and
seizure of data violates the foreign state’s (i.e. Australia’s) sovereignty.1146 As a result,
countries are highly unlikely to conduct cross-border searches without notifying the
concerned party through proper legal avenues.1147
Search and seizure of digital evidence stored on foreign servers should be legally treated
as a physical object search and, therefore, law enforcement officers must consider the
local law applicable where the evidence is located as well as any legal agreement in
effect that covers the issue. In their book Cyber Criminals on Trial, Smith, Grabosky
and Urbas identify a number of challenges facing law enforcement officers investigating
cross-border cybercrime.1148 Two of these challenges are, for the most part,
jurisdictional concerns. The first challenge experienced by enforcement officers who
receive a request for assistance is the ambiguity concerning whether the conduct in
question is unlawful in their own jurisdiction.1149 While in the above example the
situation is very simple, because hacking is a crime in Australia, in more complex
scenarios where the offence was not against the laws of Australia, or the offence was
considered not to be prosecutable due to insufficient evidence, the assistance may be
declined. The second challenge arises when incriminating data and files are stored on a
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remote server located in one or more other jurisdictions. 1150 The issue is even more
complicated, involving not only one but many sets of national laws. In such a case,
seeking incriminating evidence located in one or more foreign countries, getting access
to and collecting the data is a bewildering and complicated process. This challenge may
also be sufficient reason to refuse law enforcement cooperation.

9.1.1 Factors Contributing to the Success or Failure of Cross-border
Searches
Three important factors should be considered when approaching cross-border searches,
namely political, cultural and legal factors.

a) Political
Scholars argue that a good relationship between the countries concerned is going to
benefit cross-border criminal investigations. For example, informal police-to-police cooperation flourishes in a friendly political atmosphere. In this context, Smith, Grabosky,
and Urbas opined:
…If relations with one’s counterparts in another country are not close, one is less likely to go the
extra mile. Even where a treaty places an obligation on parties to cooperate…when authorities in
another country are disinclined to cooperate, for whatever reason, investigations can be complex
and legally murky.

1151

The political factor, i.e., the presence or absence of political will, significantly
contributes to the success or failure of any cross-border investigation.1152 For example,
the 1996 attack on Citibank in New York by Russian hackers1153 clearly demonstrated
the problems of co-operation within an unstable political relationship between Russia
and the USA. The Russian counterpart showed no interest in cooperating with the FBI.
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The latter responded unilaterally and in an unprecedented way. The FBI set up a bogus
computer security company in Seattle, and then lured the Russian hackers, Alexei
Ivanov

1154

and Vasiliy Gorshkov, to do some well-paid security work as hackers. For

the job interview, undercover FBI agents installed keystroke logging, a programme that
records what is typed on a keyboard on the laptop provided by the FBI, 1155 and asked
Ivanov and Gorshkov to demonstrate their hacking skills. The hackers happily complied
and logged in to their home server back in Russia.1156 Following their arrest, FBI agents
used the recorded information to access the hackers’ computer situated in Russia and
download evidence.1157
Good political relationships between the concerned parties coupled with regular
implementation of any relevant treaty enhance the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)
process. M.M Richard, Senior Counsel for Enforcement Matters, US Mission to the EU,
opined that ‘experience has shown that countries tend to give priority attention to
requests from bilateral partners where special relationships have grown between those
responsible for implementation over multilateral requests’.1158 Thus, cross-jurisdictional
search and seizure can sometimes be affected in the absence of a good political
relationship but a good relationship and willingness to help each other in cross-border
investigation is usually a requirement prerequisite. Fortunately, political relationships
between Jordan, Australia, and the USA are fundamentally in good shape.

b) Cultural
Cultural factors are of crucial importance in cross-border investigations. Widely
differing cultural perspectives are may hinder coordination and co-operation on criminal
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assistance and cross-border investigation.1159 Mike Kennedy, the president of Eurojust,
opined:
Increasingly, we are finding that there are cases linked to Member states which are not just
adjacent to each other in geographical terms but also linked, possibly through the internet, right
across the European Union. Because the legal systems are so different, particularly the four
common law countries…from those based on the Napoleonic Code or other codes…there are
many rubbing points. This is simply in the systems themselves. There is a cultural difference
1160

…we need to bridge these gaps and these barriers to be able to deal satisfactorily with cases.

Each nation has its own notion about what constitutes criminality, the appropriateness
of punishment, proportionality of punishments1161 and investigative priorities.1162 This is
obvious in some views of cybercrime investigation policy. For example, countries such
as Australia and the USA pay maximum attention to fighting child pornography but pay
no attention to pornography production and distribution. This situation is totally
opposite to that in Jordan, where child pornography is not on the national agenda
because of the lack of resources and the need to attend other prevalent crimes, such as
the production, distribution and possession of pornography. Arguably, such cultural
factors may be of less affect in cybercrime investigations because there are few
discrepancies in cultural policy concerning cybercrime criminalisation. Indeed, a
significant degree of consensus exists regarding certain types of cyber offences.1163

c) Legal
Cyberspace has no geographic boundaries,1164 so cybercrime often crosses multiplejurisdictional boundaries with differing laws and procedures.1165 Law enforcement
officers must engage in a complicated jurisdictional quarrel to obtain evidence.
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Sometimes, evidence cannot be obtained, because of data protection and privacy rights
concerns,1166 or the lack of legal instruments authorising transnational cooperation.
Substantive legal factors, such as the existence of a common criminalisation policy, are
still essential. For example, the failed prosecution for the release of the ‘I love you’
virus by a Philippine student demonstrated the importance of a common criminalisation
policy.1167 The Philippine student was able to walk free from court in the Philippines,
despite the fact that the political relationship between the Philippines and the USA was
quite positive, because of the absence in the criminal code at the time in the Philippines
of the crime of the creation and distribution of computer viruses.1168 However, different
legal instruments in particular serve to facilitate law enforcement co-operation in the
fight against transnational crimes. MLA, letters rogatory and domestic legislation are
particular legal instruments that seek to resolve problems of cross-border criminal
investigation and create effective co-operation among countries.
The three mentioned above – political, cultural and legal - factors have always existed
and have a close relationship in any form of transnational cooperation. Political and
cultural differences preclude concerned parties from adopting common criminalisation
policies. For example, freedom of religion is protected by the constitution of the USA,
while conversion from Islam to another religion is considered a serious crime in most
parts of the Islamic world. Hence, creating a website to promote atheism and fight
religious influence is not an offence in the USA, but a crime in Jordan.1169 If that
website is hosted by an American Internet Service Provider and the webmaster lives in
the USA, the latter will not respond to an assistance request issued by Jordan. The
existence of the political will to assist and cultural consistency, as well as robust legal
instruments, are each vital for successful cross-border investigation. Nevertheless, the
existence of robust legal mechanisms for obtaining evidence in foreign nations reflects
both the political will to cooperate and bridge cultural differences.

1166

M M Richard, above n 1152, 228.
See Sections 1.4.1/3.1 and 3.2.2.1 for more information about ‘I LOVE YOU BUG’.
1168
Smith, Grabosky and Urbas, above n 25, 55.
1169
Criminal Law 1960 (278).
1167

253

9.2 Legal Mechanisms to Obtain Evidence Situated in a
Foreign State
Over the past decade, it has become critical for law enforcement agencies and officers
involved in any cybercrime investigation to understand the legal mechanisms by which
evidence may be obtained from foreign nations. In the absence of particular legal
provisions concerning searches and seizures of digital evidence, the traditional legal
avenues for searching and collecting evidence remain pre-eminent. They are MLA and
letters rogatory as well as domestic legislation. These will each be examined in this
chapter. The sole international legal instrument on cybercrime, the Convention on
Cybercrime, will also be examined and discussed. Then the perspectives of Jordan,
Australia, and the USA will be explored and analysed.

9.2.1 Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)
The use of MLA instruments which allow the exchange of evidence between
jurisdictions is commonly and increasingly used to cooperate in transnational
prosecutions.1170 Michael and Rose define MLA as a ‘mechanism by which lawyers and
the courts of one jurisdiction can request assistance from another.’1171 Another
definition ‘is the process whereby one state provides assistance to another in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal offences’. 1172 The two definitions seem to
emphasise two different but equally important aspects of MLA. According to Rose, the
MLA can be carried out in a more simplified way, and would be less susceptible to the
political factor because it can be requested by lawyers or courts. According to the
second definition, it can be formalised through bilateral state-to-state agreement.1173 For
example, the USA has bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with more
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than 80 countries around the world,1174 and multilateral agreements, such as the Council
of Europe Convention on MLA in Criminal Matters (which came into force in 1962).1175
9.2.1.1 Bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
Bilateral MLAT is a popular legal mechanism which obliges two parties to assist each
other in various criminal investigations by obtaining evidence located in one country for
the benefit of the requesting party.1176 For example, Article 15 of the bilateral MLAT
between the government of Australia and the USA stipulates ‘The Requested State shall
execute a request for the search, seizure, and delivery of any article to the Requesting
State if the request includes the information justifying such action under the laws of the
Requested State’.1177 MLAT is one of the most important legal tools that can be utilised
to obtain evidence located in a foreign country. It deals with the legal complexities
associated with the problems of coordinating law enforcement, including dual
criminality1178 and other transnational co-operation requirements.1179
Countries seem to prefer not to have a bilateral MLAT limited to a narrow range of
offences or procedures1180 and, therefore, there is no bilateral MLAT specifically to
address cybercrime investigations assistance. The classical forms of mutual legal
assistance, which were originally established to address traditional crimes, are currently
used to provide assistance in searching for and gathering digital evidence across
borders. It provides several advantages including that investigation assistance may be
provided even in the absence of common criminalisation policies and that a designated
authority will serve as a direct point of contact for receiving and transmitting requests
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for assistance.1181 Nevertheless, the classical form of mutual assistance seems much less
capable of handling digital evidence searches because digital evidence is highly
volatile1182 and has a correspondingly high risk of contamination or destruction at the
touch of a keyboard.1183 Cybercrime searches require swift and decisive action to which,
often, the normal search and seizure procedures addressed by MLAT are not well
suited. For example, Article 15/3 of the MLAT between Australia and the USA
stipulates that ‘the Central Authority of the Requested State may require that the
Requesting State agree to terms and conditions deemed necessary to protect the articles
to be transferred’. 1184 Although this Article requires the requested State to process the
request in accordance with the procedures set forth in its law, it delays quick and
immediate response. Indeed, the MLATs have been consistently criticised as being
‘cumbersome and time consuming’.1185 Richard opined that:
In fact, our experience has shown that even well drafted international instruments that are poorly
implemented can be less effective than poorly drafted ones that are implemented with a view by
the parties of providing the widest possible range of co-operation allowed under the
1186

instrument.

The practical application of the treaty is fraught with complications due to the
bureaucratic system it goes through and poor implementation.
9.2.1.2 Multilateral Mutual Legal Assistance
Several countries and international organisations have made efforts to improve
cybercrime law enforcement co-operation by adopting measures especially concerning
extradition and mutual legal assistance procedures and other forms of co-operation such
as common training. For example, the Council of Europe (CoE), Asian-Pacific
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Economic Co-operation (APEC), the G81187 and the United Nations (UN) have each
developed cross-border mutual assistance responses to cybercrime. The CoE
Convention on Cybercrime is the first and only multilateral MLAT specially aimed at
cybercrime and open to non-member countries to ratify.1188 The USA is a signatory to
the Convention, while Jordan and Australia can sign up and become parties.

Convention on Cybercrime
The foreign ministers of the Council of Europe, on November 8, 2001 adopted the
Convention on Cybercrime.1189 At its adoption date, the Convention was signed by 26
of the 46 member states of the CoE, along with the CoE’s partner states Canada, Japan,
South Africa and the USA, who participated in its elaboration but who are not member
states of the CoE.1190 On July 1, 2004 the convention came into force for Albania,
Croatia, Estonia, Hungry and Lithuania.1191 As of August 28, 2008, the Convention has
been signed by 45 states and ratified by 23 countries.1192
The European Convention on Cybercrime consists of forty-eight articles in four
chapters, namely, use of terms, measures to be taken at the national level, international
cooperation, and final provisions.1193 It is the first and sole international treaty focused
only on problems arising from cybercrime.1194 The Convention aims at harmonising the
member

states’

provisions

on

cybercrime

and

strengthening

international

cooperation.1195 Accordingly, it adopts a three-pronged approach, encompassing
provisions relating to the harmonisation of substantive cybercrime law, domestic
1187
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procedural law powers for investigation and prosecution of cybercrime, and mutual
legal assistance.1196
The first prong of the three-pronged approach is legislative.1197 Articles 2 to 13 address
substantive law issues and include criminalisation provisions.1198 One of the
Convention’s key achievements is to require members to ensure that their national
cybercrime laws meet the criteria set forth in the Convention with respect to four
categories of cybercrime:1199
1) Offences against the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and
systems, including hacking, illegal interception, data interference, system interference,
and misuse of devices;

1200

1201

2) Computer-related offences including forgery and computer fraud;

3) Computer-related offences including production, dissemination, and possession of child
pornography;

1202

4) Offences related to infringement of copyright and related rights, including commercial
scale distribution of pirated works.

1203

The four categories represent the minimum list of offences necessary for a uniform
criminal policy on legislation concerning cybercrime.
The second prong of the Convention, Articles 14 to 21 seeks to harmonise domestic
rules of procedural law and jurisdiction among signatory countries.1204 This requires
each member country to incorporate the following procedural laws:
1) Expedited preservation of stored computer data, including any measures as

may be necessary to oblige a service provider to preserve and maintain the
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integrity of that computer data for a period of time as long as necessary, up
to a maximum of 90 days, and subject to an extension;1205
2) The ability to order a person to provide computer data under his or her

control and to order a service provider to provide subscriber information
under its control;1206
3) Search and seizure of stored computer data, ensuring that a member state

can authorise the search of any computer system located in its territory and
any other computer system accessible from the initial system;1207 and
1208

4) Real-time collection of traffic data and interception of content data.

These procedures are to be applied not only to the crimes defined in
accordance with the Convention but also to any crime committed by means
of a computer system and to the collection of digital evidence for use in
prosecuting any other crime.1209
The third prong pertains to mutual assistance.1210 Although the Convention does not
supersede existing bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties, it addresses a variety of
areas of mutual legal assistance, including extradition,1211 spontaneous information
exchanges,1212 designation of a central authority responsible for all incoming and
outgoing legal assistance and extradition requests,1213 expedited preservation of stored
computer data located within the territory of a party,1214 expedited disclosure of
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preserved traffic data,1215 search and seizure across-borders,1216 and real-time collection
of traffic data.1217 These create a new regime of mutual legal assistance with respect to
mechanisms particularly necessary for rapid effective co-operation in computer related
criminal matters.
In relation to search and seizure across-borders, the Convention empowers member
states to issue an expedited request for the preservation of data and disclosure of
preserved data. According to the Explanatory Report, preservation of data means to
keep data, which already exists in a stored form, protected from anything that would
cause its current quality or condition to change or deteriorate.1218 The Convention
divides the expeditious preservation request into two stages. The first stage requires the
requested party to keep the specified information safe from modification, deterioration
or deletion.1219 The data can be preserved for as long a period of time as necessary, up
to a maximum of 90 days unless an extension is granted.1220 The preservation request
does not, however, prevent the owner from accessing or using the preserved data, unless
the requesting country requests clearly otherwise.1221 Second, the preserved data is not
disclosed to the foreign law enforcement authorities during the preservation period,
unless the requesting party expressly requests its disclosure.1222 The request for
preservation should be made by expedited methods, such as fax or e-mail and processed
by a designated central authority.1223 The central authority of the state receiving the
request must respond immediately to avoid data contamination or destruction.1224
The Convention authorises participating countries to take unilateral action in specific
situations.1225 If the computer system to be searched is located in a foreign jurisdiction
and is a publicly accessible open data space, the participating nation may without the
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permission of the other member state access the stored computer data and obtain
evidence.1226 In a similar manner, if the computer system to be searched is password
protected or restricted in some other way, the participating nation may also conduct a
cross-border search without the authorisation of the other concerned member state if a
lawful and voluntary consent is obtained from the person who has the lawful authority
to give consent.1227
However, the Convention is subject to criticism for its classical and decentralised
approach. The Convention did not establish a new mechanism for tackling cybercrime.
Instead, it delegated the responsibility for tackling cybercrimes to member states
individually.1228 For example, each state is responsible for defining cybercrime and for
investigating, prosecuting and punishing cybercriminals. This approach, according to
Brenner, ‘attests a traditional approach, nationally based law enforcement to
nonterritorially based crime’.1229 She suggested two alternative approaches. The first is
to establish a global enforcement agency or ‘global cybercrime police’1230 which would
be responsible for investigating cybercrime, and prosecuting and sanctioning
cybercriminals. This is a centralised approach, in which the role of the concerned
counties is limited and the agency’s role is broad.1231 However, the approach is unlikely
to be successful because countries are not likely to be willing to give up their
enforcement powers.1232 The second approach is a mixed model which incorporates
both centralised and decentralised elements.1233 The prosecution and sanctioning of
cybercriminals would remain the responsibility of discrete states, but the processes of
investigating cybercrime and apprehending cybercriminals would be delegated to the
global agency.1234 The agency would have a wider role than Interpol, which only
coordinates investigations among law enforcement officers from various countries.1235
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Also the Convention has attracted a good deal of criticism because of the complexity of
its provisions and its lack of mechanisms to ensure compliance with its provisions.1236
Accordingly, many developing countries, including Jordan, will be hesitant to
implement the Convention. Therefore, in 2009 the United Nation’s International
Telecommunications Union commissioned a multidisciplinary international group of
experts to draft model legislation to assist developing countries to draft cybercrime laws
to implement the Convention. The model legislation uses language drafted in a manner
that can be customised to suit the cybercrime laws of a particular country but that
should eliminate confusion as to the meaning or the varying interpretations of the
Convention.
Howeverd, the Convention will have little influence on crimes committed from nonmember countries.1237 Jack L Goldsmith, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School, suggests that state parties should impose significant sanctions on nations that
fail to ratify, implement, or enforce it.1238 Finally, the Convention did not specify how
data should be preserved and then seized. It is left to each state to determine the
appropriate manner of preservation.1239
Although the Convention established a common criminal policy among countries, i.e.
its three-pronged approach, it stopped short of establishing a global agency that would
investigate and prosecute cybercriminals. Consequently, developing countries, such as
Jordan, will be hesitant to comply with the Convention because of the lack the
necessary resources. Brenner’s suggestion to establish an international investigative unit
could encourage developing states to accede because it could provide the necessary
resources to enable them to comply. These countries will be able to respond to the
requirements of development in cybercrime so long as the developed countries keep
providing them with the logistical support and funding which are necessary for tackling
cybercrime.
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9.2.2 Letters Rogatory
Letters rogatory are requests for assistance from the courts of one country to the courts
of another country.1240 This approach is only appropriate when the assistance requested
is beyond the scope of MLAT,1241 i.e. the country requesting the assistance is not a
signatory to a multilateral or bilateral MLAT with the requested country.1242 Thus, they
are a default mechanism based upon the principle of international comity.1243
Letters rogatory are processed slowly because of the huge bureaucracy that it takes to
issue and process them.1244 For example, the USA Department of State (DOS) outlines
the steps in the letters rogatory process as follows:1245
1) draft request,
2) obtain seal and signature of USA court,
3) forward request to DOS or USA embassy,
4) USA embassy prepares diplomatic note and forwards to ministry of foreign affairs,
5) ministry of foreign affairs forwards to ministry of justice,
6) ministry of justice forwards to foreign court of competent jurisdiction,
7) foreign court executes request subject to court’s calendar,
8) evidence sought returned by court to ministry of foreign affairs,
9) ministry of foreign affairs returns evidence to US embassy,
10) US embassy returns evidence to DOS,
11) DOS returns evidence to US court that issued request, and
12) US court returns evidence to requesting party.
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It is a time consuming process1246 and generally takes between six months and one year
to achieve.1247 This slowness in multiple handling may be attributed to three reasons:
1) The absence of particular forms for letters rogatory;1248
2) The absence of an equivalent central authority among countries for
overseeing and coordinating the process;1249 and
3) The processing of letters rogatory through diplomatic channels. 1250
Thus, scholars prefer the use of MLAT over letters rogatory regime. According to
Cherif Bassiouni and David Gualtieri, MLATs have six advantages over letters
rogatory.1251 Four of these advantages contribute to the inefficiency of the letters
rogatory approach in cross-border cybercrime investigation.
1) MLATs represent obligations between states, while letters rogatory function merely as a
matter of comity.
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Therefore, law enforcement officers are discouraged from using letters rogatory to
obtain evidence.1256 However, scholars consider it more likely that letters rogatory will
be processed through non-traditional means, such as by e-mail.1257 If e-mail were
adopted as a primary method of letters rogatory transmission, it would be a major
change that benefits cross-border cybercrime investigations. The use of non-traditional
media to prepare, process, receive and transmit letters rogatory would definitely
accelerate processing of letters rogatory.

9.2.3 Domestic Legislation and Responses to MLA & Letters Rogatory
Several countries have domestic laws that deal with mutual assistance in criminal
matters. The objectives of these laws are to ensure that mutual assistance in criminal
matters is provided in response to requests even in the absence of a formal
agreement.1258 Australia and the USA have both enacted domestic legal instruments to
ensure that mutual assistance is regulated by the law. Meanwhile, Jordan has not yet
enacted any law governing mutual legal assistance.
a) Jordan
Unfortunately, Jordan’s participation in international co-operation to combat cybercrime
is not at all apparent. The Jordanian government is neither a signatory to bilateral
treaties on mutual legal assistance with Australia and the USA, nor to any multilateral
treaties in criminal matters.1259 This deficiency may be attributed to the two following
factors. First, the lack of technical knowledge, training and funding causes difficulties in
keeping up with the forensic investigations required to provide the assistance sought.
Second, Jordan’s current procedural provisions with respect to cybercrime are not
strong enough to effectively handle digital evidence and are inadequate to deal with

1255

Ibid.
See, eg, Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime
Control in International Relations (2006) 143.
1257
Broadhurst and Grabosky, above n 107, 12.
1258
See, Bullwinkel, above n 1176, 274.
1259
See generally, [ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻌﺎت اﻻردﻧﯿﺔTrans of: Jordanian Legislation] National Information System <
<http://www.lob.gov.jo/ui/contracts/listall.jsp> at 17 August 2008. See also, U.S. Department of State:
Bureau of Consular Affairs, above n 1247.
1256

265

situations involving cross-border searches. For example, there are no specific provisions
for compelling ISPs who hold the information to cooperate with investigators.
The use of letters rogatory for search and seizure of property is unknown in Jordan.1260
According to the USA Department of State, Jordanian officers are unfamiliar with the
procedures of letters rogatory and reluctant to execute letters rogatory requests.1261
b) Australia
In addition to the MLAT between Australia and the USA,1262 the federal legislature has
enacted the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (MACMA) to regulate
mutual legal assistance. The MACMA regulates, among other things, the taking of
evidence in a foreign country,1263 evidence collection from Australia,1264 the production
of any document or other article including articles in digital format for the purposes of a
proceeding in a foreign country; 1265 and the issue of a search warrant and the seizure of
anything relevant to a proceeding or investigation in a foreign country.1266
Part 3, entitled ‘Assistance in Relation to Search and Seizure’ comprises two sections.
The first deals with the evidence requested by the Australian authorities and its
admissibility in the national legal standard and second deals with a request by foreign
countries for search and seizure of evidence located in Australia. Furthermore, Section
38N authorises the executing officers to operate electronic equipment at the premises to
seize evidence.
According to the Act, the Attorney General, the Minister of Home Affairs, or a delegate
can offer to and request from foreign nations a broad range of assistance.1267 This makes
the MACMA very important to countries which do not have a bilateral MLAT with
Australia, such as Jordan, because Section 13 of the MACMA allows the Attorney
1260

See generally, Jordanian Legislation, above n 1259.
US Department of State: Bureau of Consular Affairs, above n 1247.
1262
Australian Bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements, Australian Government: AttorneyGeneral’s Department <
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Extraditionandmutualassistance_Relationshipwithothercou
ntries_Australianbilateralmutualassistanceagreements> at 26 September 2008.
1263
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987(Cth) s12 (a).
1264
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987(Cth) s13 (a) (b).
1265
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987(Cth) s12 (b).
1266
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987(Cth) s14 (2).
1267
Attorney General Department, Mutual Assistance (2006) Australian Government <
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Extradition_and_mutual_assistanceMutual_assistance> at
28 September 2008.
1261

266

General of Australia, upon a request from Jordan, to search for and seize evidence
located in Australia and transmit the collected evidence to the requesting country.
c) USA
Section 28 U.S.C § 17821268 is an important legal instrument to obtain evidence located
in the USA. It has builds on what is called a Subpoena Duces Tecum.1269 It authorises
the US courts at the request, and on behalf, of a foreign jurisdiction to compel a
defendant to produce evidence.1270 It is commonly used by foreign jurisdictions to
obtain evidence located in the USA.1271 Although the use of the Subpoena Duces Tecum
suffices to obtain most documents and other tangible evidence, MLAT is necessary for
issuing a warrant authorising USA officers to conduct a search and seizure in response
to a foreign request.1272
US law enforcement agencies significantly rely on both bilateral and multilateral mutual
assistance agreements to obtain evidence located in another jurisdiction.1273 The USA
has bilateral MLATs with more than 80 countries around the world.1274 The objectives
of these treaties are mainly twofold. First, the USA wants the signatory country to
provide the requested evidence.1275 Second, the requested evidence should be provided
in a form that will be admissible in USA courts.1276 A MLAT is self-executing and the
scope of evidence available pursuant to a MLAT is not substantively limited by the
terms of 28 U.S.C. §1782. The US courts ruled that where a MLAT exists, the elements
of §1782 do not have to be met in order to provide assistance to a foreign jurisdiction
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invoking the MLAT. 1277 This point of view grants enforcement officers more scope to
deal with mutual assistance requests.

d) Comparative Legal Analysis
There is a consensus among scholars that the default letters rogatory regime is
inappropriate for cross-border investigation. This inappropriateness will be obvious in
cybercrime investigations because it is ill-suited to the requirement of swift action. The
letters rogatory regime operates slowly and is clogged with bureaucratic and diplomatic
procedures. Although the use of e-mail and other forms of electronic communications
may accelerate the transmission of letters rogatory, bureaucratic and diplomatic
procedures are likely to continue to hinder their speed and effectiveness. Therefore,
MLA is more appropriate for cross-border investigations.
The capability differences between Australia and the USA, on the one hand, and Jordan,
on the other hand, are quite striking. Jordan lacks practical experience, knowledge and
the legal tools to cooperate with foreign nations. Australia and the USA are actively
involved in international co-operation on criminal matters in the fight against
transnational crimes, including cybercrimes. The Australian MACMA and the USA
Section 28 U.S.C § 1782, as well as MLAT between the two countries, are legal
instruments used to obtain evidence located in a foreign state. Although these
instruments provide officers with tools necessary to deal with cross-border
investigation, none of them is sufficiently well adapted to the needs of particular digital
evidence because they have been designed to address the search for physical objects
and, therefore, are not effective in addressing cybercrime searches unless appropriate
amendments are made to these instruments.

9.3 Conclusion
The absence of physical borders in cyberspace makes the investigation of cybercrime
even more complicated, as procedures for obtaining evidence from abroad can be
cumbersome and somewhat daunting for developing countries such as Jordan. On the
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other hand, because of the absence of borders, investigating countries are able to hack
into a foreign network, server or computer to obtain evidence. However, because of the
doctrine of international comity and of the futility of unilateral action, as well as the
availability of cooperative assistance to access foreign data, countries often avoid acting
unilaterally. Instead, evidence situated in a foreign nation can be obtained only by
means of MLA or letters rogatory.
The letters rogatory regime may be used to obtain digital evidence, however, it is not a
practical tool for this purpose, because the nature and characteristics of cybercrime and
digital evidence require a timely response and expedient handling. Therefore, MLA
(whether in bilateral or multilateral form) is more appropriate for use in obtaining crossborder assistance. The classical forms of bilateral mutual legal assistance, which were
originally established to address traditional crimes, are currently used to provide
assistance in searching for and gathering digital evidence across-borders. This form is
much less capable of handling cybercrime investigations because the latter require swift
and decisive action and MLA is fraught with complications due to the bureaucratic
system it goes through.
The Convention on Cybercrime established a MLA regime designed and optimised
specifically to satisfy the particular needs of cross-border assistance in respect of
cybercrime. Although the Convention accelerated international co-operation in
cybercrime, it did not establish a global cybercrime police force to enforce the
Convention’s provisions and to investigate cross-border cybercrime. It is believed that
such an agency would encourage developed countries to join the Convention and to
fully implement its provisions.
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10 GENERAL CONCLUSION

Introduction
The key concern of this thesis has been to review and reconceptualise substantive and
procedural laws in Jordan in order to accommodate the search for and seizure of digital
evidence. Cybercrime is a new phenomenon in Jordan. As far as the author knows, there
are no formal published reports on cybercrime which explore the magnitude of the
problem or strategies to deal with it. As is evident in proceeding chapters, there is no
consolidated Jordanian cybercrime legislation in place although scattered provisions do
address specific types of cybercrimes. The dearth of law is further deepened by the
absence of any specific judicial precedential decisions on the issue. Therefore, the
author has contrasted and critically analysed the legislation, investigation models, and
judicial decisions in Australia and the USA, both of which have developed robust
responses to cybercrimes. Then the results found in the Jordanian, Australian, and the
US approaches on the one hand, and the particularity of cybercrime investigations on
the other hand, have been analysed and synthesised together to shed light on the optimal
approach to cybercrime investigation.
Chapters 3 and 4 analysed in detail the inadequacy of Jordanian substantive laws in
criminalising common types of cybercrimes. Chapter 5 compared and analysed
cybercrime investigation models and the challenges posed by privacy law and
encryption technology. Chapter 6 demonstrated the nature of digital evidence extracted
from cybercrime scenes and the legal approaches to this evidence. Then, chapters 7, 8
and 9 analysed in detail how traditional search and seizure procedures can be applied to
digital evidence in cybercrime investigations.
The aim of this final chapter is to summarise the major findings of the thesis and to
formulate specific recommendations for improvements in Jordanian national legislation
concerning cybercrime, cybercrime investigations, collection of digital evidence and
search and seizure procedures.
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10.1 Criminalisation of Cybercrime
The population of Internet users is increasing rapidly. At the same time, the quantity and
sophistication of cyber offences are also increasing. Therefore, Jordanian legislators
must quickly craft laws that effectively respond to cyberspace offences.
In terms of criminalisation, cybercrimes comprise no more than two main types: first,
new crimes invented for a technology-enabled environment like ‘a new wine in a new
bottle’ and, second, traditional crimes committed with the use of computers, like ‘an old
wine in a new bottle’. In the absence of a comprehensive cybercrime law in Jordan, a
handful of provisions either explicitly or implicitly criminalise some forms of
cybercrimes. They can be found scattered across various laws, for example, the
Jordanian Criminal Law 1960, Telecommunications Law 1995 and Electronic
Transactions Law 2001. These provisions are either too narrow or are inappropriate to
address all the forms of cybercrimes.
The Criminal Law 1961, which was formulated in the past century primarily to protect
property and tangible objects against traditional criminals, fails to criminalise various
forms of cybercrime, mainly because cybercrime is invisible, new, and the victims are
almost intangible. On the other hand, the Telecommunications Law 1995, which was
enacted before the arrival of the Internet revolution in Jordan, is inappropriate to address
cybercrime, because it is so broad in scope. It treats both physical and logical attacks
against electronic communications alike.
To close the loopholes in the above laws, Jordanian legislators passed the Electronic
Transactions Law in 2001. Although most of its provisions focus on electronic
transactions, Article 38 criminalises the use of computer systems to commit traditional
crimes. This article, however, is too narrow because it criminalises one aspect of
cybercrime. It does not apply to new crimes, such as computer hacking.
By contrast, Australia and the USA have been relatively successful in enacting
legislation specifically focused on cybercrime. The Australian Cybercrime Act 2001 and
the USA Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1984 (CFAA) are the backbone of antihacking and cybercrime laws in these countries.
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10.1.1 Cyberspace as the Target of the Crime
The most common types of cybercrime where cyberspace is the target of the crime are
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) related-crimes, cybertrespass, and cybersabotage.
In TCP related-crimes, legislators in the three countries studied avoided making any
specific references to the Denial of Service Attack and the Distributed Denial of Service
Attack attack, but rather aimed at setting out a broad framework addressing
communications interruption and impairment. The Jordanian Telecommunications Law
1995, however, mainly addresses physical attack against electronic communications,
because the communications installations and telecommunications traffic mentioned in
the law are physical devices, such as modems, and computers. However, specific types
of cybercrime, such as TCP attacks, can be prosecuted under the law because both
logical and physical attacks cripple communications traffic. This is problematic because
it treats alike all cybercriminals regardless of their motivations and objectives. A hacker
who breaks down a website, for example, could be punished as severely as a person
who attacks national infrastructure. On the other hand, the consequences of the illegal
physical attack may exceed the virtual world attack as it causes injuries to people and
property and the loss of human lives. Conversely, the Cybercrime Act 2001 and the
CFAA prohibit unauthorised prevention of electronic communication traffic to or from
a computer system and distinguish between minor and serious cybercrimes, imposing
harsh penalties in the latter cases.
Concerning cyber-trespass, the criminal intention is either to access without permission,
to exceed permission, to alter parts of or the entire computer system, or to commit
further crimes. The Telecommunications Law 1995, the Cybercrime Act 2001 and the
CFAA provide that a person is guilty of cybertrespass once he wilfully and knowingly
accesses a computer system illegally. The Telecommunications Law 1995, however,
does not apply if the legitimate user then exceeds her/his permission, or accesses
beyond a pre-determined period of time.
Concerning cybersabotage, the application of the Jordanian Criminal Law 1960 to
cyberspace poses a problem because it does not recognise the intangible nature of
digital programmes and data. Thus, deleting or modifying data and programmes without
damaging the physical medium, as a Trojan horse does, is not a crime. Also, the
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Telecommunications Law 1995 provision (76) only criminalises actions specifically
intended to inflict damage on the contents of a message being transmitted through a
communications network, but sabotage which goes beyond destruction of a mere
message, such as alteration of programmes or static data stored in a computer memory,
does not fall under the above provision. However, the Cybercrime Act 2001 and the
CFAA sufficiently and directly address all forms of cybersabotage.

10.1.2 Cyberspace as the Means of the Crime
Concerning cyber forgery, Jordanian laws and the CFAA fail to protect the forgery
digital documents, such as software dependent records, because they do not recognise
them as documents having legal efficacy or force. To criminalise cyber forgery, digital
records should be granted legal efficacy or the use of computers to forge digital records
or documents should be criminalised. Australian lawmakers provide a useful model of
this in the Crimes Act 1914. Jordanian lawmakers should come up with adequate laws to
close the loopholes that facilitate using computers to forge digital records.
Concerning cyberpornography, although the Criminal Law 1960 can be interpreted
extensively to apply to all forms of cyber pornography, including virtual characters, to
do so would contradict a core principle of criminal law, which is that criminal laws are
to be construed narrowly. In addition, the expansive application ignores any distinction
between adult and child pornography. Child pornography threatens the physical and
psychological well-being of children. Therefore, the punishment must be proportionate
to the crime. This is why the Cybercrime Act 2001 and the CFAA impose harsh
punishments on cyber-child pornography criminals.
Concerning cyber identity theft, the Criminal Law 1960 specifically addresses only two
forms of traditional identity theft: false identification and impersonating law officers.
The definitions of these crimes do not extend to cyberspace identity theft offences, such
as web spoofing, unless a physical appearance or I.D. card has been used for the
deception. Meanwhile, the Cybercrime Act 2001 criminalises unauthorised access to
computer systems with intent to commit or facilitate an offence, such as identity theft.
The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 1998 criminalises all forms of cyber
identity theft and the use of personal information of other people to defraud online.
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Concerning cyberstalking, the Jordanian Criminal Law 1960 only addresses physical
harm and different forms of physical sexual harassment. The Criminal Law 1960 can be
applied to cyberstalking only if the latter escalates into physical harm. It is therefore
inadequate because cyberstalking does not always escalate into physical harm. The
Australian Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other
Measures) Bill 2004 criminalises cyberstalking by addressing the use of
telecommunications services for menacing and harassing people. In the USA, the
Criminal and Crimes Procedure Act criminalises the transmission of any
communication in interstate or foreign commerce containing a threat to injure and
harass people.
Recommendations
The author recommends the urgent establishment of a comprehensive Jordanian law that
addresses cybercrime. Legislators should enact legislation defining the following
actions as crimes:


First, accessing the whole or any part of a computer system without
authorisation by infringing security measures.



Second, damaging, deleting or altering computer data without authorisation.



Third, seriously hindering without authorisation the functioning of a computer
system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, altering, or suppressing
computer data.



Fourth, inputting, altering and deleting data, resulting in inauthentic data with
the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were
authentic.



Fifth, offering or making available child pornography through a computer
system; distributing or transmitting child pornography through a computer
system; producing child pornography for the purpose of distribution through a
computer system.
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Sixth, transmitting any communication containing a threat to injure and harass
people.

10.2 Cybercrime Investigation Approaches and Challenges
Promulgating a criminalising law is only part of the solution. The other half of the
solution lies in streamlining and strengthening procedures concerning cybercrime
investigation and eliminating impediments to it.
The continuous growth in cybercrimes is jeopardising the capability of police
investigators to investigate almost any type of crime. Different types of cybercrimes are
perceived as a trivial or low-value and not worthy of investigation, while others are high
profile crimes. Parameters that specify which cybercrimes should be investigated and
which ones should not, should consider the cost and time of investigation, level of
effect, sophistication of the attack, nature of target, and significance of the target.
Therefore, the ‘Quality over Quantity’ approach applied to traditional crimes in the mid1970s to determine investigation priority, works to optimise cybercrime investigations
too. This would enhance law enforcement investigation management, by freeing
resources, such as staffing and equipment, to investigate high-profile cybercrimes only.
In Chapter 5, cybercrime investigation models developed by governmental and nongovernmental organisations and among computing experts were selected and examined
and compared with the Jordanian model. These models are intended to provide
incontestable proof that digital evidence was not contaminated and that it remained
intact during the computer forensic process. Optimality was not evident in any of these
models as no benchmark was available to measure each model’s robustness, nor does a
single widely accepted model exist for conducting and managing cybercrime
investigations. Forensic scholars, however, provide guidelines for crafting a model
yielding admissible digital evidence that can be used in court proceedings. First, the
model must include features that make it possible for investigators to protect the
cybercrime scene from contamination, hypothesise how the attack took place, collect
evidence, analyse the incident, reconstruct the crime scene, conduct a trace back
investigation, perform detailed analysis, and prepare a report.
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The model formulated and adopted by the Jordanian Computer Crime Unit (JCCU)
lacks comprehensiveness and it omits necessary steps. Although it addresses the proper
acquisition and preservation of computer evidence and its documentation, the
examination process, analysis, and reporting are not mentioned anywhere in the model.
Therefore, the JCCU’s model should be remodelled to clarify more aspects of
cybercrime investigation. Examination, analysis, and reporting processes should be
incorporated into the model.
A comprehensive and robust model is part of the approach to an effective investigation.
The other part is to eliminate or reduce obstacles and barriers that can be present when
investigating cybercrimes. Privacy restrictions and encryption are two common
obstacles that can prevent investigators from efficiently investigating cybercrimes.
In Jordan, privacy objections do not raise a legal concern for investigators, because
there are no laws or regulations that address the rules of cyberspace surveillance and
data collection. Although the Constitution specifically recognises a limited right to
privacy protection in relation to telephonic communications, this protection does not
extend to cyberspace because the latter is different from telegraphic and telephonic
communications. Encryption, on the other hand, is a concern as there is no effective
legal mechanism to compel a holder or third party to divulge the decryption keys. In
Jordan and the USA, police investigators have no power to compel offenders or a third
party to divulge encryption keys. Meanwhile, Australian police officers have been given
the power to do so.
Recommendations
The author recommends the urgent establishment of criteria and guidelines that quantify
and assess which cybercrimes should be investigated as priorities and whether they are
investigable. The guidelines should consider the following criteria: investigation cost
and time, level of effect, or what level of harm has been caused, and sophistication of
the attack, nature of the target, and the target’s significance.
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The JCCU’s model of cybercrime investigation should be remodelled to clarify more
aspects of cybercrime investigation, including the examination process, analysis and
reporting.
Law enforcement officers should be provided with a new legal mechanism to deal with
encrypted systems to prevent suspects and third parties from hiding or refusing to reveal
encryption keys.

10.3 Digital Evidence Admissibility
Enacting robust cybercrime laws and crafting effective investigation approaches are
fruitless efforts unless the collected digital evidence is admissible in the criminal trial.
Indeed, admissible, reliable digital evidence is essential to the success of cybercrime
investigation and prosecution.
Digital evidence typically exists in different data types and resides in different locations,
networks, or repositories. This makes the evidence very volatile and needy of more care
and diligence in its handling to achieve the highest possible standard of integrity and
admissibility. Thus, investigators must always ensure that the original version of the
evidence is kept intact and must make a mirror-image copy of it. There are two digital
instruments available to authenticate the mirror-image copy: Metadata and Hash value.
They play a critical role in authenticating digital evidence; however, their role should be
subject to regular judicial review to decide whether they adequately sustain data
integrity.
Jordanian laws addressing digital evidence lack comprehensiveness and breadth of
scope. The Electronic Transaction Law 2001 and Evidence Law 1952 demonstrate
incomplete understanding of digital evidence. The Electronic Transactions Law 2001
only admits electronic contracts and messages that are generated, sent, received or
stored electronically and the Evidence Law only admits e-mail and computer stored
evidence. As a result, many types of computer generated evidence, such as log files,
metadata, and hash value are beyond the ambit of Jordanian laws because they are
neither electronic contracts nor messages. On the other hand, although the Credit
Information Law 2003 and Banking Law 2000 admitted the two broad types of digital
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evidence (i.e. computer generated and computer stored evidence), their scope and
application are narrow because they are applicable only to a limited range of cases,
namely for credit information and banking disputes. Finally, although, the Criminal
Procedure Law 1961 provides judges with discretionary power to admit any relevant
evidence which they deem to have probative value, the judges lack the necessary
knowledge and training in the field of cyber law and, consequently, they will be hesitant
to accept digital evidence. By contrast, the Australian and the US legislatures amended
the rules of evidence to include both computer generated and computer stored evidence.
Recommendations
The author recommends the urgent revision of current Jordanian legislation to recognise
the two broad types of digital evidence and to enable the exact duplicate copy to be
admitted into evidence in lieu of the original copy. In addition, courts should be fitted
with appropriate visual or computerised equipment necessary for displaying or
illustrating digital evidence.

10.4 Searching and Seizing Digital Evidence with a Warrant
Law enforcement officers, judges, lawyers, and prosecutors in Jordan are not fully
aware of the extent to which digital information impacts on search and seizure concepts.
The unique nature of digital evidence in cybercrime investigations requires the
formulation and use of a specifically designed cyber search warrant. The following
issues are indispensable to the newly formulated warrant. First, the search authorisation
can be obtained instantly without the need for a signature. Second, the search must be
conducted by highly experienced forensic officers. Third, a warrant must protect
individual privacy by restricting the boundaries of the search but this specificity does
not preclude a certain level of generality, in case a precise description of the subject of
the search is not attainable.

The terms of the cybercrime search warrant should include restrictions on the scope and
location of the search and should be premised on the existence of reasonable cause to
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justify the search. Restrictions force investigators to search and seize only the items
listed in the search warrant and to ensure that the items identified in the warrant are
properly related to the crime committed.

1) Threshold for Issuing a Cyber Search Warrant
Search warrant regimes should create a balance between privacy protection and crime
detection requirements. Legislators have set out several conditions to be fulfilled before
a court or General Prosecutor issues a search warrant. These conditions are the
reasonable cause threshold for search warrant issuance, the subject matter of the search
and its scope.
a) Probable cause
A problem encountered by investigators in drafting cyber search warrants is the
difficulty of establishing probable cause. The statement of probable cause must contain
factual evidence linking both the criminal activity with the item to be seized, and the
item to be seized with the place to be searched. In some scenarios, Internet Service
Providers can play a significant role in identifying the link between the items described
in the warrant and the physical place to be searched by providing investigators with the
Internet Protocol address identifying the suspected physical location.
The probable cause threshold set by Jordanian law is low. A warrant can be obtained if
any one of the three following circumstances has occurred: a visual observation of a
crime, or information provided by other citizens about the crime, or an occupant of the
property’s request for a search. Accordingly, it authorises investigators to obtain a
search warrant without the need for a reasonable ground or factual information linking
the evidence to be searched with the physical location. Similarly, to issue a search
warrant, the Australian Crimes Act 1914 and US courts request a reasonable ground to
believe that the search will uncover evidence of a crime. This threshold is applicable to
a cyber search warrant without any problems. For example, an undercover investigator
posing as a minor will be able to obtain a cyber search warrant because of his visual
observation of the crime.
With a cybercrime warrant, however, the problem arises when the courts require factual
information which forms a link between the evidence to be searched with the physical
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location because, in some cases, the Internet Protocol addressing system offers the user
anonymity, which makes locating the suspect’s physical location impossible.
Recommendations
The author does not believe that probable cause requires establishing factual
information which links the items to be seized and the place to be searched, particularly
when officers are able to obtain evidence remotely without the need for physical access
to the suspect’s property.

b) Subject of the Search Warrant
In cybercrime, the data itself is contraband, evidence or the instrument of a crime, thus
the subject of the search will be for intangible items, such as data, images, files, and so
on.
The current Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 permits officers to seize visible
and tangible objects and specifies that the subject of the search warrant is either a
physical place or an individual. The lack of recognition of intangible data as an object
under the law of search and seizure is problematic. By contrast, Australian legislation
precisely describes the subject of the search as both tangible items and ‘data’. It
provides law enforcement officers with the resources which they need to search for and
seize intangible evidence. In addition, the US Supreme Court has expanded the
definition of property to include data that may be seized under search warrant rules.

Recommendations
Jordanian law should be amended to explicitly permit the search and seizure of
intangible materials. This can be achieved by inserting the word ‘data’ in provision 1/86
after the word ‘things’.

c) Scope of the Search Warrant
Particularity or specificity is required in a search warrant, which means that the search
warrant should be issued for a particular crime, to search a particular place, and to seize
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particular items. The common practice in cybercrime investigation scenes is that the
investigators create a mirror copy of the hard disk.
Two approaches have emerged to define the scope of a digital search, i.e. restrictive and
non-restrictive approaches. The first approach constrains investigators from searching
the entire mirror copy and opening a variety of files, while the non-restrictive approach
allows investigators to conduct an unlimited search if there is plenty of time and
uncertainty about what evidence being sought and to seize evidential materials.
Although the restrictive approach protects privacy, it poses considerable difficulties for
investigators to sufficiently search and seize evidence because the ability of the
investigators to separate between incriminating and non-suspect data is difficult.
In Jordan, none of the above approaches have so far been adopted. The broad language
of the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961, however, might allow officers to create
a mirror copy search and conduct unlimited search.
In Australia, the non-restrictive approach is adopted. The Crimes Act 1914 authorises
investigators to rummage through data first and then make a mirror copy and seize only
evidential material. In contrast, some courts in the USA have ruled that investigators
must engage in the intermediate step of sorting various types of documents and then
only search the ones specified in a warrant. The Ninth Circuit Court, however, has set a
new precedent to permit the non-restrictive approach in certain circumstances.
Recommendations
The Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 should expressly entitle investigators to
create a mirror copy and to rummage through data to determine the items that should be
seized. Simultaneously, the law must restrain investigators from rummaging through
non-suspect data unless a more precise description is impossible, or the circumstances
make it difficult to describe the items to be seized or the size of data is very large.
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2) Execution of the Cyber Search Warrants
The execution of a cyber search warrant differs considerably from a traditional search. It
involves two stages, i.e. pre-digital and digital searching. The first one mimics the first
stage of the traditional search procedure, i.e. knock and announcement. The second
stage involves unique procedures conducted by forensic officers off-site. Although the
two stages of search are apparently separate, each impinges on the other. Procedures
executed in the pre-digital phase may indirectly affect the later digital search in a
negative way. For example, in some scenarios, the notifying procedure of the search
warrant execution gives the suspect opportunities to destroy, contaminate or hide
incriminating evidence.
In Jordan, although the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 authorises investigators to
conduct a search without notifying the suspect in advance, it requires the defendant’s
presence during search execution or a representative, such as a lawyer, or two witnesses,
or a local notary.
In a similar manner, the Australian Crimes Act 1914 obliges investigators to announce
their presence and authority. It also requires investigators to hand the occupier of the
premises a copy of the warrant.
In contrast, the USA PATRIOT Act authorises the executing officers to perform what is
called a ‘sneak and peek’ search. This warrant authorises investigators to search,
observe, copy, download or transmit computer files without notifying the occupier of
the premises.
Recommendations
The knock and announcement prior to entry requirement must be narrowly applied in
relation to a cyber search warrant in order to prevent the suspect from having any
opportunity to destroy, contaminate or hide incriminating evidence. Indeed, the law
must authorise the investigators to execute a ‘sneak and peek’ warrant in a cybercrime
investigation when there is a factual basis for believing that announcement would result
in the destruction of the evidence.
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3) Who Should Accompany the Officers Executing the Search
Cybercrime searches have a unique nature which requires a specialised group of
investigators technicians, evidence custodians, forensic examiners and forensic analysts.
In Jordan, the Criminal Procedure Law 1961 requires the attendance of two groups of
people, namely, police officers executing the warrant and witnesses, i.e. two local
witnesses or a local notary. The latter’s attendance is, of course, impractical and even
not feasible in cyber searches due to the off-site investigation and use of remote
searches.
In a different manner, the Australian Crimes Act 1914 authorises investigators to
terminate the occupier’s presence if s/he impedes the search. In the USA, the presence
of the occupier of the premises during the search is not a requirement.

Recommendations
The Criminal Procedure Law 1961 must be amended to allow enforcement officers to
conduct a search in cases of cybercrimes without the attendance of two local witnesses
or a local notary.

4) Search Location
Moving computer hardware off-site for criminal investigation purposes can jeopardise
businesses and the individuals who depend on them. Similarly, conducting a search onsite for a long duration of time also negatively affects business and individuals’ working
lives.
There are basically two viewpoints about whether computer searches should be
conducted on-site or off-site. The majority of scholars support the off-site search. The
Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 provides officers with absolute discretionary
power to determine the appropriate measures for executing a search warrant. There is a
somewhat different approach in Australia and the US. The decision to investigate onsite or off-site is discretionary but depends on the circumstances of a case. For example,
the off-site search is permissible if the search would take days or weeks to find the
specific information.
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Recommendations
The Jordanian investigators’ discretionary powers should not be left without guidance
concerning the search location. Investigators should be given the needed power to move
computers off-site only when it is not reasonable and practicable to conduct the digital
search on-site.

10.5 Search and Seizure without a Warrant
Although the Jordanian Constitution enshrines the privacy of dwellings, it allows a
limited exception in which law enforcement officers may enter private properties
without a search warrant in specific circumstances prescribed by the law to protect life
and property, preserve evidence, or to search for evidence and to make an arrest. Thus,
the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 addresses search warrant exceptions.
Unfortunately, though, developments in information technology and the emergence of
new criminal offences with new modi operandi have made the Act less responsive to the
demand of digital searches.
In comparison, the Australian Crimes Act 1914 and US courts have developed a number
of exceptions to the warrant requirements. Important legal precedents have been set in
recent years which play a substantial role in applying search exceptions to digital
evidence.

1) Exigent circumstances
Legal systems acknowledge that urgent circumstances require swift action to prevent
imminent destruction of evidence. The core problem of the exigent circumstance
exception in cybercrime is the scope of the search and whether the doctrine allows
officers to conduct a thorough digital search or just the seizure of the physical
components. Jordan, Australia and the USA each approach the exigent circumstances
exception differently.
The Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 provides law enforcement officers with
the necessary power to enter and perform a search without a warrant under three limited
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circumstances: (1) a crime is about to be committed; (2) a crime is being committed;
and (3) a crime has just been committed. It does not allow search in order to prevent
imminent destruction of evidence. Therefore, a Jordanian scholar has argued that the
three circumstances are illustrative only and not intended to be exclusive and, therefore,
investigators are authorised to act to prevent imminent destruction of evidence. He
added that the exigent circumstances doctrine must not allow investigators to perform a
search, but only to seize evidence. In the digital context, Jordanian courts have not yet
examined this doctrine.
In Australia, the Crimes Act 1914 justifies searches without a warrant to prevent the
evidence from being concealed, lost or destroyed. Similarly, US courts have ruled that
the fragile nature of digital evidence authorises the search under the exigent
circumstances doctrine.

Recommendations
Jordanian law should be amended to provide investigators with the right type of power
to seize and search electronic storage devices and evidence in exigent circumstances in
which there is an immediate danger of losing data, or to prevent the imminent
destruction of electronic devices and hardware components.

2) Consent
Consent to search is a very important exception that is made to allow a swift search or
extend a search without the need for formal prior authorisation through the issue of an
official search warrant.
Jordanian law does not recognise the concept of defendant’s consent to search his home.
Instead, it permits a warrantless search upon a request from the owner or the occupier of
the premises. This is very different to the situation in Australia and the USA, where
consent to search is a well recognised exception to the usual search warrant
requirements.
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Recommendations
Jordanian law should provide officers with a similar power to seize and search
electronic storage devices and evidence upon consent given by the owner or occupier of
premises.
Although, no fundamental problem exists in applying consent to digital searches,
defining the scope of the consent and who may give it constitute the unresolved
concerns pertaining to digital searches.
a) Scope of Consent
In regard to the scope of consent, the question arises as to whether the police officers
can go beyond the limits of search set by the consenting person. For example, can
answers to these questions be implemented?
1) Can consent to search a physical place extend to searching digital devices

located on the property?
2) Can consent to examination of a compact disk extend to search of a PC’s hard

drive, or
3) Can consent to examine JEPG files extend to MP3 files?

In Jordan and Australia, in the absence of legislative provisions and judicial precedent
on this matter, law enforcement officers are not restrained from rummaging through
electronic devices and extending the search beyond the specified area of the property. In
the USA, courts have delivered contradictory decisions on this issue. Some courts have
approved searches that exceeded the scope of consent, while others have rejected the
extension of a physical search to a search for digital evidence.

Recommendations
To avoid the potential invalidation of the search, the author supports suggestions that
law enforcement officers must present a written consent form delineating the scope of
the consent in order to clarify in advance the boundaries of the consent search. For
example, the form will show precisely the search limits, and how the officers will carry
out the search and whether he is going to extend the search.
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b) Third Party Consent
Third party consent is very important because computers, networks and the Internet are
often shared between multiple users, such as family members, roommates and work
colleagues. It takes two forms: local and remote consents. These forms of consent
enable individuals associated with, but other than the suspect person against whom
evidence is sought, to validly consent to a search of the suspect person’s computer.
In Jordan, third party consent is not recognised by the law. Instead, law enforcement
officers are authorised to search any private premises without a search warrant if they
are companied by a local notary or two local witnesses to observe the search process.
In Australia and the USA, third party consent is valid as long as the consenting party
has equal rights of possession and control of the property or has apparent authority over
the computer to be searched. For example, because spouses live together and may share
a computer, then one or the other may consent to a search.

Recommendations
Jordanian law should be amended to permit all forms of third party consent and not
require third party attendance (i.e. by two local witnesses or a local notary) because
their attendance in cybercrime is impracticable and disruptive to the search process.
However, the consenting third party must have joint access or control over the
defendant’s computer.
c) Workplace searches
Workplace computers and networks are important in cybercrime investigation because
of the high percentage of cybercrimes that occur in workplaces. Thus, law enforcement
officers can take advantage of workplace access to conduct searches and, more
importantly, to obtain consent to conduct warrantless searches.
The Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961 and Australian Crimes Act 1914,
respectively, do not address workplace searches. While the problem is more
complicated in Jordan because third party consent is not recognised by the law, in
Australia, an employer’s consent would be governed by rules relating to third party
consent principles.
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In the USA, the workplace’s policies, regulations, instructions and practices may reduce
an employee’s expectation of privacy and, therefore, employers can consent to
investigators to search. The Courts have ruled that employers exercise common
authority over employees’ offices and workplace computers and that the common
authority validates consent to search workplace computers.

Recommendations
Jordanian law should be amended to permit law enforcement officers to obtain consent
from employers who have common authority over the employees’ computers to conduct
workplace searches.

3) Plain View
The plain view doctrine allows investigators to observe or to seize but not to search
evidence of a crime, even though the crime is not the one that the investigator was
authorised to investigate or to seize evidence for. Usually, it occurs during the execution
of a search warrant or arrest, when contraband not described in the search warrant is
observed and seized.
The unique aspects of digital evidence and its forensic tools, which capture every bit of
digital information stored on a hard drive, including latent data and closed files, make it
difficult to apply the plain view doctrine. Those data are not apparent immediately and
officers must open, download, or run specific applications to observe an object’s
contents. Therefore, some scholars have suggested limiting the application of the plain
view doctrine to digital searches; others have suggested that the doctrine should not
apply in computer searches since it unduly extends the scope of the search. While the
latter recommendation is appealing from the point of view of privacy advocates, it
would undermine law enforcement efforts in tackling crimes.
Jordanian law does not provide much direction on whether officers may seize
incriminating digital evidence discovered inadvertently. From the general meaning of
Articles 82 and 87 of the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law 1961, however, it can be
inferred that investigators may seize an object not described in a warrant if the object
itself is in plain view and its incriminating nature is immediately apparent.
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Australian law explicitly authorises officers to seize digital evidence not described in a
warrant if it presents itself in plain view.
In the USA, courts have taken different positions, some overruling investigators’
authority to open files they see as suspicious, others upholding investigators’ authority
to open files and discover evidence of criminal activity other than that described in the
warrant.

Recommendations
Because electronic storage devices are increasing in capacity and increasing the
likelihood of encountering incriminating objects not described in the search warrant,
investigators should be given the power to open suspicious files and seize evidence
presenting itself in plain view.

4) Search incident to a lawful arrest
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is the most common exception to the search
warrant requirements. It is based upon the necessity to preserve evidence of a crime
and/or to protect the suspects, officers or others from possible danger. The search of
digital devices incidental to a lawful arrest is crucial due to the fact that digital evidence
is fragile and delicate, liable to damage, and susceptible to alteration or concealment.
Scholars have debated whether a search incidental to arrest should allow officers to
conduct a thorough search of the digital contents. Some scholars have rejected the
search power arguing that the unique nature and characteristics of digital data require
treatment different from tangible items and that the search should be confined to the
physical device only and not to the digital contents.
Laws in Jordan and Australia authorise officers to search items or premises incident to a
lawful arrest. In the absence of a judicial position on the issue, the traditional practice
of search and seizure incidental to arrest would allow officers to search when they
encounter a person carrying or possessing a digital device. In the USA, the courts have
upheld the validity of a search of digital contents incidental to a lawful arrest.

289

Recommendations
The author supports the idea of confining the search and seizure incidental to arrest to
the electronic device only to avoid digital evidence contamination, privacy invasion and
misuse of personal data. Thus, investigators must obtain a warrant to conduct a
thorough search.

10.6 Cross-border Searches and Seizures
Cyberspace has no geographic boundaries. Cybercriminals can commit cybercrimes
without leaving their desks, while law enforcement agencies are encumbered by
physical borders. Law enforcement investigation power in cybercrime can often not be
performed effectively without assistance from other states or countries. Even though
law enforcement and intelligence co-operation is increasing, it is substantially
influenced by political, cultural and legal factors. The existence of the political will to
assist and of cultural consistency, as well as robust legal instruments in each
jurisdiction, are vital for successful cross-border investigations. A good relationship and
willingness to help each other in cross-border investigations usually contributes to the
success of cross-border investigations. However, cultural factors may be of less
negative effect in cybercrime investigations because there are few discrepancies in
cybercrime criminalisation policy.
The classical forms of mutual legal assistance, which were originally established to
address traditional crimes, seem less capable of handling searches of digital evidence
because digital evidence requires swift and decisive action for which the normal search
and seizure procedures are not well suited. Therefore, the Convention on Cybercrime
adopted new specific procedures for improving and strengthening international cooperation in cybercrime investigations. Expedited preservation of stored computer data
located within the territory of a member, expedited disclosure of preserved traffic data,
search and seizure across borders, and real-time collection of traffic data are new
procedures for mutual legal assistance with respect to mechanisms particularly
necessary for rapid effective co-operation in cybercrime investigations.
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Jordan’s involvement in cross-border cybercrime investigations is hindered by its lack
of an adequate legal basis necessary to set up, facilitate and process mutual legal
assistance. In contrast, Australia and the USA are actively involved in international cooperation on criminal matters in the fight against transnational crimes, including
cybercrimes. The Australian Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 and the
US Section 28 U.S.C § 1782 as well as the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the
two countries are legal instruments used to obtain evidence located in a foreign state.

Recommendations
The author recommends the urgent enactment of Jordanian domestic legislation on
mutual assistance in criminal matters that would incorporate provisions necessary for
the success of mutual legal assistance in cybercrime investigations. The statute should
establish a central authority responsible for receiving and processing assistance requests
and it should empower General Prosecutors to issue expedited requests for the
preservation of data stored by Internet Service Providers and its disclosure on request.
The data should be preserved for as long a period of time as necessary, up to a
maximum of 90 days, unless an extension is granted.

10.7 Closing Comments
The Author hopes that recommendations made in this research will support efforts to
strengthen law enforcement efficiency in the investigation of cybercrimes. He also
hopes that the research findings will provide a useful source for Jordanian General
Prosecutors, lawyers, judges and students of law and that the findings will encourage
law-makers and regulators to enact a comprehensive cybercrime law and enhance
investigations and international co-operation to counter cybercrimes. Also, the author
hopes that the research will pave the way for more research in the area. Cybercrime
investigation and digital evidence studies are still in their infancy, particularly in Jordan,
and to date there has been little interdisciplinary research. Shariah law and cybercrime,
the behaviour of Middle Eastern hackers, cyber-sectarian and the geographical aspects
of cybercrime (i.e. within the Arab world) are very rarely examined.
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]اﻟﺠﻨﺎﺋﯿﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺟﺮاﺋﻢ اﻟﺘﺰوﯾﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺤﺮارات ﻓﻘﮭﺎء وﻗﻀﺎء.
أﻣﻞ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﻋﺜﻤﺎن, Criminal Procedure Law Explanation (Alaeldin Mansour Maghaireh
trans, 1975 ) [Trans of: ]ﺷﺮح ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻻﺟﺮاءات اﻟﺠﻨﺎﺋﯿﺔ.
 ﻗﺴﻢ ﺟﺮاﺋﻢ اﻟﺤﺎﺳﻮب,  ادارة اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺒﺮات و اﻻدﻟﺔ اﻟﺠﺮﻣﯿﺔ,ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻻﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺎم, اﻻدﻟﺔ اﻟﺮﻗﻤﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺴﺮح اﻟﺠﺮﯾﻤﺔ
Computer & Cyber Crime Digital Evidence, (Alaeldin Mansour Maghaireh, trans
unpublished) [trans of: ] اﻻدﻟﺔ اﻟﺮﻗﻤﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺴﺮح اﻟﺠﺮﯾﻤﺔ.
ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﻋﻠﻢ, the Law of Criminal Procedures (Alaeldin Maghaireh, trans) [ trans of ﻗﺎﻧﻮن
]اﻻﺟﺮاءات اﻟﺠﻨﺎﺋﯿﺔ.
ﻋﻼء اﻟﺪﯾﻦ ﻣﻨﺼﻮر ﻣﻐﺎﯾﺮة, The Modern Aspect of Information Crimes: comparative study
(Alaeldin Mansour Maghaireh trans, 2000) [trans of: اﻻوﺟﮫ اﻟﺤﺪﯾﺜﺔ ﻟﻠﺠﺮاﺋﻢ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﯿﺔ " دراﺳﺔ
]ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ.

ﻋﺼﺎم اﻟﻄﻮاﻟﺒﺔ, Computer Search and Seizure Procedures (Alaeldin Mansour Maghaireh
trans, 2003) [trans of ]اﺟﺮاءات اﻟﺒﺤﺚ و اﻟﺘﻔﯿﺶ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻜﻤﺒﯿﻮﺗﺮ
ﺳﺎﻣﻲ اﻟﺸﻮا, Informatics Fraud as a new phenomenon (Alaeldin Mansour Maghaireh
trans, 1993) [trans of: ]اﻟﻐﺶ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﻲ ﻛﻈﺎھﺮة اﺟﺮاﻣﯿﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﺤﺪﺛﺔ.

ﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﯾﻦ ﺟﻤﺎل اﻟﺪﯾﻦ, the Validity of Search Procedures (Alaeldin Maghaireh trans,
2005) [trans of: []اﻟﻄﻌﻦ ﻓﻲ اﺟﺮاؤات اﻟﺘﻔﺘﯿﺶ.

ﻛﻤﺎل اﺣﻤﺪ, The Practical Principles of Computer Crime Investigation (Alaeldin
Maghaireh trans, 2002 Unpublished [trans of: ]اﻻﺻﻮل اﻟﻔﻨﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﻓﻲ ﺟﺮاﺋﻢ اﻟﺤﺎﺳﻮب.
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ﻛﺎﻣﻞ اﻟﺴﻌﯿﺪ, Computer and Information Technology Crimes (Alaeldin Mansour
Maghaireh trans, 1993). [trans of: ]ﺟﺮاﺋﻢ اﻟﻜﻤﺒﯿﻮﺗﺮ واﻟﺠﺮاﺋﻢ اﻻﺧﺮي ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل اﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﯿﺎ.

ﻛﺎﻣﻞ اﻟﺴﻌﯿﺪ, Explanation of the Criminal Procedure Law: Analytical Comparative Study
(Alaeldin Maghaireh trans, 2005) [ trans of:  دراﺳﺔ ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻠﺔ: ﺷﺮح ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﺻﻮل اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻛﻤﺎت اﻟﺠﺰاﺋﯿﺔ
] ﺗﺎﺻﯿﻠﯿﺔ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﮫ

ﻗﺪري ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻔﺘﺎح اﻟﺸﮭﺎوي, Search Disciplines in the Egyptian Law: Comparative Study
(Alaeldin Mansour Maghaireh trans, 2005) [trans of: ﺿﻮاﺑﻂ اﻟﺘﻔﺘﯿﺶ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﯾﻊ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي
]واﻟﻤﻘﺎرن.
ﻣﺤﻤﻮد ﻧﺠﯿﺐ ﺣﺴﻨﻲ, “ Criminal Code explanation – crimes division (Alaeldin Mansour
Maghaireh trans, 1992) [trans of: اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺨﺎص-]ﺷﺮح ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﻌﻘﻮﺑﺎت.

 ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻻﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺎم اﻻردﻧﻲ, Annual Report, Department of Laboratories and Criminal
Evidence (Alaeldin Mansour Maghaireh trans, 2002) [trans of:  ادارة اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺒﺮات,اﻟﺘﻘﺮﯾﺮ اﻟﺴﻨﻮي
]واﻻدﻟﺔ اﻟﺠﺮﻣﯿﺔ.

 ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻻﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺎم اﻻردﻧﻲ, Environmental Police Department (Alaeldin Mansour Maghaireh
trans) [trans of: ] إدارة اﻟﺸﺮطﺔ اﻟﺒﯿﺌﯿﺔ.
http://www.psd.gov.jo/arabic/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=62&Item
id=139> 7 December 2006.
 ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺔ اﻻﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺎم اﻻردﻧﻲ, Public Security Directorate: Overview and Achievements
(Alaeldin Mansour Maghaireh trans) [trans of: ]اﻻﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺎم ﻓﻲ ﺳﻄﻮر ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ واﻧﺠﺎز.
<http://www.psd.gov.jo/arabic/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=571&It
emid=384> at 7 December 2006.

ھﻼﻟﻲ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻼه اﺣﻤﺪ, Searching Computer Systems and Suspect’s Rights: Comparative
Study (Alaeldin Maghaireh, trans 1997) [trans of:  دراﺳﺔ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ: ﺗﻔﺘﯿﺶ ﻧﻈﻢ اﻟﺤﺎﺳﺐ اﻻﻟﻲ و
]ﺿﻤﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﮭﻢ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت.
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